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The role of bank governance: 
Evidence from market discipline, 
capital structure, ownership structure, 
risk taking and political connection 
 
Abstract 
Banks, like other business firms, must attract outside funding within competitive capital 
markets, must face competition in product, and must deal with corporate governance 
issues deriving from agency problems and asymmetric information. Corporate 
governance in banks is unique compared to non-financial firms, with factors such as 
higher opaqueness, heavy regulations, and government interventions, which thus require 
distinct analysis. Although it is well recognised that corporate governance can affect 
bank value, in this thesis I combine external and internal corporate governances by 
considering board composition and ownership structure, as well as trading behaviour on 
stock markets. The main objective of this thesis is to study empirically the impact of 
various governance mechanisms on bank stability, in terms of capital strategy, 
risk-taking and performance.  
 
The finding is that there exists a significantly positive relationship between market 
discipline and bank capital structure. In addition, over-performing banks attract a high 
level of informed trading, which in turn leads to a higher level of capital buffer held by 
a bank. Also, banks with strong corporate governance are associated with higher 
risk-taking. More specifically, banks that have an intermediate board size, a separation 
between the CEO and the chairman of board, and are audited by the Big Four audit firm, 
are likely to take higher risks. Banks with more state shareholders also tend to have 
poorer performances, and banks with higher domestic and private shareholders 
generally operate more profitably. Ownership type diversity is associated with better 
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bank performance, while banks with concentrated ownership are worse performing. 
Finally, banks with political connections distribute more credit than nonpolitically 
connected banks. The results have certain policy implications for understanding the role 
of governance in affecting bank operations that, in turn, could improve bank prudency 
and assist the design of an enhanced regulation framework. Regulators should reduce 
protection, improve banks’ asset quality, and strengthen market discipline. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The concept of corporate governance is relevant to all firms globally, but it still has no 
generally accepted definition. Corporate governance can be defined as the system of 
laws, rules and factors that control operations in a company (Gillan and Starks, 1998). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as the ways in which investors 
supply finance to corporations to ensure a return on their investment. Thus, corporate 
governance can act as a group of mechanisms used by stakeholders to ensure managers 
maximise shareholder wealth. These mechanisms refer to the methods used by 
shareholders to reduce managerial agency costs, such as board composition, voting rules 
and mangers shareholding. Gillan (2006) develops a corporate governance framework 
that separates two aspects of governance systems: internal and external corporate 
governance. Internal governance is related to the role of the board (such as CEO duality 
and the proportion of independent directors, and shareholding of executives), capital 
structures, antitakeover measures, internal control systems and management 
compensation. These internal mechanisms used by shareholders would motivate and 
constrain management’s behavior to mitigate the conflict between managers and 
shareholders. External governance covers regulations and laws, capital markets and 
product market competition. Therefore, the effectiveness of corporate governance is 
largely determined by these internal and external factors, which in turn, affects firm 
value.  
 
Banks, as with other business firms, must attract outside funding in competitive capital 
markets, face competition with regard to products, and deal with corporate governance 
issues deriving from agency problems and asymmetric information. In addition, banks 
impact economic growth, poverty, entrepreneurship, labour market conditions, and the 
economic opportunities that are available to people. Because of these impacts, financial 
institutions are more able to cause a systemic event with possibly catastrophic market 
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effects. Indeed, healthy banking systems exert a significant impact on economic growth 
and development. The subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical 
importance in the banking sector. A typical modern commercial bank engages in 
securities, insurance and real estate activities, or owns other nonfinancial firms, so that 
neither private nor public official entities can effectively monitor such a complex entity. 
These idiosyncrasies make it more difficult to be monitored by outsider stakeholders. In 
addition, the qualities of a bank’s loan assets are not always clearly perceived and are 
often obscure, as are the financial statements, which often prove to be complicated and 
not transparent with regard to information. Furthermore, as compared with 
non-financial corporations, banks' financial statements reflect significantly higher 
leverage. For instance, the debt component commonly comprises around 90 per cent of 
a bank's capital structure, and the existence of government-backed financial safety nets 
can significantly reduce incentives for depositors to monitor a bank’s risk-taking 
behavior. Thus, the role and the profile of risk management in financial institutions have 
been put under scrutiny. All these are confirmed by Morgan (2002), who argues that 
banks are extraordinarily complex and opaque. Hence, corporate governance would play 
a special role in the banking sector due to these opaque or complex organisational 
structures. 
 
Corporate governance in banks is unique in a manner not applied to non-financial firms. 
Banks have their own particularities, such as higher opaqueness, heavy regulations and 
interventions by governments (Levine, 2004), which require a distinct analysis of 
corporate governance issues. Thus, public policy makers around the world have started 
to question the appropriateness of the current corporate governance that is applied and 
exercised in financial institutions. For instance, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision has paid attention to the need to study, understand and improve corporate 
governance in banks (Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, BCBS, 2010). 
The Committee believes that good corporate governance is crucial to guaranteeing a 
stable financial system and, consequently, a country’s economic development. These 
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proposals were designed to strengthen bank governance with a view to promoting a 
more resilient banking sector. In addition, with recent calls from regulators and the 
ensuing banking reforms, the world corporate governance landscape has changed 
dramatically during the past few years. As the banking reforms take hold and new 
regulations evolve, information on these changes are becoming available and it is the 
time to ask new questions and explore unresolved issues. Furthermore, the wave of bank 
collapses and scandals in the last decade has stimulated the drive for improved 
corporate governance. However, the majority of the existing body of literature tends to 
focus more on governance for non-financial companies and excludes financial firms 
from its sample. Therefore, we know little about the effectiveness of corporate 
governance in the banking sector. As a result, it is an opportune moment for governance 
researchers to add to our understanding of governance systems.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the assessment of the types of reforms in 
bank governance that work best to achieve well-functioning banking systems. I classify 
my research into four streams based on the questions and the underlying economic 
issues being studied in banking sector. Specifically, I focus on research examining: (1) 
how the market discipline affects bank capital; (2) the relationship between bank 
corporate governance bank risk taking; (3) how the ownership structure affects bank 
performance and (4) the relationship between political connection and bank lending 
behavior. In short, this thesis spans several aspects of governance systems within the 
banking sector. 
 
1.2 Market discipline and bank capital  
Bank capital can be interpreted as equity, as the holders have the right to liquidate; it 
can also be interpreted as debt, where holders exercise their right only if there is a 
default. A lower survival probability bank can be defined as one that has insufficient 
capital. Therefore, bank capitalisation strategies are the fundamental issues in 
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determining the survival of a bank, both at the individual bank level and at the systemic 
level. 
 
In banking, the presence of supervisions reduces the need for governance from other 
stakeholders. Due to the increasing complexity and opacity of banking organisations, 
however, regulators have recently begun to draw attention to market discipline. Bank 
supervisors have focused more intensely on using market information to enhance the 
process of identifying risks in the banking sectors. In addition, the standard corporate 
finance determinants have little explanatory power relative to regulation determinants 
over the bank capital structure. Furthermore, bank safety systems are difficult to design 
and implement because they have the conflicting objectives of protecting depositors 
while reducing bank incentives to engage in risky activities.  
 
A general financial market is the production and aggregation of information. The role of 
financial market investors in disciplining listed banks is not straightforward. This occurs 
through the trading process that transmits information produced by investors for their 
own speculative trading into market prices. In addition, financial markets may enhance 
investment efficiency because they provide valuable information to managers. The 
trading results in the formation of the stock price that is informative about the investor’s 
activity. Managers can thus learn from the information in stock prices about the 
prospects of their decision-making. Surprisingly, market discipline from informed 
trading has not played a central role in the empirical bank capital literature, despite the 
potentially fertile ground for studying the effects of the credit market on bank 
risk-taking.  
 
The main findings in this chapter show that there is a fundamental tension between the 
informativeness of stock prices and bank capital. A significantly positive relationship 
between market discipline and the bank capital structure is being found. In another word, 
banks with a high level of informed trading are more likely to adjust their capital ratio 
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tightly. In addition, banks with better performance levels respond more promptly to 
stock prices as a source of information for monitoring. Indeed, a more informative stock 
price allows banks to reap more of the benefits of efficient investments. My findings 
complement the existing literature on the determinants of bank capital build up. 
 
1.3 Corporate governance and bank risk taking 
The financial crisis of 2008 has changed the world financial system in many different 
ways. Bank risk-taking is an important issue that has been reemphasised by the financial 
crisis and the subsequent attempts to reformulate the nature of global banking 
regulations. To improve risk reporting and management practices, regulators take steps 
to produce positive impacts on the quality of risk disclosure and risk management in the 
banking sector. In most corporations, corporate governance is generally responsible for 
designing and implementing strategic decisions. There is widespread recognition, as 
well as growing empirical evidence, that corporate governance arrangements can 
substantially affect a firm’s value. Thus, regulators have emphasised the importance of 
effective corporate governance practices in the banking sector. Given that the solvency 
of financial institutions is a critical concern for regulators, a number of important 
reforms took place to overhaul the norms of governance, as well as in the board 
structure and ownership structure of corporations (see e.g., Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2010; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2010a; b; 
OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2010). Those 
requirements strongly focus on internal mechanisms and risks when describing good 
corporate governance. 
 
In this chapter, I provide empirical evidence on the effects of corporate governance on 
bank risk-taking in the Greater China Region. My results show that banks with strong 
corporate governance are associated with higher risk-taking. In particular, banks with no 
relationship among the top ten shareholders, a meaningful stake-holding by managers 
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and audited by Big Four audit firm, are likely taking more risk. These findings are 
consistent with the importance of the monitoring role of corporate governance. 
 
This chapter has two purposes. Firstly, it analyses the effectiveness of internal corporate 
governance in monitoring and advising managers in the banking sector. The underlying 
idea is that several characteristics of internal corporate governance (board size, board 
composition, ownership structure, or auditing) might reflect directors’ motivations and 
their abilities to effectively monitor and advise managers. Secondly, some previous 
literature has investigated the relationship between corporate governance and bank 
performance. Yet, it normally focuses only on the specific internal dimensions of 
governance rather than multiple governance mechanisms. The core of this chapter is the 
conviction that good corporate governance increases the monitoring of bank risk-taking. 
 
1.4 Ownership structure and bank performance 
The ownership structure of banks has long been studied in multiple disciplines and 
through various theoretical frameworks. It is recognised as an important determinant of 
general investment policies and, in particular, of bank performance and profitability. 
However, there is no consensus regarding the effect of ownership type on bank 
performance. To date, literature surrounding this relationship has only provided mixed 
results. While some studies show that government-owned banks are less efficient than 
private-owned banks (Berger et al., 2008; Iannotta et al., 2007 and Lin and Zhang, 
2009), others find little evidence that private-owned banks are more efficient than 
government-owned banks (Altunbas et al., 2001), or that there are neutral associations 
between ownership and performance (Micco et al., 2007). In addition, previous 
literature has examined this relationship in international contexts (Caprio et al., 2007 
and Micco et al., 2007), and some comparative work with European banks has been 
conducted (Altunbas et al., 2001), but very little is known about these relationships in 
an emerging market.  
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The aim of this chapter is to reconcile these conflicting results by enriching the analysis 
of the firm's ownership structure using the Chinese case. The Chinese banking system 
has several institutional characteristics that make it suitable for explaining the influence 
of ownership type on performance, and distinguishes it from those considered in 
previous research. I move a step further from the simple dummy characterisation of the 
main shareholder to incorporate two features: (1) the percentage at stake of different 
types of shareholders; and (2) the degree of concentration necessary to affect a bank. 
Previous studies rest on the assumption that shareholders have homogenous preferences 
for investment strategies. Only recently has the type of shareholder received some 
attention. Extending this line of research, I explore four different types of shareholders: 
state, state-owned enterprises, domestic private owners, and foreign owners. By 
introducing the type of shareholder as an explicative element, I can evaluate how 
differences in preferences may influence bank performance. Moreover, I consider the 
degree of ownership diversity, a variable that has been largely neglected in previous 
studies, as an additional determinant of bank operating strategies.  
 
To investigate the relationship between types of large shareholders, ownership structure, 
and bank performance, I collected data from 138 Chinese banks during the period 2006–
2015 to test my hypothesis. The main findings regarding the static effects of bank 
ownership on performance suggest that banks with more state shareholders tend to have 
poorer performance, consistent with much of the literature. In addition, banks with 
higher domestic private shareholders generally operate more profitably. Furthermore, 
higher foreign ownership may negatively affect bank performance. Moreover, 
ownership type diversity is associated with better bank performance, while banks with 
concentrated ownership types perform worse. The results are robust to a number of 
sensitivity tests, including alternative measure of bank profitability, alternative proxies 
of ownership concentration, bank-level regressions, and endogeneity concerns of 
ownership and performance. This chapter concludes by offering new contextual 
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directions to better understand the role of ownership in shaping bank outcomes.  
 
1.5 Political connection and bank lending 
Growing studies investigating the phenomenon of political implication on financial 
systems. There are two competing argument that explain the role of politics on 
economic institution. The ‘development’ view claim that government-owned financial 
institutions would achieve the public interest goal by capital injection to underpin 
economy in market recession. In contrast, the ‘political economy’ view argues that 
government-owned financial institutions are speculate tools for the politicians rather 
than public interest and tends to be associated with distortions in allocation of resources 
(Jackowicz et al., 2013; Sapienza; 2004). This debate is readily apparent for the 
public-sector involvement on economic reform in developing countries. Compare with 
other sectors, failure of individual bank can spread to others, as a consequence, a chain 
effect might impair the stability of the entire financial system at a specific economy or 
even globally. Previous financial crisis has been shown to cause a negative shock to 
start from banks failure to whole financial system globally.  
 
This study is one of the first attempts to identify differences in lending behavior based 
on banks’ missions in an emerging market. Specifically, I investigate whether banks 
with political connection, which exclusively focus lending behavior, and seek to 
maximize the credit supply. This issue is important because politics are an especially 
important element of the developing country’s financial architecture. Not only do this 
chapter provide new proof about the role of political connections in credit allocation, we 
also show the effects of political connections under different economic environments.  
 
The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows: Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 present my studies on 
the previously discussed research topic in the format of three papers. Chapter 2 
investigates the influence of market discipline on bank capital strategy. Chapter 3 
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explores the association between internal corporate governance and bank risk-taking. 
Chapter 4 examines the role of ownership structure in enhancing bank performance. 
Chapter 5 investigates the relation between political connection and bank lending. 
Finally, chapter 6 provides concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2: Invisible hand discipline from 
informed trading: Does market discipline 
from trading affect bank capital structure? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The capital adequacy requirement is one of the appropriate tools that enable regulators 
to maintain the stability of the banking system. A wealthy body of theoretical and 
empirical banking literature suggests that bank capital levels purely reflect regulatory 
minimum requirements. However, recent banking literature reveals that banks maintain 
or strengthen their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity and want to 
strengthen their capital structure, and thus solvency standards, and improve their ability 
to raise external funds (Berger et al., 2008; Distinguin et al., 2013; Gropp and Heider, 
2010).  
 
The challenges in monitoring banks are closely linked to the complexity and 
information asymmetry problem that feature in this unique sector (De Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008). Informed trading, by incorporating private information into share 
prices, is central to the price discovery process and eventually enhances price 
informativeness in stock markets (Ealey and O’Hara, 2004). Governance via informed 
trading has recently been recognised as a potential market discipline mechanism on the 
management of firms that complement legal and regulatory institutions, thus improving 
market efficiency (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans 2009; Edmans and Manso, 
2011; Edmans et al., 2013; Ferreira et al., 2011; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Gallagher et 
al., 2013; Massa et al., 2015). The basic insight gleaned is that informed trades drive 
stock prices to fundamentals, and are dependent on corporate managerial actions. With 
stock prices more sensitive to these actions, governance through trading credibly 
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rewards (penalises) the stock-incentivised manager, who ex ante has greater incentive to 
put in effort by means of costly hidden actions (Holmstrom and Tirole 1993). Ultimately 
stock-incentivised managers exert more effort on behalf of shareholders (Edmans et al., 
2013, 2015; Gallagher et al., 2013; Massa et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015). 
 
Despite trading being widely recognised as a market discipline in corporate governance 
literature, its role in affecting bank capital structure has been neglected. In this chapter, I 
focus on informed trading and investigate how it targets banks with different 
performance levels, and ultimately how this affects bank capital ratio. I argue that 
informed trading, by actively incorporating the superior insights of a bank’s real 
fundamental status, including its solvency condition into share prices, should act as an 
“invisible” hand to discipline bank managers. It especially targets “under-performing” 
bank managers, thus acting as a private enforcement to force managers to strengthen 
their solvency standards above the mandatory minimum requirement. The effectiveness 
of trading, as the market discipline, should become more obvious if bank managers are 
more stock-incentivised. This analysis can enhance the understanding of why banks 
maintain their capital buffer from a market discipline perspective. It has implications for 
policy makers on whether and under what conditions market discipline, via informed 
trading, can act as an effective private enforcement to strengthen the solvency standards 
in addition to the public mandatory minimum requirement. 
 
This chapter focuses on banks listed on stock exchanges from Mainland China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. This is because Mainland China is the largest emerging economy 
where disclosure quality is relatively poor, and stock-option compensation is rare in its 
banking sector. Despite Hong Kong and Taiwan sharing many similar market and 
cultural characteristics with Mainland China, as their economic development and 
financial systems are being increasingly integrated, they have highly stock-incentivised 
managers in their banking sectors. Hong Kong, in particular, has the highest disclosure 
quality and most stock-incentivised bank managers among these three. Thus, these three 
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markets represent a good opportunity for us to mitigate different culture related impacts 
on capital buffer decisions made by bank managers, and to focus on the impacts of 
informed trading conducted in similar market structures with different degree of 
stock-incentivised bank managers and their capital decisions. 
 
I employ a three-step procedure to generate the empirical evidence in this study. First, 
the level of informed trading is estimated using a market microstructure model (PIN) 
and high frequency trade and bid-ask data. Following recent literature (De Jonghe and 
Oztekin, 2015; Flannery and Giacomini, 2015; Lepetit et al., 2015), I measure capital 
level using the traditional ratio of total capital to total asset. I measure bank 
performance using bank efficiency estimated by the frontier approach. I then construct 
an empirical model to test the relationship between PIN and capital. My main finding is 
that there is a significantly positive relationship between market discipline and bank 
capital structure. In addition, over-performing banks attracts a high level of informed 
trading, which in turn leads to a higher level of capital buffer held by a bank. Finally, 
my results are robust in pooled OLS, fixed effect panel-regression. I acknowledge the 
potential endogeneity issue of research on market discipline and bank capital, which is 
general recognised as “a serious methodological problem”. Thus, I employ an 
instrumental variable (IV) in the two-stage least square regressions (2SLS) to treat for 
endogeneity IV-2SLS, as well as the dynamic GMM approach panel regression 
estimations, while controlling for several specific financial and macro-economic 
characteristics. 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the chapter makes the 
attempt to explore the role of informed trading in the banking sector through a 
microstructural perspective. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first study to link the 
literature concerned with PIN, in the context of market microstructure, with the 
numerous empirical studies on bank capital structure. Second, the chapter sheds light on 
the bank performing condition where market discipline influences capital structure, 
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which adds a new dimension to the understanding of the relationship between market 
discipline and bank capital decisions. Third, the chapter also gives an empirical analysis 
on the relationship between bank capital and efficiency, using the sample of the Great 
China listed banks, while the existing theory often provides contradictory predictions. 
Moreover, a single-market study seems appropriate for this type of analysis. However, 
given the cross-market discrepancy in the development level of capital markets, 
culturally homogeneous samples provide an excellent laboratory for understanding the 
role of information in the banking sector. 
 
The reminder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
related literature on informed trading as the market discipline force, and literature on the 
determinants of bank capital structure. Drawing on these theoretical insights, I develop 
hypotheses relating market discipline with bank capital structure, as well as the 
effectiveness of using bank performance to discipline bank managers and affect bank 
capital decisions. I then explain the operationalisation of the dependent and explanatory 
variables, present and discuss some descriptive statistics, and outline the estimation 
methodology for the main regression analysis. The empirical results are then presented 
and discussed, as well as several robustness tests. Finally, I conclude with some 
comments about the importance and applicability of my analysis and make some 
suggestions about future work. 
 
 
2.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.2.1 Bank capital 
Although the role of capital has varied over time, it remains an important source of 
funds for banks in all countries. Normally bank capital is financed by shareholder funds 
as non-financial firms that serve three important functions. First, bank capital can be a 
buffer against adverse outcomes. Second, bank capital creates incentives for 
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management to manage risk when inverting in risky assets. High capital implies higher 
losses for the bank’s shareholders in case of default, and hence lower incentives for 
risk-taking (Hilscher and Raviv, 2014). Regulators may require some additional capital 
for individual banks that are perceived to pose significant risks. Third, sufficient capital 
can be a single to different stakeholders suggesting that the bank will not be taken 
advantage of.  
 
Capital adequacy ratio has played an important role in regulation as banks have long 
been subject to explicit or implicit limits on their permissible leverage levels. Setting 
capital requirements is a major task for regulators. There is a large literature on 
regulation that analyses its role in determining bank capital (Allen et al., 2011; Barrios 
and Blanco, 2003; Chalermchatvichien et al., 2014). For example, the 1988 Basel 
Accord1, and subsequent amendments, significantly influences the effectiveness of bank 
capital structure. A common justification for bank capital regulation is the reduction of 
bank moral hazard and conflicts between equity holders and debt holders. In addition, 
an under-capitalised bank may take excessive risks to maximise its shareholder wealth. 
This incentive is reduced if banks have capital at risk. The equity capital is costly for 
banks, compared to other types of funds, and thus bank managers attempt to economise 
on the use of the valuable resource.  
 
Although the regulatory constraint is one of factors related to the determinant of capital 
level, it is not the most important one (Barrios and Blanco, 2003; Gropp and Heider, 
2010). Gropp and Heider (2010) do not detect a first-order effect of regulation on banks' 
capital holdings. Based on their sample, they find that both banks and non-financial 
firms function as a buffer against regulatory distress, and conclude that the regulatory 
requirement is not the main determinant of bank equity. In addition, despite banks 
complying with regulatory standards for minimum capital requirements, several 
                                                             
1 The Basel Agreement of 1988 is to ensure that financial institutions have enough capital to meet their obligations, 
which requires that banks in European countries meet the minimum capital ratios of 4 per cent tier 1 capital and 8 per 
cent tier 1, plus tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets. 
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financial crises have undoubtedly demonstrated that existing capital regulations were 
inadequate to prevent a panic in the financial sector. The historical system of relying on 
book capital rules and supervisory (Basel Pillar 2) discretion to maintain adequate 
capital may need to be revised (Flannery and Giacomini, 2015). Benink and Wihlborg 
(2002) find that supervision alone cannot prevent banks from ‘gaming and manipulation’ 
of risk-weights.  
 
Both theoretical (Barrios and Blanco, 2003, Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Mehran and 
Thakor, 2011) and empirical (Berger et al. 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Miles et al. 
2013) literature suggests that banks have a target capital structure, which is different 
from the regulatory requirement. Barrios and Blanco (2003) develop two theoretical 
models: the first one for firms not affected by capital adequacy regulations, and the 
second one for firms which are affected. They demonstrate in both models the existence 
of an optimal capital ratio. In addition, Diamond and Rajan (2000) summarise that 
optimal capital structures for bank trades off three effects of capital, rent absorbed by 
the banker, against shocks and extracted from borrowers. In addition, banks might target 
higher capital ratios to mitigate insolvency risk. Given the historically high profitability 
of the banking sector, banks increase the capital ratio because earnings are easily 
retained. Berger et al. (2008) find that banks actively manage their capital ratio, set 
target capital levels above regulatory minima, and make rapid adjustments toward their 
targets. Alternatively, banks might target lower capital ratios to maintain lending 
relationships and competitive advantage. 
 
Memmel and Raupach (2010) analyse the capital ratios using monthly regulatory data 
of large German banks and obtain the best fit to the optimal capital ratio of just above 
the regulatory minimum of 8 per cent. Miles et al. (2013) find that the amount of equity 
capital that is likely to be desirable for banks to use is much larger than banks have 
actually used, and it is also higher than targets agreed to under the Basel III requirement 
in United Kingdom banks for the 1992–2010 period. In the United States, Flannery and 
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Rangan (2008) find that banks' capital ratios increased substantially during the 1990s, 
with banks holding capital levels that were 75 per cent more than the regulatory 
minimums in the early 2000s. Berger et al. (2008) also find similar evidence in US bank 
holding companies from 1992 to 2006. 
 
Gropp and Heider (2010) suggest that unobserved time-invariant bank fixed-effects are 
ultimately the most important determinant of a bank’s capital structure. Based on a 
global sample of 64 countries, De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015) find that banks make 
faster capital structure adjustments in countries with more stringent capital requirements, 
better supervisory monitoring, more developed capital markets, and higher inflation. 
Memmel and Raupach (2010) find that large German private commercial banks (neither 
state-owned nor cooperative), and banks with a high level of proprietary trading are 
more likely to adjust their capital ratio tightly. Lepetit et al. (2015) find that the internal 
governance mechanisms affect the way banks adjust to the target capital structure.   
 
2.2.2 Market discipline 
To make progress in understanding bank capital structures, it is necessary to consider 
other various determinants. Market discipline might be an instrument to induce banks to 
hold appropriate capital under the Basel Accord, as markets have significant resources 
with numerous investors and analysts that have access to both public and private 
information about bank operations. For market discipline to be effective, factors such as 
changes in equity values and returns would influence the firm’s manager 
decision-making. Bliss and Flannery (2002) show that market discipline implies two 
distinct notions: the private investors’ ability to understand (monitor) a financial firm’s 
true condition, and their ability to influence managerial actions. Therefore, market 
participants can affect bank behavior. 
 
A large body of evidence in the banking sector suggests that markets monitor banks 
effectively and promptly. For example, Flannery and Rangan (2008) demonstrate that 
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market investors can influence bank behavior in terms of capital decision. Barrios and 
Blanco (2003) argue that a bank’s capital ratio is primarily driven by the pressure of 
market forces rather than regulatory constraints, concluding that the main determinant 
of bank capital requirements is the pressure of market discipline. Nier and Baumann 
(2006) suggest that market discipline is effective in providing incentives for banks to 
limit their risk of default by holding capital buffers. Allen et al. (2011) also claim that 
market discipline is imposed on the bank’s capital to provide monitoring incentives. 
Bennett et al. (2015) suggest that market discipline tends to begin far enough in advance 
to signal to both banks and supervisors that corrective actions can and should be taken. 
Curry et al. (2008) claim that the equity market can provide timely information and add 
value to bank holding companies. Hilscher and Raviv (2014) show that effecting market 
discipline via introducing contingent capital into bank capital structures represents a 
possibility to substantially reduce incentives to increase bank risk and decrease bank 
failure rate. 
 
The informational efficiency of prices is a key attribute of capital markets that can have 
significant implications for the real economy. Thus, information from stock markets is a 
useful mechanism for designing corporate governance and can discipline managers on 
corporate investment decision-making (Dow et al., 2015; Faure-Grimaud and Gromb, 
2004; Ferreira et al., 2011; Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Gorton et al., 2016). Indeed, 
investors can exert governance through affecting stock prices. The stock prices generate 
informative signals that affect how managers run their companies. Gorton et al. (2016) 
show that there is a fundamental tension between the informativeness of stock prices 
and the effectiveness of market discipline in corporate governance. Dow et al. (2015) 
analyse the incentives for financial market traders to produce information about a firm’s 
investment opportunities.  
 
More specifically, various literature argues that stock trading can be an effective 
mechanism of market discipline in corporate governance (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; 
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Edmans, 2009; Ferreira et al., 2011). By trading on information, market participates 
move the stock price toward fundamental value and closely reflect the effort exerted by 
managers. Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) claim that public trading results in the 
formation of a stock price that is informative about the large shareholder’s incentives to 
engage in value-increasing activity. Edams (2009) finds that institutional trading 
enhances the informational efficiency of the firm’s equity, which leads myopic 
managers to make better financing decisions. Massa et al. (2015) suggest that short 
selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers. 
 
Market discipline can be a source from information asymmetry, which arises from 
differential information between informed and non-informed traders. Informed traders 
are normally large shareholders, financial analysts and managers. Informed traders use 
superior knowledge, on such private information, to obtain private benefits. Managerial 
private benefits are commonly represented in previous studies as shirking, managerial 
career concerns, and perquisites. John et al. (2000) recognise that managerial 
compensation schemes may directly affect bank risk-taking preferences. In addition, 
Barakat et al. (2014) find that the increase in information asymmetry is higher for 
internal fraud-related events. Dell’Ariccia (2001) suggest that informational 
asymmetries are important determinants of the industry structure and of bank strategic 
behavior. 
 
2.2.3 Hypothesis development 
Bank supervisors require that banks maintain minimal equity capital as a protection for 
depositors and other stakeholders. Although supervisory pressure may contribute to the 
capital build-up, it also creates the environment that makes market discipline more 
relevant to banks. Capital build-up might be a rational response by market participants 
to changes in the banking environment.  
 
First, market discipline through informed trading would help discipline management 
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and improve corporate governance (Admati and Pfeiderer, 2009; Edmans et al., 2013). 
This in turn encourages managers to invest in long-run growth instead of short-term 
earnings. Edmans et al. (2013) and Edmans and Manso (2009) show that governance 
from trading by blockholders leads to positive announcement returns and improvements 
in operating performance. Ferreira et al. (2011) claim that external market discipline by 
informed trading and internal board monitoring are substitutes. Both Berger (1995) and 
Mehran and Thakor (2011) find that total bank value and bank equity capital are 
positively correlated in the cross-section. Anginer et al. (2016) show that executive 
options and stock wealth that is invested in the bank are generally associated with better 
capitalisation. 
 
Second, informed trading has significant impact on stock prices (Kitamura, 2016; Vega, 
2006). A higher stock price would increase the value of equity. However, a sharp 
decrease in stock prices may lead to the risk of holding stocks. As a consequence, stock 
prices influence bank behavior indirectly if price changes lead supervisors to take steps 
designed to reduce a bank’s risk exposure. The Third Pillar of Basel III specifies rules 
for expanded information disclosure to enhance the market disciplines on bank risk 
taking. The increasing complexity of large banking organisations makes it difficult for 
regulators to monitor and control using traditional tools, but markets can recognise and 
influence a bank’s complex activity, and can therefore assess the true condition. 
Therefore, market discipline from informed trading can play an important role in bank 
supervision. Both Estrella (2004) and Benink and Wihlborg (2002) suggest that market 
discipline is a necessary supplement to capital requirement.  
 
The requirement of capital build-up might be a rational response by supervisors to raise 
bank risk taking. Lepetit et al. (2015) find that banks are likely to boost their capital 
ratios by issuing equity without cutting lending when control and cash-flow rights are 
identical. Based on a sample of 341 European commercial banks during the 2002–2010 
period, Allen et al. (2011) claim that the market discipline is one of the forces that 
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induces banks to hold positive capital because it allows higher borrower surplus. Allen 
et al. (2011) explain that borrowers prefer lower interest rates and higher capital as they 
do not bear the cost of the capital. Even there is deposit insurance, banks' incentives to 
monitor are reduced, but the market discipline still entails high capital level. Nier and 
Baumann (2006) find that stronger market discipline, resulting from uninsured liabilities 
and disclosure, creates larger capital buffers. In addition, Demirguc-Kunt (2013) finds 
that better capitalised banks experience higher stock returns. 
 
Third, large shareholders often collect information and use it for informed trading.  
These shareholders have private information about managerial actions and/or about the 
consequences of these actions to the value of the firm. Thus, these shareholders with 
more information (private or public) have more knowledge about the true value of an 
asset, and are more likely to trade on this information (Vega, 2006). They can influence 
managerial decisions through an elected board of directors. Additionally, there is 
general agreement that the risk classification determines the bank capital requirement. 
Markets can recognise and influence bank default risk. Thus, bank capital ratios reliably 
relate to portfolio risk exposures. Flannery and Giacomini (2015) demonstrate that large 
European banks’ reported regulatory capital measures often far exceeded their 
loss-absorbing capacity during 1997–2011. Bank risk exposures increase when banks 
are permitted to enter new, riskier lines of business. Risk aversion investors are likely to 
require the bank to adjust upward the capital ratio based on the risk level. Nier and 
Baumann (2006) find that while competition leads to greater risk-taking incentives, 
market discipline is more effective in curbing these incentives. Curry et al. (2008) 
conclude that equity markets provide an economically substantive degree of 
independent assessment of banking company risk, thereby establishing the conditions 
for market discipline to be effective. Allen et al. (2014) conclude that banks hold a 
positive amount of equity capital as a way to reduce bankruptcy costs. 
 
Based on the above arguments, market disciplinary forces can be the explanation behind 
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capital buildup. To sum up, there are several reasons why a bank that is disciplined by 
the capital market should keep its capital ratio within a narrow high range. Therefore, it 
is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 1: Market discipline from informed trading is positively associated with the 
level of bank capital. 
 
Previous literature also provides rational explanations for low capital ratios. First, the 
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) states that information asymmetries 
between bank managers and outside investors induce a preference order from internal 
capital through debt, to equity financing. Information asymmetries about banks’ 
financial health can be relieved by market monitoring. Strong external market discipline 
enables market participants to assess bank capital adequacy more efficiently. Therefore, 
this form of monitoring should be associated with lower external financing costs, thus 
increasing the leverage.  
 
Second, bankers normally argue that an excessively high equity capital level has a 
negative effect on their ability to compete. An increase in bank competition erodes the 
present value of the banks’ future rents, which lead to reducing the incentives to behave 
prudently.  
 
Third, liquidity production is a central function of banks. Greater bank capital reduces 
the probability of financial distress, but also reduces liquidity creation (Diamond and 
Rajan, 2000). Distinguin et al. (2013) find that banks decrease their capital ratios when 
they face higher illiquidity. DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) claim that high leverage is 
optimal for banks to have a meaningful role in liquid claim production. Allen et al. 
(2014) show that equity capital is costly relative to deposit to provide liquidity.  
 
Fourth, raising equity by issuing new shares may entail significant share price 
reductions and transaction costs. De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015) suggest that external 
26 
 
 
governance has an opposite effect on bank capital structure adjustments. 
 
Based on above arguments, the contribution of market disciplinary forces can used to 
explain capital decrease. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 2: Market discipline from informed trading is negatively associated with the 
level of bank capital. 
 
Bank performance may contribute to the effect of market discipline on capital structure. 
General investors have limited knowledge and skills and cannot become privately 
informed about every bank; thus they choose to trade banks that are most profitable. 
Management may respond to market assessments of company performance and change 
capital strategies. If markets are efficient, it leads to changing equity market valuations, 
reflecting market attitudes, and expectations of bank profitability. Thus, better 
performing banks respond to stock prices as a source of information to monitor 
management. Uninformed investors are likely to access an asset portfolio that has been 
‘cream-skimmed’ by informed investors (Bolton et al., 2016).  
 
Short selling is another avenue that contributes to market discipline when a bank is 
underperforming. Large shareholders are more likely to sell their stake in an 
under-performing bank rather than bear the cost of intervening to fix things. Such sales 
not only drive down the stock price, but also reduce the manager’s equity compensation 
and, thus, punish them ex post. Anginer et al. (2016) show that executive options and 
stock wealth invested in the bank is generally associated with better capitalisation. 
Managers are more sensitive to the short selling as their wealth is closely tied to the 
stock price. Although market participants could be motivated purely to maximise their 
trading profits, by disciplining the manager such actions also have a social benefit. A 
bulk of the literature focuses on empirically testing the effect of short selling behavior 
from investors on company reaction. For example, Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) argue 
that when the larger shareholders observe managers underperforming, they will exit 
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before the information becomes public. Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015) claim that the 
efficacy of exit as a governance mechanism by equity blockholders can be an effective 
market discipline. Fang et al. (2016) find that short selling, or its prospect, helps detect 
fraud and improves price efficiency. Massa et al. (2015) document a significantly 
negative relationship between the treat of short selling and earning management. 
Edmans et al. (2013) also provide evidence consistent with exit theories suggesting that 
trading by institutions is an effective governance mechanism. 
 
Bank performance has an important role to play in shaping the relationship between 
market discipline and bank capital structure. When banks are under-performing, their 
capital ratio is difficult to adjust upwards. The idea is simply that banks with lower 
earnings can be expected to face higher costs of issuing equity and have less financial 
slack. Under-performing banks will adjust their capital level downwards in response to 
exogenous changes in market discipline. In such a situation, these banks cannot obtain a 
better price when issuing new equity (De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015). In addition, 
managers are more likely to engage in risky investments when banks are 
underperforming. In another words, over-performing banks attract a high level of 
informed trading.  
 
Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 3: Market discipline from informed trading can increase the capital ratio 
when banks perform efficiently.  
 
 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Bank capital 
The economist’s definition of bank capital is the amount of equity that is financed by 
itself with. The regulatory view is similar but broader, in that regulatory capital typically 
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includes other sources of financing, such as preferred stock. As the variety of regulatory 
definitions of capital all assign a central role to equity, I will refer to bank capital simply 
as common equity (paid-in capital plus retained earnings) in the bank. Therefore, the 
ratio of equity to total assets (ETA) represents the bank capital and is calculated by the 
equity position as a fraction to the total assets of a bank. The ETA is commonly used to 
measure the level of bank capital in literature, as seen in Flannery and Giacomini (2015), 
De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015), and Lepetit et al. (2015). The ETA is used to capture the 
capital structure and risk preference across banks in terms of their equity requirements.  
 
In addition, I include an alternative measure for the bank capital for the robustness test, 
which is the regulatory capital ratio (REG). Normally banks need to hold more capital 
than the required regulatory minimum in order to reduce the likelihood of liquidation. 
The regulatory capital is the amount of capital needed for a bank to be regarded as in 
continuous operation by depositors and other stakeholders. Basel III requires that banks 
with more risky assets maintain higher regulatory capital. Following Lepetit et al. 
(2015), Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014) and Memmel and Raupach (2010), the 
regulatory capital ratio is defined as the bank’s core capital divided by the risk-weighted 
average assets.  
 
2.3.2 Market discipline 
To measure market discipline levels, the market microstructure model of Easley, Kiefer, 
and O’Hara (1996; 1997a; 1997b) is used to generate the PIN. The PIN is a measure of 
market disciplinary that exists based on the stock market. It reflects a firm-specific 
estimate of the probability that investors trade from private information; hence, it 
directly captures the extent of information among investors in the capital market. In 
addition, the model focuses on the mechanism through which the market participants 
observe updated trading and draw inferences about the true value of an asset. If the 
private information is being reflected on relevant transactions and the market participant 
updates their beliefs, then the trading price will be affected. In time, the full information 
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converges into the processes of trading, learning and pricing. 
 
In Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara’ model (EKO), it is assumed that news events2 occur 
independently with probability 𝛼. When an event occurs, it is either bad or good news, 
and the probabilities are 𝛿 and 1 – 𝛿 respectively. Therefore, the bad news event 
occurs at the probability 𝛼𝛿, and good news event occurs at the probability 𝛼(1 −  𝛿). 
During each trading day, orders from market participants are assumed to arrive 
according to the Poisson process. The informed traders arrive at rate 𝜇, regardless 
whether the news is good or bad3. The selling and buying of orders from uninformed 
traders would arrive at the rate of 𝜀𝑠 and 𝜀𝑏 respectively. According to EKO, the 
likelihood function induced by this simple model of the trade process for a single trade 
day is given as follow: 
 
L (θ ｜B, S) = (1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑒−𝜀𝑏
𝜀𝑏
𝐵
𝐵!
∙ 𝑒−𝜀𝑠
𝜀𝑠
𝑆
𝑆!
+ 𝛼𝛿 ∙ 𝑒−𝜀𝑏
𝜀𝑏
𝐵
𝐵!
∙ 𝑒−(𝜇+𝜀𝑠)
(𝜇 + 𝜀𝑠)
𝑆
𝑆!
+ 𝛼(1 − 𝛿)
∙ 𝑒−(𝜇+𝜀𝑏)
(𝜇 + 𝜀𝑏)
𝐵
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𝑒−𝜀𝑠
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𝑆
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(Equation 1) 
As the likelihood function is a mixture of distribution, these three elements refer to the 
likelihood weighted by the probability of a day with “no event day” (1 –α), a “bad news 
day” (αδ), and a “good news day”(𝛼(1 − 𝛿)). The (Bi, Si) is the total number of buys 
and sells in a single date for the period i ∈ (1, … . , I), and θ =  (α,μ,εb,εs,δ) is the 
parameter vector. All that is required to generate these parameters is to input the number 
of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades. However, trade and quote databases do not 
provide the number of seller-initiated or buyer-initiated trades in each day. The validity 
of my study that classifies trades as buyer-initiated and seller-initiated depends on the 
accuracy of the classification method. Consistent with Lai et al. (2014), the Lee and 
Ready (1991)4 trade classification algorithm is being used to identify the trades. Ellis et 
                                                             
2 The events could relate to private information of which the firm is aware or unaware, such as releasing new 
competitive products, or an adversely changing legal environment.  
3 The EKO model assumes that either informed buying or selling order occur on the same data.  
4 The Lee and Ready (1991) method is the classification of each trade by comparing the transaction price and the 
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al. (2000), Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) and Odders-White (2000) examine the validity 
of the Lee and Ready algorithms and find that this method correctly classifies 81.5 per 
cent, 93 per cent and 85 per cent of the trade, depending of the sample period and 
market studied.  
 
Assuming sufficient independence conditions are held across a trading day, the 
likelihood function for the period is: 
V = L (θ ｜M) = ∏ L (θ｜Bi, Si )
n
i=1
 
(Equation 2) 
Here M = {(Bi, Si)}i=1
I  refers to the data set. This maximises the likelihood of giving 
us the ML estimator for θ, from which I can estimate the probability that the trade is 
information-based as follows: 
PIN =
𝛼𝜇
𝛼𝜇 + 𝜀𝑏 + 𝜀𝑠
 
(Equation 3) 
The denominator 𝛼𝜇 + 𝜀𝑏 + 𝜀𝑠 is the arrival rate for all orders, which includes the 
informed and uninformed. The numerator 𝛼𝜇 is the arrival rate for information-based 
orders. Therefore the PIN equals the fraction of trades in a given day that arise from 
informed trading. This model interprets normal trading activities as uninformed trades, 
and the abnormal trades as informed trades. Two concerns may exist about the model:, it 
is simplistic and does not consider the volume factor.  
 
There are several reasons to choose PIN as proxies of market discipline. First, it 
captures the characteristic of each transaction on the microstructure economic 
environment. Easley et al. (2002) use PIN in the asset pricing and find that higher PIN 
stocks earns higher expected returns. Vega (2006) finds that stocks with high PIN have 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
midpoint of the current bid and ask price. A trade would classify as a buy (sell) if the transaction price is closer to the 
prevailing ask (bid) quote. If the current transaction price is equal to the midpoint, the previous transaction price is 
used. A trade would classify as a buy (sell) if the transaction price is higher (lower) than the previous price. Next 
previous transaction price is being used if the current and previous transaction prices are the same. 
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smaller reactions with earnings announcements, which suggests that those stocks likely 
contain more speculator-held private information. Second, full information can 
converge through the processes of trading and learning from trading results in prices 
(Easley and O’Hara, 1992). Therefore, a high PIN helps the market become more 
efficient. Third, compared to other proxies of market forces, such as spread-based, 
abnormal accruals and earnings informativeness, PIN is more accurate for using the 
decision by all stock investors rather than individual reports or analysts. Classifying the 
number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades for a listed company is more direct 
and comprehensive than reflecting the probability of informed trading in a dynamic 
market view. 
 
2.3.3 Bank performance 
The most common efficiency estimations in banking are nonparametric techniques, such 
as data envelopment analysis (DEA), and parametric techniques, such as the 
distribution-free approach (DFA) and stochastic frontier approach (SFA). The main 
difference between DEA and SFA is how they separate the measure of efficiency for an 
individual bank from random errors. DEA has the disadvantage of not allowing for 
random errors associated with luck and other measurement errors. Thus, I employ SFA 
to measure efficiency, which considers measurement errors, as well as other random 
factors in the estimation of efficiency. It was developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and 
Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). This method has been widely applied to the 
banking sector to evaluate cost and profit efficiency, both theoretically and empirically 
(Altunbas et al., 2007; Berger and Mester, 1997; Berger et al., 2009a; 
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis, 2009; Jiang et al., 2013). SFA has been 
criticised for predetermining functional form and for the distributional assumptions for 
the residual and efficiency score. However, separating the random error and efficiency 
score would be more appropriate in the efficiency literature in transition economies 
(Fries and Taci, 2005).  
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Suppose that total cost for each bank in each time period is given by: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡) +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 4) 
where TC denotes observed total overhead for bank i at year t. P is a vector of input 
prices, Y is a vector of outputs, and Z stands for a set of control variables (fixed netputs). 
This approach disentangles the error term in two components. The first, (v), corresponds 
to the random fluctuations, and is assumed to follow a symmetric normal distribution 
around the frontier, capturing all phenomena beyond the control of management. The 
second, (u), accounts for bank inefficiency, relative to the frontier, and is assumed here 
to follow a truncated normal distribution. Cost efficiency measures the extent to which 
an individual’s cost is above the cost of the best performance bank under the same 
condition. Cost efficiency is based on a more reasonable economic goal of cost 
minimisation and explains errors on both the output and the input sides (Sun et al. 
2013). 
 
Concerning issues regarding the choice of functional form, the translog function form 
has been commonly applied in bank efficiency studies (Beccalli et al., 2006; Fu et al., 
2014a). The Fourier Flexible Form has gained the attention of bank related literature as 
it offers a better global approximation of the unknown function without misspecification 
(Vennet, 2002). But Altunbas and Chakravraty (2001) suggest that there is a problem 
with the Fourier Flexible Function when dealing with heterogeneous data sets. Berger 
and Mester (1997) argue that the difference between the translog form and the Fourier 
Flexible Form does not cause serious inconsistencies. Thus, the translog form has been 
chosen, and the SFA efficiency is based on the following function: 
ln 𝑇𝐶  = 𝛼𝑖0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖
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1
2
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𝑖
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 5) 
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where TC is the logarithm of the overhead cost, Pi are input prices, Yi are output 
quantities, and Zi are control variables. For the definition of bank inputs and outputs, 
the intermediation approach proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1997) is applied. The 
banks collect funds through labour and physical capital, and transfer to the loans and 
other earning assets. So there are two inputs: labour and financial capital; and two 
outputs: loans and other earning assets. These two output variables are commonly used 
in previous researches, such as Berger et al. (2009a) and Bonin et al. (2005). Due to the 
unavailability of the personal expense data, I follow Jiang et al. (2009) and Fu et al. 
(2014), where the ratio of operating expenses to average assets is used as the price of 
labour. The price of financial capital is calculated by dividing the total interest expenses 
by the total interest bearing borrowed funds. Greater organisational complexity may be 
associated with lower efficiency; therefore, two bank-specific control variables are 
being employed to account for the size differences associated with banks. These are the 
amount of total earning assets and fixed assets.  
 
To ensure that the estimated frontier is well behaved, standard homogeneity and 
symmetry restrictions are imposed. All variables are normalised by total assets, except 
for input price, which imposes linear homogeneity to ensure that the cost-minimising or 
profit-maximising do not change if all input prices are multiplied by the same positive 
scalar.  
 
Table (1) presents the summary statistics of the used variables in stochastic frontier 
approach. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables in stochastic frontier approach for efficiency 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total overhead (TC) 345 0.108 0.011 0.026 0.142 
      
Output quantities      
Gross loans (Y1) 345 0.539 0.118 0.181 0.776 
Other earning assets 
(Y2) 
345 0.396 0.117 0.170 0.695 
      
Input prices      
Price of labour (P1) 345 1.660 1.362 0.300 15.34 
Price of capital (P2) 345 0.023 0.042 0.002 0.627 
      
Control variables      
Fixed assets (Z1) 345 0.012 0.007 0.002 0.054 
Total earning assets 
(Z2) 
345 0.928 0.052 0.744 0.988 
Note: All variables are normalised by total asset, except for input prices. Price of labor (P1) is the ratio of operating expenses to average 
assets. Price of capital (P2) is the ratio of total interest expenses to total interest bearing borrowed funds. All variables are winsorised at the 
1 per cent and 99 per cent levels.  
 
 
2.3.4 Main model specification and variable construction 
To disentangle the relationship between capital, information risk and efficiency leads on, 
the system of equations estimated is as follows: 
𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐼𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (Equation 6) 
 
where ETA represents the level of capital and is calculated by equity to average asset. 
The PIN is proxy for the market discipline, which is calculated by the Easley et al. 
(1997a, b) market microstructure model. CEFF represents bank cost inefficiency and is 
a proxy for bank performance. The interaction term between PIN and CEFF is being 
included to test Hypothesis (3). Lastly, X i,t refers to a list of control variables which 
includes bank specific characteristics and macro market control variables. The controls 
(Xi, t) include a full set of time-fixed effects and all variables listed in Table (2).  
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For control variables, I use a range of bank and market-specific variables that are 
considered important in explaining the relationship between the market discipline and 
capital. First, the logarithm of total asset (LNTA) is used to control the firm size. Larger 
banks hold more diversified asset portfolios and have a size advantage over smaller 
banks (Hughes et al., 2001). However, Berger et al. (1987) provide evidence that very 
large banks often encounter scale inefficiencies. I expect this variable to negatively 
impact the variation in the capital level because larger banks experience lower expected 
costs of raising new equity and enjoy conjectural government guarantees. In addition, 
banks with high earnings may choose to maintain higher equity capital ratios. This 
motive is likely to be amplified by the degree of risk aversion among bank management. 
However, high earnings indicate that banks will easily raise new capital in the future. 
Therefore, higher earnings would be associated with a lower capital ratio. I use earning 
per share (EPS) to control the impact from the fluctuation of earnings on capital. Third, 
the ratio of total deposits to total loans (DEPTOL) assesses the degree to which 
customer loans are financed by customer deposits, and is related to the bank's liquidity. 
DEPTOL is expected to be positive with capital, since holding more liquid assets is 
usually accompanied with higher risk, therefore leading to higher levels of capital. 
Finally, assets per employee (APE) is used as a control for the basic indicators of 
productive efficiency. I expect that APE negatively impacts the capital structure. 
 
Several market specific variables are also included for controlling the macroeconomic 
development characteristics of Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. The impact of 
a macroeconomic environment may be more important for financial institutions than for 
non-financial firms because banks are exposed to business cycle fluctuations. These 
variables are commonly used in the banking literature. First, the inflation rate (INF) is 
also used to capture market characteristics. Customer bank fees would increase in 
high-inflation environments, but due loans may be accumulated and lead to higher risks. 
Athanasoglou et al. (2008) find that inflation can determine bank performance in the 
Greek market. In addition, the lending interest rate (LINT) is used to capture the 
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differences of regulatory regimes and monetary policies in these three markets. Third, a 
dummy variable (PCRISIS) of financial crisis (years 2008–2015) is used to capture the 
impact of the global financial crisis. 
 
Table 2: Definition of variables 
Variables Symbol Description  Sources 
Capital ratio ETA The ratio of equity to average asset Bankscope 
Regulatory ratio REG The bank’s core capital divided by 
risk-weighted assets, as mandated 
by Basel III 
Bankscope 
    
Market discipline PIN The probability of informed 
trading calculated by equation (3) 
Use original trade 
and quote data from 
stock exchange to 
estimate 
Cost inefficiency CEFF The score of cost inefficiency 
obtained using stochastic frontier 
approach with translog 
specifications 
Use original 
Bankscope data to 
estimate 
    
Bank size LNTA The natural logarithm of total 
assets in thousands of USD 
Bankscope 
Earnings  EPS The ratio of earning per share Bankscope 
Liquidity DEPTOL The ratio of total deposits to total 
loans 
Bankscope 
Asset per employee APE The natural logarithm of total 
assets per employees 
Bankscope 
Return volatility PRICEV The annualised standard deviation 
of daily stock returns 
Datastream 
Share turnover LNTBV The natural logarithm of share 
turnover by volume.  
Datastream 
    
Inflation rate INF Inflation rate Datastream 
Lending interest LINT Lending interest rate Datastream 
Financial crisis POSTC 1 for the post financial crisis 
period (years 2008–2015), 0 
otherwise 
Year dummy 
 
 
2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Data sources 
In this chapter, I use a region sample of banks over the 2006–2015 period. The sample 
covers the listed banks in three capital markets: Mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. There are several reasons for concentrating on the Greater China listed banks. 
First, as the scope of this chapter involves understanding the potential effects of trading 
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behaviour on the stock market, it is important to consider markets that have a similar 
culture. These three stock markets can offer great opportunities to exam investor trading 
behaviours from a similar cultural background. Second, unlike the European and US 
banks, my sample is less affected by the global financial crisis. Thus, far less coverage 
has been given to non-western banks. I hope to fill this gap in the literature. Third, as 
the PIN variable needs to be calculated from the trading data from the stock market, the 
unlisted banks are excluded. 
 
The financial data regarding income statements and balance sheet information on 
individual banks is from Bankscope (Fitch’s International Bank Database). Given that 
my focus is listed commercial banks in the stock exchanges of the Mainland China, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan markets, I start by excluding central banks, investment banks, 
policy banks, securities houses, multilateral government banks, non-banking credit 
institutions, and specialised government financial institutions. For estimate efficiency, I 
exclude banks that have the following features: (1) missing values for profit before tax; 
(2) missing, negative or zero values for inputs and outputs; and (3) missing values for 
control variables (total assets and fixed assets). In addition, duplicate information is 
eliminated. If Bankscope shows both unconsolidated and consolidated financial 
statements, I use consolidated statement to analyse (except, of course, for banks that do 
not consolidate their data and do not belong to a consolidated group), as capital 
requirements are imposed at the consolidated group level. The scope of the risks 
contained in the consolidated statement is broader, as information about the banking 
subsidiaries operating outside Greater China is included. Furthermore, most of the 
banks in Mainland China follow the International Accounting Standards (IAS), while 
some banks, including the joint ventures and banks listed in the stock market, also 
prepare annual reports based on the Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS). However, the 
CAS was developed in 2006, following the principles of IAS. Therefore, I compare the 
financial statements of the same banks in Mainland China, which report under both the 
CAS and IAS, and do not find a major difference. The quality of data in China is often 
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questioned and criticised, so data from multiple sources has been checked carefully. 
 
Another problem I have faced in this bank-level sample is that Bankscope reports 
financial statement data at the aggregated level. The impact of bank mergers during the 
period has also to be taken into account, especially in the Taiwan market. The 
aggregated statements are combined of a group of affiliated banks that have merged or 
expect to merge. These banks neither have financial links nor form a legal entity. 
Therefore, a given bank might be presented several times in Bankscope. Micco et al. 
(2007) propose two methods to deal with banks that have aggregated statements. The 
first is using the aggregated statement and dropping the observation for the individual 
banks. The second is using individual banks up to the time of merger, and then starting 
from the year of merger with the new bank. Following Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011), 
I use the first method and work with the aggregated statements. In addition, a similar 
problem arises for banks which, having belonged at t-1 to a consolidated group, leave 
the group at t. To calculate both the averages of certain variables, the figure at t-1 is 
obtained from the individually reported financial statements. 
 
In order to calculate PIN, my sample is restricted to publicly listed banks because I 
require high-frequency transaction data from the stock market. The high-frequency data 
represents trades and quotes submitted during the regular trading hours of each listed 
bank. The high-frequency transaction data for banks in Mainland China are from the 
GTA Information Technology Company Limited. GTA Information Technology 
Company Limited is a local data provider that collects all the Chinese listed company 
transaction data. The transaction data for banks in Hong Kong are from Hong Kong 
Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx). HKEx is a leading global operator of 
exchanges and clearing houses based in Hong Kong. The transaction data for banks in 
Taiwan are from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). TEJ is a financial data collection and 
content processing companywhich focuses mainly on the Taiwan stock exchange. My 
transaction data includes all trades and quotes submitted to the stock exchanges of the 
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three markets from January 2006 through December 2015. Those three data sources 
provide information on trade qualifiers., Trades identified as irregular trades, and those 
with negative trading prices, are excluded. 
 
In my study, three of stock exchange markets implement an automated electronic 
trading system during my sample period from January 2006 to December 2015. In this 
manner, a full business cycle of the Great China economy is included; a point of 
particular importance given that the aim of this paper is to analyse whether there is a 
relationship between the market discipline driven from the stock market and the capital 
held by financial institutions. 
 
In addition to the bank-specific data and stock market information, I use two 
macroeconomic variables to control for a country’s macroeconomic environment and 
overall level of economic development. These are the rate of inflation of consumer 
prices and the lending interest rate. This data is obtained from Datastream, which is 
managed by Thompson Financial Limited.  
 
The initial sample contained 468 bank-level observations for PIN measure. I merge 
these observations with efficiency data, calculated by using SFA. For those observations 
that cannot be matched by efficiency, I manually match by firm names. Therefore, my 
panel is incomplete since new listed banks have started to operate during the period 
considered, while other banks have ceased to exist.  
 
As shown in Table (3), some years have more observations than others due to new IPO, 
delisted, or acquisition during the sample period. Next, I apply the filters for 
firm-specific information. After filtering, the dimension of the data set is 345 
observations and 36 banks for the period of 2006–2015. The number of banks and the 
number of bank-year observations are the highest from the Taiwan market, with 15 
banks and 150 observations (making up 43.47% of the number of observations). The 
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Mainland China market is ranked second with 16 banks and 145 observations (making 
up 45.03% of the number of observations). The remaining Hong Kong market has 5 
banks and 50 observations. The observations are distributed relatively evenly over the 
2010–2015 period in the sample, but the years from 2006 to 2009 have fewer 
observations. Table (3) reports the distribution for my sample.  
 
Table 3: Sample distribution 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Mainland 
China 
7 14 14 14 16 16 16 16 16 16 145 
Hong 
Kong 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 50 
Taiwan 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 150 
Total           345 
 
Using a panel data methodology does not only control for individual heterogeneity, but 
also reduces concerns associated with multicollinearity and estimation bias, and 
specifies the time-varying relation between dependent and independent variables 
(Baltagi, 2008). Thus, my study employs a panel data methodology. An F-test is used to 
determine whether the fixed-effects model outperforms the pooled OLS. In addition, the 
appropriateness of the random-effects model relative to the pooled OLS model is 
examined with the Breusche and Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. Finally, 
Hausman’s test is used to compare the fixed-effects model with the random-effects 
model.  
 
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table (4) presents the summary statistics of the used variables in the PIN estimation. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for PIN estimation 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
PIN 345 0.180 0.105 0.001 0.800 
ALPHA 345 0.648 0.263 0.001 1.000 
MU 345 5.174 0.846 2.274 7.597 
EPSILON 345 5.522 1.424 0.878 7.600 
Note: PIN is probability of informed trading. ALPHA is probability of an information event. MU is arrival rate of informed traders. 
EPSILON is arrival rate of uninformed investors. The summary statistics of MU and EPSILON are based on the natural logarithm of MU 
and EPSILON. All variables are winsorised at the 1 per cent and 99 per cent levels. 
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Table (5) presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in main empirical 
model. The key variables in my analyses are the proxies for the bank capital structure 
and market discipline. 
 
For the full sample, as banks are highly leveraged, the mean (median) capital asset ratio 
(ETA) is 9.56 per cent (9.2 per cent), with a standard deviation of 2.9 per cent. The 
mean of the regulatory capital (REG) is 9.6 per cent, comfortably above the minimum 
Basel requirement of 8 per cent, with a standard deviation of 3.9 per cent. There is much 
greater variation in the ratio of equity to average assets. The pattern is similar to the 
study of Williams (2004), who examines the relationship between bank risk and 
efficiency in European banks. These two measures of bank capital level represent 
different capital structure dynamics, and one should be cautious in interpreting and 
generalising results obtained with each measure. 
 
My estimated PIN variable has a mean of 0.17 and ranges from 0.05 to 0.65. This mean 
of PIN is comparable to previous studies. Easley et al. (2002) find that the mean of PIN 
is 0.19 in the New York Stock Exchange. More recently, Lai et al. (2014) use a larger 
dataset from 47 countries worldwide to examine the pricing effect of PIN. They 
estimate that the mean of PIN in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan are 0.10, 0.20 
and 0.23 respectively. As the participants of Chinese equity markets are 99.5 per cent 
individual investors (Ng and Wu, 2006), the lower PIN is more plausible in these 
markets because individual investors have less information advantage compared to 
institution investors. While the PIN estimates are in the same order of magnitude, the 
frustrating in the PIN estimate probably reflects the increasing financial transparency of 
Mainland China markets and the implementation of an automated trading system. 
 
In addition, the mean of cost inefficiency is 0.07, which is same as the cost efficiency in 
the study of Sun et al. (2013). The sample of Sun (2013) covers an eight-year period 
(2002–2010) in Mainland China. For other control variables, the asset size is highly 
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skewed to the right, as banks in the top quartile are several times bigger than median 
sized banks. Therefore, I use the natural logarithm of total assets (LNTA) to measure 
bank size to reduce the effect of skewness on my results. The average natural logarithm 
of the total assets is 18.27. The deposit to loan ratio (DEPTOL) ranges from 0.77 to 1.87, 
with an average of 1.23. The median DEPTOL ratio is 1.21, with a lower degree of 
variation across banks. The earning per share ratio (EPS) ranges from -0.52 to 1.85, 
with an average of 0.12. All these various checks reinforce my level of confidence in the 
accuracy of the estimated variables. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for main model variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
ETA 345 0.095 0.029 0.017 0.264 
REG 345 0.096 0.024 0.029 0.273 
PIN 345 0.173 0.100 0.048 0.659 
CEFF 345 0.070 0.064 0.025 0.527 
LNTA 345 18.27 1.656 15.29 21.97 
EPS 345 0.120 0.223 -0.524 1.856 
DEPTOL 345 1.237 0.165 0.772 1.874 
APE 345 10.81 25.80 1.120 36.08 
PRICEV 345 0.019 0.007 0.005 0.039 
LNTBV 345 15.30 1.853 10.46 18.75 
INF 345 2.111 1.908 -.860 5.864 
LINT 345 4.663 1.489 2.560 7.900 
POSTC 345 0.724 0.447 0.000 1.000 
Note: This table contains means, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values on the variables included in the main model. 
ETA is the ratio of equity to average asset. REG is bank’s core capital divided by risk-weighted assets, as mandated by Basel III. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). CEFF represents the score of cost inefficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithm. EPS is the ratio of earning per share. DEPTOL is the ratio 
of total deposits to total loans. APE is the natural logarithm of total assets per employee. PRICEV is the annualised standard deviation of 
daily stock returns. LNTBV is the natural logarithm of share turnover by volume. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
POSTC is the dummy variable, 1, for the post financial crisis period (years 2008–2015), and 0 otherwise. 
 
The correlation matrix of correlations between the variables is shows on Table (6). The 
correlation between market discipline (PIN) and capital ratio (ETA) is 0.141, and is 
significant at the 5 per cent level, which suggests that banks with an intensive market 
disciplinary are likely to build up their capital. Additionally, the correlation between the 
regulatory ratio (REG) and PIN is -0.014, and is insignificant, while correlation between 
the REG and ETA is 0.344 and significant. The bank inefficiency (CEFF) and ETA 
43 
 
 
variables have a correlation of -0.190, and is not significant, while the CEFF and REG 
variables have a correlation of -0.213 and is significant at the 5 per cent level. This 
suggests that an inefficient bank may hold higher levels of bank capital. The correlation 
between CEFF and PIN is not very high, only -0.099, and in absolute value not more 
than 9 per cent. 
 
Table 6: Correlations 
 ETA REG PIN CEFF LNTA EPS DEPTOL 
ETA 1.000       
REG 0.344* 1.000      
PIN 0.141* -0.014 1.000     
CEFF -0.190* -0.213* -0.099 1.000    
LNTA -0.193* 0.001 -0.375* -0.002 1.000   
EPS 0.016 0.285* -0.091 -0.006 0.219* 1.000  
DEPTOL -0.067 0.296* -0.078 0.062 0.234* 0.075 1.000 
APE -0.087 -0.057 -0.099 0.044 0.147* 0.121* 0.038 
PRICEV 0.061 -0.041 0.023 0.165* -0.042 -0.145* 0.026 
LNTBV -0.272* -0.153* -0.375* 0.074 0.753* -0.088 0.117* 
INF -0.098 0.184* -0.140* 0.079 0.179* 0.198* 0.123* 
LINT -0.143* 0.138* -0.378* 0.164* 0.468* 0.257* 0.279* 
POSTC 0.005 0.084 -0.027 -0.110* 0.222* 0.174* 0.101 
        
 APE PRICEV LNTBV INF LINT POSTC  
APE 1.000       
PRICEV -0.048 1.000      
LNTBV 0.110* 0.234* 1.000     
INF 0.056 0.184* 0.017 1.000    
LINT 0.120* 0.205* 0.293* 0.579* 1.000   
POSTC 0.118* -0.432* 0.052 -0.303* -0.317* 1.000  
 
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to average asset. REG is a bank’s core capital divided by risk-weighted assets, as mandated by Basel III. 
PIN is the probability of informed trading given by equation (3). CEFF represents the score of cost inefficiency obtained from the 
stochastic frontier approach with translog specifications. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithm. EPS is the ratio of earning per share. 
DEPTOL is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. APE is the natural logarithm of total assets per employee. PRICEV is the annualised 
standard deviation of daily stock returns. LNTBV is the natural logarithm of share turnover by volume. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is 
the lending interest rate. POSTC is the dummy variable, 1, for the post financial crisis period (years 2008–2015), and 0 otherwise. * 
indicates statistical significance at the 5 per cent level. 
 
Table (6) further shows that the correlation between the ETA and bank size (LNTA) is 
negative at -0.193 and significant, while the correlation between the REG and LNTA is 
positive and insignificant. This suggests that the economic impact of bank size on 
capital level may be opposite. In addition, the negative relation between PIN and bank 
size (LNTA) is consistent with previous empirical studies, such as Vega (2006), which 
uses PIN as an informed trading measure. 
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Overall, most of the value drivers considered exhibit a statistically significant 
correlation, so there are no strong correlations between the variables forming my 
models, and the risk of multicollinearity is very low. 
 
 
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 Fixed effect estimation 
Table (7) contains estimation results for the baseline model for the full sample using 
ETA as the dependent variable from Equation (6). It presents the results of proxy 
regressions for market discipline over bank capital variables, and a set of bank-level and 
country-level control variables.  
 
To formally test how a firm fixed effect makes a difference to my results, I use the firm 
fixed effect estimation as my the baseline. I allow for residuals of the firms to be 
correlated over time. Bank capital structure can be explained by time invariant, 
firm-specific effect, i.e. a firm fixed effect (Gropp and Heider, 2010). These fixed 
effects can be correlated with other observed variables and influence the estimates. 
 
Table 7: The relationship between market discipline and capital - Fixed effect 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable  ETA ETA ETA 
     
PIN  0.064** 0.045* 0.068*** 
  (2.44) (1.79) (2.64) 
CEFF  0.099* 0.089* 0.107** 
  (1.94) (1.73) (2.11) 
PIN * CEFF  -0.845*** -0.741** -0.890*** 
  (-2.67) (-2.35) (-2.85) 
LNTA  0.020*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 
  (4.64) (6.89) (4.57) 
EPS  -0.006 0.004 -0.005 
  (-0.49) (0.33) (-0.43)  
DEPTOL  -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 
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  (-0.62) (-0.34) (-0.64)  
APE  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.17) (0.31) (0.50)  
INF   -0.001** -0.001  
   (-2.18) (-0.09)  
LINT   -0.004*** -0.007*** 
   (-2.62) (-2.93)  
POSTC   -0.023*** -0.013 
   (-6.09) (-1.62)  
Constant  -0.262*** -0.312*** -0.241*** 
  (-3.25) (-4.60) (-2.83)  
     
Observation  345 345 345  
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
R  0.248 0.221 0.271 
Year fixed effect  Y N Y 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to average asset. REG is a bank’s core capital divided by risk-weighted assets, as mandated by Basel III. 
PIN is the probability of informed trading given by equation (3). CEFF represents the score of cost inefficiency obtained from the 
stochastic frontier approach with translog specifications. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithm. EPS is the ratio of earning per share. 
DEPTOL is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. APE is the natural logarithm of total assets per employee. PRICEV is the annualised 
standard deviation of daily stock returns. LNTBV is the natural logarithm of share turnover by volume. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is 
the lending interest rate. POSTC is the dummy variable, 1, for the post financial crisis period (years 2008–2015), and 0 otherwise. 
 
First, I include market discipline, bank inefficiency, the interaction term between PIN 
and CEFF, and bank specific control variables in column (1) of Table (7). The 
coefficient of PIN is positive and significant at the 5 per cent level, and the termed slope 
shifter is 0.064. Increased market discipline results in a context in which managers are 
less likely to enjoy a quiet life and it encourages more bank-specific capital strategies. 
This findings supports Hypothesis (1). In addition, the coefficient of CEFF is positive 
and significant at the 10 level level, indicating that bank efficiency has a negative effect 
on the level of capital. Low profit and inefficient banks have higher capital ratios. The 
result contrasts with the findings of De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015). Furthermore, the 
interaction term is negative and significant at the 5 per cent level, which suggests that 
market discipline may reduce bank capital for low efficient banks. Therefore, 
Hypothesis (3) is supported. However, the result should be handled with care as it may 
be driven by covariate: better performing banks tend to have a higher level of market 
discipline; at the same time, they tend to adjust their capital ratio frequently. The capital 
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market effectively subjects banks to a capital requirement, which brings their preference 
closer in alignment with those of the authorities, and reduces the level of social losses in 
event of bank failure.  
 
I present the full model with the bank-specific and macroeconomic development 
variables in column (2) of Table (7). Again, the coefficient of PIN is still positive and 
significant at the 10 per cent level, and the termed slope shifter is 0.045. In addition, the 
coefficient of CEFF is also positive and significant at the 10 per cent level. Furthermore, 
the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at the 5 per cent level. 
These results suggest that market discipline is a more effective method to enhance bank 
capital levels when banks perform efficiently. 
 
Finally, I present the full model with the year dummy in column (3) of Table (7). Again, 
the coefficient of PIN is still positive and significant at the 1 per cent level, and the 
termed slope shifter is 0.068. In addition, the coefficient of CEFF is also positive and 
significant at the 10 per cent level. Furthermore, the coefficient of the interaction term is 
negative and significant at the 1 per cent level. 
 
Overall, results of Table (7) show that controlling for a firm fixed effect, and other bank 
and market characteristics, does not change the effect qualitatively, and supports 
Hypothesis (1) and (3). The magnitudes of the coefficients are qualitatively unchanged, 
despite the significance decrease for some variables. All four coefficients of PIN are 
positively and statistically at the 5 per cent or 10 per cent significance level. Again, 
these findings still show that banks with strong market discipline are associated with 
higher levels of capital. The results of all the Hausmann tests shown in Table (7) suggest 
that the fixed effects model is the optimal one, in comparison to the random effect. The 
relevant value of the χ2-test is χ2 (12) = 23.60, with a p-value=0.0008. 
 
The results are consistent with Allen et al. (2011), who argue that an important factor in 
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inducing banks to choose higher capital is market discipline. In addition, Barrios and 
Blanco (2003) also find that market discipline lead banks to hold higher capital, 
compared to other factors. Furthermore, Nier and Baumann (2006) conclude that market 
discipline is more effective in limiting bank risk by the choice of a larger capital buffer. 
Curry et al. (2008) also claim that markets can provide useful information to bank 
supervisors and become channels for market discipline to be effective in restraining 
risky behaviors of institutions. A bank has a number of typical choices when raising its 
capital: it can raise funds from existing shareholders, issue new shares via the domestic 
capital market or, alternatively, it can source funds via the international capital markets. 
 
Some criticisms for banks to operate with more capital is that banks would be forced to 
reduce liquidity and thus lead to impairing their competitive advantage. However, the 
lost liquidity is likely to be significantly lower than the cost to taxpayers of bailing out 
inadequately capitalised failing banks. Banks tend to decrease their Tier 1 and 2 capital 
ratios when they face higher illiquidity (Distinguin et al., 2013). Diamond and Rajan 
(2000) propose that the fragility associated with low bank capital is necessary for banks 
to create liquidity. 
 
The result contrasts with the findings of both Petacchi (2015) and Agarwal and O’Hara 
(2007), which find that strong market discipline from higher information asymmetry 
have higher leverage, supporting the pecking order theory. However, there is a major 
difference between our study, and those of Petacchi (2015) and Agarwal and O’Hara 
(2007). The observation of Petacchi (2015) includes not only financial firms, but also 
non-financial firms, while Agarwal and O’Hara (2007) exclude financial firms.  
 
This positive relation between market discipline from informed trading and capital level 
can be explained by several factors. First, since the stock price aggregates information 
dispersed among investors, this information can be useful for the design of corporate 
governance mechanisms. The trading brings new information on the true value of a 
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stock to discipline bank managers. Thus, market information can affect a firm’s 
corporate governance through trading (Dow et al., 2015; Edams, 2009; Gorton et al., 
2016). Ferreira et al. (2011) claim that firms with a high probability of informed trading 
are associated with strong governance. The effectiveness of banking firm governance 
could also be affected by information environment from the stock market. The 
information revealed by stock prices allows external monitoring mechanisms to operate 
more efficiently. In turn, managers learn about their own firms’ fundamentals from the 
information in the stock prices, and incorporate this information in the corporate 
investment decisions (Chen et al., 2007). As suggested by Bhagat and Bolton (2008), 
better corporate governance has a positive impact on bank profitability and bank value. 
Mehran and Thakor (2011) claim a positive relation between bank value and capital. 
Therefore, the increase in capitalisation can be simply reflected by high bank earnings 
(Berger, 1995). Banks with a more conservative profile tend to hold higher capital to 
meet potential adverse shocks. Ferreira and Laux (2007) suggest that the openness in 
the market for corporate control leads to strong market discipline, which has more 
informative stock prices by encouraging the collection of, and trading on, private 
information. Banks clearly appear to have different governance structures compared 
with non-financial institutions, which have not only intensive regulations, but also 
higher leverage. In addition, a manager is less willing to pay dividends, and capital 
ratios have thus risen ‘passively’. Indeed, higher capital is associated with higher 
lending, higher liquidity creation, higher bank values, and higher probabilities of 
surviving crises (Thakor, 2014). 
 
Second, the effect of ownership could also play an important role from market 
discipline to bank capital adjustment. Holmstrom and Tirol (1993) claim that a firm's 
ownership structure influences the value of market monitoring through its effect on 
market liquidity. If the larger shareholder is government or family, rather than widely 
held institutions, the incentive for expropriation could be stronger. These shareholders 
would inject funds during hard times, with the expectation of extracting benefit in the 
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future, and to avoid failure. Thus, the ownership structure can play an important role in 
monitoring management, and banks with a strong orientation towards shareholder value 
are likely to keep the capital ratio at relatively higher levels. Although a decrease in the 
capital ratio seems desirable, as does an increase in the ROE, it may also result in costs 
of rating downgrades and rising debt spreads. Banks with excess control rights are 
presumably under greater market discipline pressure to adjust their capital ratio upward 
(Lepetit et al., 2015). Chalermchatvichien et al. (2014) find that an increase in 
ownership concentration by one standard deviation results in an improvement in capital 
adequacy by 7.64 per cent. Furthermore, these large shareholders have private 
information about their managers’ actions and/or about the consequences of these 
actions to the value of the bank. If large shareholders are aware that a bank’s 
management does not act in their best interest, it may be rational for the shareholders to 
vote ‘with their feet’ and sell their shares, rather than attempting to be active (Admati 
and Pfleiderer, 2009). Moreover, it appears that outside investors can impose discipline 
on the specific institution by mitigating the moral hazard incentives of equity holders. 
 
Third, in order to measure the ability of investors to influence bank behavior, it is 
necessary to rule out the possibility that any corrective behavior is being driven by 
pressure from regulators in terms of risk management. Market discipline can influence a 
bank’s risk management function (Barakat et al., 2014). Stronger market discipline 
should be applied to banks that are at greater risk of failure. Although the senior 
management and board of directors play an important role in bank risk management, 
market discipline is effective in providing incentives for banks to limit their risk of 
default by holding capital buffers against adverse outcomes (Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
The evolution of bank income towards an emphasis on non-interest revenue has also 
seen a structural change in banks, which may lead to higher risk-taking. Excessive 
risk-taking may lead to significant loss during financial crisis periods. William (2014) 
finds that external governance and higher capital regulations both act to reduce 
bank-level risk. Banks can improve risk control functions, due to the pressure of market 
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discipline, when they choose to undertake high-risk investments. High levels of capital 
would increase a bank’s chances of survival and assist it to withstand major negative 
shocks (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). In the event of a crisis, the lower the capital ratio 
the higher the probability that a bank will fail to pay back its debts. Miles et al. (2013) 
conclude that the amount of equity funding that is likely to be desirable for banks to use 
is much larger than what banks have had in recent years, and it is also higher than 
minimum target requirements set by the regulator. As the separation of ownership and 
control raises the question of manager incentive to take actions in the best interest of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the managers have greater incentive to 
choose the disclosure policy, which may not fully reflect the risk taking of the banks. 
Regulators may not be able to monitor the ‘moral hazard’ problem and hence cannot 
fully control a bank’s risk-taking incentive. Thus, the market force would discipline 
bank managers, who would, in turn, actively rebalance their capital structure to 
converge excessive risk taking.  
 
Fourth, Nier and Baumann (2006) find that stronger market discipline from more 
disclosure increase capital buffers. Regulators should foster disclosure information and 
private-sector monitoring of banks (Barth et al., 2004). Estrella (2004) also suggests that 
market discipline through information disclosure can be supplemented with other tools 
for bank supervision. A bank with higher information asymmetry may indicate that less 
information is released or selectively disclosed. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) suggest 
that a negative relationship exists between disclosure quality and information 
asymmetry. Disclosure is a signal that contains information on future investment, future 
cash flows, and expectation of earnings. However, there is more informative signal if 
greatened the expenditure on disclosure and leakage of strategic information. Thus, 
banks may not be willing to disclose certain information. Additionally, banks hiding 
information could represent either poor asset quality or a high portion of nonperforming 
loans, in turn raising the level of bank risk. A failing bank can be seen as one that has 
insufficient capital and excess risk-taking. The regulation on bank asset restriction has 
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limited effectiveness given the high leverage ratios of banks. In addition, higher 
information asymmetry may indicate lower quality information disclosure by firms. It 
creates a potentially constructive role for government interventions to offset the market 
failures and enhance social costs. Thus, information asymmetry is crucial in 
determining the possibility of market discipline, both at the individual level and the 
systemic level. Especially for banking sector, information asymmetry prone is 
contagious and is socially costly. Based on the information provided by the bank about 
its level of capital, the authorities should consider whether to allow the bank to continue 
to operate. Thus, banks should provide more accurate and value-relevant information to 
the regulator and public regarding the risk management function. Therefore, regulators 
may focus on the capital adequacy to maintain the stability of financial systems by 
requiring banks to enhance their capital level. 
 
More importantly, the combination of opaque assets composition and deposit liabilities 
make banks potentially vague. Thus, a bank may also ‘cherry-pick’ its information 
disclosure. For example, it might accelerate disclosing the gains on appreciated asset 
portfolios, while postponing recognition of unrealised losses. Berger and Bouwman 
(2013) suggest that banks with higher levels of capital have better chances of survival 
during a banking crisis. The benefit comes because a larger buffer of loss-absorbing 
capital limits the chances of financial crises. Setting the adequate level of capital is a 
major policy issue for banking regulators. Therefore, regulators can encourage banks to 
raise the capital when information asymmetry increases. Regulatory pressure plays an 
important role in banks’ control of the level of capital. The Basel III framework also 
requires banks use more equity capital to finance their assets than was required under 
previous sets of requirement. Overall, Hypothesis (1) is supported. 
 
The pecking order theory argues that the asymmetric information problem drives the 
capital structure (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Information asymmetries 
between bank managers and outsider investors induce a preference order from internal 
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capital, via debt to equity issuing. Agency costs arise from a conflict of interests 
between shareholders and managers, when shareholders cannot effectively monitor 
senior management. The costs include structuring, monitoring and holding a set of 
contracts among agents with conflicting interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In addition, 
there is some disadvantage for internal capital, which may have the risk of being 
misused for the private benefit of managers. Moreover, banks may have insufficient 
surplus cash during crises. However, the effect of these problems can be partially 
neutralised by adjusting capital. Memmel and Raupach (2010) suggest that banks with a 
higher level of proprietary trading are more likely to adjust their capital ratio upwards. 
High information asymmetry costs result in difficulty on external financing, which in 
turn lead to issuing equity capital. In addition, the optimal bank capital trades off three 
effects: more capital increasess the rent, increase the buffer against shocks, and changes 
the amount that can be extracted from borrowers (Diamond and Rajan, 2000). The cost 
of intermediation of saving through the banking system might offset the benefit of 
maintaining a larger buffer of capital. This would tend to reduce the level of investment, 
which has potentially long-term effects on real economy. Furthermore, the socially 
efficient capital level may exceed a bank’s optimal capital levels, and market discipline 
would become germane to minimise the system risk. To sum up, there are several 
reasons why a bank increases capital levels when strong market discipline is in place.  
 
Both column (3) and (4) of Table (6) include the bank inefficiency (CEFF); the 
interaction between PIN and CEFF that is estimated from stochastic frontier approach. 
However, both the bank inefficiency and the interaction term are not statistically 
significant. In addition, I briefly describe the set of control variables. Bank size (LNTA) 
is not correlated with capital in the first three columns, but is negatively correlated with 
this variable in column (4). This negative relationship suggests that larger banks have a 
relatively lower level of capital. This is consistent with the findings of Berger and 
DeYoung (1997), which show that larger banks are associated with lower capital levels. 
Lower capital is generally associated with higher bank risk. It is argued that in the 
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developing markets, such as Mainland China, a higher probability is attached to the 
likelihood of bailout for larger banks. Thus, large banks find the risk-seeking incentives 
from being too big to fail reinforced. Earning per share (EPS) is not correlated with 
bank capital in all specifications.  
 
 
2.6 Robustness test 
I perform several regressions to check for the robustness of my results obtained in 
Section 2.5. The causality could also go in the opposite direction, from bank capital to 
market discipline. The share price would go up for higher levels of capital and efficient 
banks, compared with counterparties. Thus, these banks may attract more attention in 
the capital market. Therefore, the trading volume would increase when more investors 
trade, and the more information would aggregate from trading. This would affect the 
level of market discipline. Another challenge is unobservable heterogeneity across 
banks, which definitively exists in these three similar markets. 
 
The previous results, although favourable to the disciplining hypothesis, may be subject 
to the same issue of endogeneity. Although the FE model addresses endogeneity due to 
unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneities, it does not take account of the endogeneity 
problems due to time-varying heterogeneities, simultaneity, or reverse causality. 
Therefore, I use IV-2SLS and dynamic GMM to further address these econometric 
challenges.  
 
2.6.1 IV-2SLS estimation 
IV-2SLS is a standard methodology used to address the endogeneity problem in 
empirical corporate finance research. Under standard identification assumptions, I apply 
2SLS methods to isolate the effect of PIN on capital. 
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A valid instrument must meet two criteria: a strong correlation with the instrumented 
specific-independent variables, and orthogonality with the error term. That is, the 
instrument should be a variable that can be excluded from the original list of control 
variables without affecting the results. In another words, the main challenge is to 
identify at least one good instrumental variable (IV), which is required to be related to 
the dummy predictor variable but not directly related to the dependent variable of the 
overall mode. Thus, I need the following instruments for PIN: a variable that is 
correlated with PIN (this assumption can be tested), but uncorrelated with bank capital 
structure, except indirectly through other independent variables. 
 
Following the literature (Ferreira et al., 2011; Easley et al., 2002), I instrument PIN of a 
specific firm in each year by using the share turnover and annual stock volatility as 
instruments. Share turnover is also likely to be strong correlated with PIN, consistent 
with the assumption that stocks with greater trading activity tend to have more 
uninformed order flow (Easley et al., 2002). This instrument variable has never been 
used as the explanatory variables of bank capital in previous studies. Another instrument 
variable is stock-return volatility; that is, the standard deviation of the daily returns. The 
volatility of stock returns corresponds to information arrival to the stock market: the 
more information arrival, the more volatile a price. A daily return, which is the sum of 
each intra-day return, then depends on the daily number of information arrivals. This 
indicates that daily volatility is also an increasing function of the number of information 
arrivals, which represents more strengthening market discipline from the stock market. 
A high volatility reflects intensive arrival of information. This instrument variable has 
been found to be significantly correlated with PIN. The annualised standard deviation of 
daily stock returns for a given year has a mean of 0.0190, with a standard deviation of 
0.007. This figure is comparable to the figure reported in Bai and Elyasiani (2013), 
using U.S. data. 
 
Based on these two instruments, I perform a two-stage IV regression as follows: I 
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regress PIN on two instruments in the first stage and then regress my capital on 
predicted PIN in the second stage, together with firm-level control variables and year 
fixed effects.  
First stage: 
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Second stage: 
𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 7) 
 
Table 8: The relationship between market discipline and capital - IV-2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable PIN PIN ETA ETA 
     
Predicted PIN   0.500** 0.237*  
   (2.24) (1.70)  
CEFF -1.475*** -1.466*** 0.777** 0.375* 
 (-18.99) (-18.94) (2.28) (1.76)  
PIN * CEFF 10.434*** 10.39*** -5.575** -2.769* 
 (28.15) (28.14) (-2.33) (-1.85)  
LNTA 0.009 0.001 0.014*** 0.025*** 
 (1.24) (0.20) (3.46) (6.53)  
EPS -0.044 -0.052* 0.016 0.014 
 (-1.49) (-1.75) (0.73) (0.91)  
DEPTOL 0.028 0.021 -0.022 -0.006 
 (1.31) (0.94) (-1.46) (-0.56) 
APE 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.96) (0.76) (-0.86) (-0.16)  
PRICEV 1.232*** 1.48***   
 (2.61) (3.01)   
LNTBV -0.001 -0.001   
 (-0.35) (-0.25)   
INF  0.001  -0.002*** 
  (0.84)  (-2.84) 
LINT  0.000  0.000 
  (0.67)  (0.17) 
POSTC  0.017**  -0.020*** 
  (2.21)  (-5.29) 
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Observation 345 345 345 345  
F test 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R 0.740- 0.753 0.753 0.058 
Sargan test    0.562 0.825 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to average asset. REG is a bank’s core capital divided by risk-weighted assets, as mandated by Basel III. 
PIN is the probability of informed trading given by equation (3). CEFF represents the score of cost inefficiency obtained from the 
stochastic frontier approach with translog specifications. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithm. EPS is the ratio of earning per share. 
DEPTOL is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. APE is the natural logarithm of total assets per employee. PRICEV is the annualised 
standard deviation of daily stock returns. LNTBV is the natural logarithm of share turnover by volume. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is 
the lending interest rate. POSTC is the dummy variable, 1, for the post financial crisis period (years 2008–2015), and 0 otherwise. 
In first stage regressions, my instruments significantly correlate with PIN at the 1 per 
cent significance level. In the second stage regressions, the Hansen's over-identification 
test fails to reject the hypothesis that my instruments are exogenous. As columns (1) and 
(2) of Table (8) illustrate, the second-stage regressions in table (8) show a strong 
positive correlation between predicted PIN and ETA. The result also supports my earlier 
findings that market discipline enhances ban capital in listed banks. Therefore, 
Hypothesis (1) is supported. 
 
2.6.2 Dynamic estimation - GMM 
To further confirm my findings and address the correlation and possible endogeneity 
problems, I employ the difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators 
developed for dynamic panel models by Arellano and Bond (1991). The lagged values 
of the explanatory variable are used as instruments for the equation in first differences. 
However, this ‘difference estimator’ has been found to exacerbate measurement error 
biases in variables by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio (Griliches and Hausman, 
1986). To reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the difference 
estimator, following Berger et al. (2009b), I employ the system GMM estimator, which 
is proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The system 
GMM estimator uses lagged differences of the explanatory variables as instruments in 
differences and levels equations, as well as lagged values of other regressors which 
might suffer endogeneity. The system GMM estimator controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity and for the persistence of the dependent variable. In addition, the two-step 
system GMM estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard error has also 
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been used in my estimation.  
 
Compared to the IV-2SLS methods, the dynamic GMM estimator has the advantages of: 
(1) tackling the endogeneity problem based on internal instruments, instead of relying 
on external instruments which may not be readily available; and (2) explicitly modeling 
the dynamic nature of the capital and market discipline relationship by including past 
capital as one of the independent variables. 
 
To tackle potential serial correlations, I use the first differences of the dependent 
variables, following Blundell and Bond (1998). The lags of each independent variable 
are used as instruments to account for the simultaneity of capital and bank inefficiency. 
These instrument variables are valid under the assumption that the correlation between 
the bank-specific effect and the levels of the independent variables is constant over time. 
To generate consistent estimations of parameters, both the validity of the assumption in 
error term and instrument need to be considered. Following De Jonghe and Oztekin 
(2015), Fiordelisi et al. (2011), and Fu et al. (2014a), I perform two tests of the GMM 
model. The first test is to examine the assumption of no serial correlation in the error 
term. The differenced error term is the test for the serially correlated second-order. The 
second test is the Hansen test of over-identifying restriction, which tests the overall 
validity of the instruments. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the residuals.  
𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 8) 
Table (9) presents the system GMM result. The coefficient in PIN documents a strong, 
positive and statistically significant relationship between market discipline by informed 
trading and the amount of capital for commercial banks. In addition, the first and second 
order correlation tests, and the Hansen tests of instrument validity, as well as the F test 
of model statistical significance. Furthermore, the lagged dependent variable for ETA is 
statically significant across all specifications, indicating a high degree of persistence of 
58 
 
 
bank capital and justifying the use of a dynamic model.  
 
Table 9: The relationship between market discipline and capital - GMM 
   (1) (2) 
Dependent variable   ETA ETA 
     
Lag. ETA   0.967*** 0.804*** 
   (12.30) (5.10) 
PIN   0.155** 0.106**  
   (2.20) (2.10)  
CEFF   0.281** 0.189 
   (2.48) (1.48) 
PIN * CEFF   -2.401** -1.498*  
   (-2.45) (-2.01) 
LNTA   -0.001 -0.001  
   (-0.26) (-1.59) 
EPS   0.001 0.007 
   (0.19) (1.50) 
DEPTOL   0.020*** 0.021*** 
   (3.03) (3.70) 
APE   0.001*** 0.001** 
   (7.56) (2.67) 
INF    -0.002** 
    (-2.53) 
LINT    0.002** 
    (2.16) 
POSTC    0.004 
    (0.85) 
Constant   -0.029 0.006 
   (-1.46) (0.19) 
     
Observation   309 309  
F test   0.000 0.000 
AR 1   0.001 0.006 
AR 2   0.115 0.131 
Hansen test   1.000 1.000 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to average asset. REG is a bank’s core capital divided by risk-weighted assets, as mandated by Basel III. 
PIN is the probability of informed trading given by equation (3). CEFF represents the score of cost inefficiency obtained from the 
stochastic frontier approach with translog specifications. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithm. EPS is the ratio of earning per share. 
DEPTOL is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. APE is the natural logarithm of total assets per employee. PRICEV is the annualised 
standard deviation of daily stock returns. LNTBV is the natural logarithm of share turnover by volume. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is 
the lending interest rate. POSTC is the dummy variable, 1, for the post financial crisis period (years 2008–2015), and 0 otherwise. 
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Overall, ETA is positively and statistically significant linking with PIN. I can confirm 
that the market discipline influences the level of capital. The system GMM estimates in 
Table (9) support my previous findings, even after controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. The diagnostics tests in Table (9) 
show that the model is well-fitted with statistically insignificant test statistics for both 
second-order autocorrelation in second differences (AR2) and Hansen J-statistics of 
over-identifying restrictions. The residuals in the first difference should be serially 
correlated (AR1) by way of construction, but the residuals in the second difference 
should not be serially correlated (AR2). Accordingly, results show statistically 
significant AR1 and statistically insignificant AR2 for all bank risk measures. Likewise, 
the Hansen statistics of over-identifying restrictions test the null of instrument validity, 
and the statistically insignificant Hansen J-statistics for all the specifications indicate 
that the instruments are valid in the respective estimation. Moreover, the systems-GMM 
estimation provides certain findings that are an improvement from the IV-2SLS results. 
 
2.6.3 Alternative capital structure measure 
In this section, I examine whether the above results are robust by replacing the capital 
ratio variables. I use an alternative definition of bank capital. Specifically, I replace the 
measure of capital structure with the regulatory capital requirement. Table (10) contains 
estimation results for the baseline model for the full sample, using regulatory capital 
(REG) as the dependent variable. The magnitudes of the coefficients are qualitatively 
unchanged, and the significance raised for some variables. The coefficients of PIN in 
regressions (1) to (2), which are termed slope shifters, are 0.147, and 0.135 respectively. 
Again, both coefficients of PIN are positively and statistically at the 1 per cent or 5 per 
cent significance level, which is an even stronger result than ETA as the dependent 
variable in Table (6). 
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Table 10: The relationship between market discipline and alternative capital - GMM 
   (1) (2) 
Dependent variable   REG REG 
     
Lag. REG   0.605*** 0.719*** 
   (10.92) (8.99) 
PIN   0.147** 0.135*** 
   (2.36) (3.04) 
CEFF   0.066 0.177*** 
   (0.67) (3.61) 
PIN * CEFF   -1.503 -1.212**  
   (-1.57) (-2.39) 
LNTA   -0.001 0.002 
   (-0.38) (1.56) 
EPS   0.018*** 0.013 
   (2.77) (1.11) 
DEPTOL   0.017 -0.001  
   (1.48) (-0.02) 
APE   0.001 -0.001**  
   (0.07) (-2.19) 
INF    0.003** 
    (2.44) 
LINT    -0.002* 
    (-1.71) 
POSTC    0.024*** 
    (4.59)  
Constant   0.022 -0.048 
   (0.44) (-1.66)  
     
Observation   309 309  
F test   0.000 0.000 
AR 1   0.0241 0.00499 
AR 2   0.370 0.122 
Hansen test   1.000 1.000 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to average asset. REG is a bank’s core capital divided by risk-weighted assets, as mandated by Basel III. 
PIN is the probability of informed trading given by equation (3). CEFF represents the score of cost inefficiency obtained from the 
stochastic frontier approach with translog specifications. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithm. EPS is the ratio of earning per share. 
DEPTOL is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. APE is the natural logarithm of total assets per employee. PRICEV is the annualised 
standard deviation of daily stock returns. LNTBV is the natural logarithm of share turnover by volume. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is 
the lending interest rate. POSTC is the dummy variable, 1, for the post financial crisis period (years 2008–2015), and 0 otherwise. 
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The estimated equation, on the other hand, passes the standard goodness-of-fit tests 
without any major problems. Major variables have expected signs and most of them are 
significant even at 1 per cent. There is significant negative first-order autocorrelation in 
the residuals (AR1 statistic), and nil second-order correlation (AR2), as should be the 
case if the error term (in levels) is white noise. The Hansen test for validity of the 
instruments used is also fully satisfactory. In all cases, the robustness results are 
consistent with those previously obtained in section 2.5 and support Hypotheses (1) and 
(3). 
 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
For banks going public, previous literature focuses mainly on the impact of stock prices 
or returns on bank performance, while the role of market discipline reflected by stock 
prices, and its potential effect on bank capital, is a relatively unexplored area. A large 
body of evidence suggests that markets monitor financial firms effectively and promptly, 
but specific tests of investor trading have been much more limited. Holding capital is 
costly due to agency and information costs. Yet, banks are required to carry minimum 
capital levels to maintain their default value at an acceptable level. This chapter 
attempts to link the literature concerned with market discipline and the numerous 
empirical works on bank capital which, to the best of my knowledge, have never been 
integrated before. Using a large sample of Chinese banks listed between 2006 and 2015, 
results show that banks with strong market discipline have higher levels of bank capital. 
In addition, I also find that market discipline is negatively associated with bank capital 
when a bank is underperforming. The findings imply that frictions associated with 
asymmetrical information problems in the stock market do impact a bank’s access to 
external finance. The results shed new light on the understanding of the role of market 
discipline for the prudential banking industry. 
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This chapter departs from the literature on the information structure of corporate 
securities and bank capital in several respects. First, it fills the gap in the literature and, 
for the first time, provides a comprehensive assessment of the causal relationship 
between market discipline and bank capital structures in Chinese banking. This chapter 
is the first study to predict and find this relation. Second, while previous literature on 
high frequency data has been dominated by empirical studies in the developed capital 
markets of the U.S. and Europe, my data covers three major Chinese regulatory regimes, 
including Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan – an interesting market that has 
never been explored in the past. Third, my proxy for market discipline is PIN, which is 
calculated by high frequency data and is based on the imbalance between buy and sell 
orders among investors. PIN is validated and strengthens previous studies focusing on 
accounting data, such as financial ratios and other accounting numbers. Public 
accounting information is incorporated in the price formation process in an efficient 
market, but private information may not be taken into consideration. Fourth, beside the 
OLS and FE estimators, I also employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
method to account for endogeneity, unobserved heteorogeneity and for the persistence 
of dependent variables. This estimator yields consistent estimations of parameters, 
compared with the OLS estimation, which may lead to inconsistent estimates in this 
type of study.  
 
The findings highlight several important issues for policymakers in the three markets. 
First, the governance role of equity trading can complement the internal governance 
mechanism as stock markets perform an external monitoring role, which will lead to an 
improvement of bank performance. As suggested by Ferreira et al. (2011), stock prices 
are informative; thus, stock markets are able to perform a monitoring role to discipline 
managers. This is especially useful for regulators when designing trading regulation to 
achieve fair competition in the stock market. Second, regulators should encourage 
financial institutions to monitor their stock price reaction of disclosure in order to 
enhance the risk management function. Third, with the mixed empirical findings on the 
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relationship between capital and bank efficiency, I argue that prudential regulation and 
supervision on capital requirement could affect bank performance. My findings extend 
the understanding of the relationship between bank efficiency and stock price in the 
Chinese market. My findings indicate that stock prices affect optimal organisation 
design. 
 
The analysis offers a simple fundamentals-based explanation for why banks need to 
maintain high levels of capital. From a methodological viewpoint, both the higher 
frequency data and the compensatory effects between bank-specific information and 
macroeconomic data prove the usefulness of measuring market discipline and bank 
capital, particularly when banks are investigated.  
 
The findings indicate a rich set of future research aspects. First, I have focused on 
market factors associated with financial firms. However, many non-financial firms in 
emerging economies also face a high degree of information asymmetry. Therefore, 
future research should verify whether my findings can be replicated in the non-financial 
industry. Second, PIN can act as one of the external corporate governance instruments 
to influence bank capital structure. However, some internal corporate governance, such 
as board composition and the ownership structure, also can affect the level of capital. 
For example, is better internal governance associated with capital structure? Third, there 
is little known about the inter-relationship between the external and internal corporate 
governance. Future research should address these important questions. 
 
  
64 
 
 
Chapter 3: How the corporate governance 
mechanisms affect bank risk taking 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The reason behind the 2008 financial crisis is, to a large extent, attributable to excessive 
risk-taking by financial institutions (DeYoung et al., 2013; Minton et al., 2014). In turn, 
international supervisory authorities proposed an array of requirements to monitor and 
control bank risk. In addition, the forces of technological change have contributed to the 
progressive process of financial integration and have increased competition in the 
banking industry over the last two decades. Therefore, the scope of banks’ operations 
and activities has been completely reshaped, from traditional intermediation products to 
an array of new businesses. As a result of this process, the intensive competition may 
lead to banks taking greater risks, or possibly even excessive risk-taking.  
 
Given that corporate governance is essentially a mechanism for controlling risk within 
banks, it is not surprising that the recent academic studies have emphasised the 
importance of effective corporate governance practices in the banking industry 
(Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2015). Some researchers argue 
that banks with better governance take lower risks (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; 
Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). However, other studies claim that banks with more favorite 
shareholders governance associate with higher risk-taking (Erkens et al., 2012; Wang 
and Hsu, 2013). Moreover, the same governance may have a different effect on bank 
risk-taking depending on the bank’s ownership structure (Adams and Mehran, 2012; 
Laeven and Levine, 2009) and board composition (Pathan, 2009). These mixed 
empirical evidences motivate my investigation. 
 
I empirically investigate the relationship between bank risk-taking and corporate 
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governance using data from listed commercial banks in the Greater China banking 
industry during the 2006–2015 period. My results show that banks with strong corporate 
governance are associated with higher risk-taking. More specifically, banks that have no 
relationship with the top ten shareholders, have a meaningful stake-holding by 
managers, and that are audited by the Big Four audit firm, are likely to be taking more 
risks. These findings are consistent with the importance of the monitoring role of bank 
governance in recent papers (Anginer et al., 2016; Bolton et al., 2015). 
 
This chapter complements the existing empirical research on banking governance in 
several ways. First, my underlying idea is that several characteristics of the corporate 
governance might reflect shareholders’ motivation to effectively monitor and advise 
managers. Bank governance-research on risk-taking typically incorporates the 
information on board compositions alone, such as the board size, the number of board 
meetings and the percentage of independent board members. However, ownership 
structure is an essential part of governance, which should also be a significant factor in 
explaining risk difference for the banking sector (Barry, et al., 2011). My research aims 
to fill this gap by incorporating three characteristics to construct a governance score, 
and which represent the level of corporate governance. In addition, measurement of 
bank risk can encompass a variety of dimensions; this chapter focuses on loan quality 
and default risk (Z score). 
 
Second, my research increases the understanding of banking governance in an emerging 
economy by involving China’s banking sector. This sector is dominated by large 
state-owned banks, which operate under strict government regulations and intervention. 
Intensive government intervention may reduce the role of corporate governance on 
effectively monitoring managers. However, my results show that internal governance is 
still an effective mechanism to monitor bank risk-taking in the Chinese market, which is 
consistent with the findings on European and US markets.  
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
related literature and hypothesis development. Section 3 outlines the methodology used 
in this chapter to construct measures of corporate governance and bank risk-taking, as 
well as describes the empirical model used. Section 4 describes my dataset, including 
descriptive statistics about governance mechanisms and bank risk-taking. In section 5 I 
discuss my main empirical results on the relationship between governance and bank 
risk-taking. Section 6 presents results from additional robustness checks. Section 7 
provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
Banking research has devoted tremendous effort to studying the roles of corporate 
governance in recent years. Some studies emphasise that flaws in corporate governance 
play a key role in bank risk-taking (Minton et al., 2014; Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2015; 
Williams, 2014). Srivastav and Hagendorff (2015) highlight the need for effective bank 
governance to mitigate the behaviours harming the interest of different stakeholders and 
exacerbating risk-taking, which reflect the needs of shareholders, creditors and the 
taxpayer. The idea is, generally, that strong corporate governance normally associates 
with better risk management function, which would lead to correctly identify risks and 
prevent such excessive risk-taking. Therefore, this chapter is related to two strands of 
literature: first, to the extensive literature on corporate governance in the banking sector; 
and second, to the literature on the effects of bank risk-taking. 
 
Corporate governance is significantly related to bank risk-taking because there are some 
observed and unobserved bank characteristics. Such bank characteristics include: the 
functioning of the board, CEO duality, ownership structure, and external monitoring. 
Following Srivastav and Hagendorff (2015), I define bank risk-taking as policies that 
increase risk through governance channels.  
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Academics have argued that the board is the shareholder’s first line of defense in 
governance (Adams and Mehran, 2012; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Indeed, the 
role of the board of directors in overseeing and identifying risk in financial institutions 
has come under scrutiny since the financial crisis. Additionally, establishing and 
implementing risk-control systems are also part of the responsibility of boards. Thus, 
the board becomes one of the key mechanisms to monitor management behavior on 
risk-taking of the firm. Furthermore, having strong board governance structure is 
important to ensure that bank managers focus on the right issues. However, the evidence 
for a beneficial effect of a board’s composition on bank risk-taking has remained far 
from convincing. Specifically, extant literatures on boards of directors that concentrate 
on the determinants of size, board meetings, and the fraction of independent board 
members, are still mixed and inconsistent. 
 
The relationship between board size and bank risk-taking remains ambiguous. Large 
boards may add value due to the operational, geographic and financial complexity in 
banking firms, which in turn requires greater levels of advising and monitoring, and is 
less easily captured by management. Adams and Mehran (2012) find that board size is 
positively related to performance. However, free-rider problems may arise in large 
boards, which negatively affect the value of banks. According to Jensen (1993), 
increased group becomes less effective because of coordination and process problems. 
Anginer et al. (2016) find that boards of an intermediate size are associated with lower 
bank risk-taking in terms of bank capitalisation. Equally, De Andres and Vallelado 
(2008) also suggest an inverted U-shaped relation between board size and bank 
performance. Pathan (2009) finds that a small bank board is associated with more bank 
risk-taking. 
 
The presence of independent directors on a bank’s board is mainly to mitigate the 
agency cost of equity. A higher number of independent directors on a board are expected 
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to better represent the interest of shareholders and effectively monitor the bank’s 
managers. However, the impact of a more or less independent board on a bank’s 
risk-taking is unclear, given the mixed nature of the empirical results. For instance, De 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) find that larger and not excessively independent boards 
might prove more efficient in monitoring and advising functions, and thus create more 
value. Erkens et al. (2012) find that banks with more independent boards raised more 
equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders 
to debtholders. Nevertheless, both Anginer et al. (2016) and Pathan (2009) report that a 
higher fraction of independent directors pursue less risky policies. Minton et al. (2014) 
find that independent directors with financial expertise supported increased risk-taking 
prior to the financial crisis in US banks.  
 
CEO power is also an important factor that affects a board’s monitoring ability. CEO 
duality means that the chief executive officer and the chairman of the board are the 
same person. CEO duality restricts the information flow to other members of the board, 
which may give rise to riskier bank strategies, and hence negatively affect the 
independence of the board. DeYoung et al. (2013) show that contractual risk-taking 
incentives for CEOs increase when industry deregulation expands banks’ growth 
opportunities. Thus, effective separation of the CEO and chairman roles may enable a 
board to promote the interests of shareholders better (Anginer et al., 2016).  
 
Despite the standard factors on board governance discussed above, Elyasiani and Zhang 
(2015) examine the association between the ‘busyness’ of the board of directors (serving 
on multiple boards) and bank holding company (BHC) risk. Berger et al. (2014) 
demonstrate that banks take on more portfolio risk if they are managed by younger 
executives, or by a higher proportion of female executives, while an increase of 
executives holding PhD degrees reduces portfolio risk.  
 
In addition to the board function, standard agency theories suggest that ownership 
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structure has an impact on corporate risk-taking. Indeed, analysis without ownership 
structure may provide an incomplete evidence of bank risk-taking. Laeven and Levine 
(2009) find that the relationships between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit 
insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities, depend on each bank’s ownership 
structure. However, the evidence on the relationship between the ownership of banks 
and bank risk-taking is still mixed. Lin and Zhang (2009) assess the effect of bank 
ownership on performance in the Chinese market. They find that banks with foreign 
ownership are more profitable and have better asset quality than state-owned banks. The 
management of state-owned banks is not adequately monitored; thus there are no private 
owners with necessary incentives to engage in active monitoring. Iannotta et al. (2013) 
use cross-country data on a sample of large European banks and find that 
government-owned banks have a lower default risk, but a higher operating risk, than 
private banks, indicating that the presence of governmental protection induces higher 
risk-taking. In addition, institutional ownership of banks has increased substantially 
over the past two decades, which also implies changes in corporate governance and 
banks’ behaviors in terms of risk-taking. Both Erkens et al. (2012) and Barry et al. 
(2011) claim that banks with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the 
crisis, which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period. Moreover, 
after empirically examining the determinants of risk-taking at Japanese commercial 
banks, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) show that the relationship between the stable 
shareholders’ ownership and bank risk is nonlinear.  
 
Hypothesis development 
H1: Strong corporate governance is associated with lower bank risk-taking.  
My main hypothesis is motivated by Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), who suggest that 
banks with strong internal control on governance should have a lower tail risk, all else 
equal. In contrast, banks with poor governance likely engage in excessive risk-taking, 
causing them to make larger losses. For risks to be successfully managed, they must 
first be identified and measured correctly. A strong risk-management function is 
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necessary to correctly identify risks and prevent such excessive risk-taking. The main 
job of effective risk management at banks is to limit exposure to risks, and hence to the 
possibility of negative outcomes (Chernobai et al., 2012). DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) 
suggest that risk management is central to banks’ operating policies. Keys et al. (2009) 
find that strong risk management is associated with less risky subprime loan 
securitisations. Because only safe debt commands a liquidity premium, banks use risk 
management to maximise their capacity to include such debt into their operations. In 
addition, Minton et al. (2014), Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), and Aebi et al. (2012) all 
show that risk-management governance can affect bank risk-taking. There are many 
tools used by banks to control their portfolio risk and maintain higher levels of safe debt, 
such as diversification, hedging, and using derivatives. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) 
suggest that banks with better governance (lower G-Index), more independent boards, 
and less entrenched CEOs have strong a risk-management function in large US bank 
holding companies. Moreover, Aebi et al. (2012) document that banks with a chief risk 
officer (CRO) directly reporting to the board of directors exhibited significantly higher 
stock returns and return on equity during the 2008 financial crisis. Additionally, from an 
asset quality management perspective, better quality credit and the reduction of 
excessive shares of illiquid loans in asset portfolios will diminish bank risk-taking 
(Ghosh, 2015).  
 
Risk-taking is affected not just by risk-management, but also by the taking of private 
benefits of larger shareholders. Larger shareholders may opt to risk adverse investments 
in order to protect their private benefits. Because there is less fear of expropriation by 
insiders if the corporate governance improves (Burkart et al., 2003), the dominant 
shareholders might reduce their holding, or directly influence the decision-making by 
managers. From a shareholder’s perspective, assessing the risk of a bank may be more 
difficult than other nonfinancial firms. Thereafter, managers would implement 
conservative investment policies, which would lead to reduced risk-taking.  
 
71 
 
 
The third argument is that managerial incentives matter. Higher executive compensation 
leads to excessive risk-taking by banks (Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Bolton et al., 2015; 
Cunat and Guadalupe, 2009; DeYound et al., 2013), which may improve performances 
in the short run, but can cause significant impairments to the banks when such risks 
materialise. Specifically, equity-based compensation (EBC) has increased recently in 
embedded bank executive compensation packages. The advantage of EBC for 
executives is to share the benefits from risky investments with shareholders, and to 
reduce agency costs. As a senior manager’s personal wealth is undiversified, they would 
not support the positive net present value but risky investment, which may lead to risk 
aversion. Indeed, it is difficult to directly monitor managers when firms have a wide 
range of investment opportunity sets. However, adopting EBC schemes aligns the 
interest of management and shareholders, and also encourages managers to pass up 
risky investments. A number of studies on financial firms provide evidence consistent 
with this phenomenon. Specifically, Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) find the evidence 
which supports the view that increased EBC leads banks to make riskier choices in their 
mergers and acquisition decisions. As Core et al. (1999) note, the executives earn 
greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. Overall, the 
presence of strong corporate governance may be necessary to control the risk exposures 
of financial institutions. 
 
H2: Strong corporate governance is associated with higher bank risk-taking. 
My second hypothesis is that banks with strong corporate governance attributes may 
take more risks. Value-maximising shareholders are likely to choose aggressive 
strategies, especially for banks, and such risky strategies may lead to significant losses. 
Thus, firms with better investor protection governance are likely to undertake riskier, 
but more value enhancing, investments (John et al., 2008). Anginer et al. (2016) find 
that shareholder-friendly corporate governance associates with lower bank capitalisation, 
and that such a relationship is especially strong for banks located in developed countries. 
In addition, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that CEOs whose incentives are better 
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aligned with the interests of shareholders perform worse, and there is no evidence that 
they perform better. Pathan (2009) finds that strong bank boards positively affect bank 
risk-taking. Sullivan and Spong (2007) also find that stock ownership by hired 
managers can increase total the risk of a bank.  
 
In addition, deposit insurance schemes are widely applied in many countries as part of a 
financial system safety net to promote banking stability. However, the schemes may 
contribute to bank shareholders’ moral hazard problems by stimulating higher bank 
risk-taking, as they enjoy a ‘subsidy’ which increases the value of leverage. For instance, 
Laeven and Levine (2009) find that that deposit insurance is associated with an increase 
in risk when the bank has a large equity holder with sufficient power to act on the 
additional risk-taking incentives created by the deposit insurance. The scheme also 
discourages most bank creditors from limiting managers’ risk-taking. Anginer et al., 
(2014) find that deposit insurance schemes increased bank risk and systemic fragility in 
the years leading up to the global financial crisis. Since shareholders have incentives to 
take higher risks, strong corporate governance can be expected to be positively 
associated with bank risk-taking.  
 
H3: Corporate governance has no impact on bank risk-taking. 
My third hypothesis is that corporate governance does not have any impact on bank 
risk-taking. Several arguments support this hypothesis. First, risk managers of banks are 
without any real power; they merely satisfy the regulatory requirements of banks. 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find no relationship between better governance and bank 
risk-taking because of the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market 
funding. Vazquez and Federico (2015) also find that banks with weaker structural 
liquidity and higher leverage are more likely to fail later on.  
 
My second argument relates to regulation. The stability of the banking sector is a major 
concern of relevant economic authorities. Indeed, the authorities use several tools to 
73 
 
 
monitor and control bank risk-taking, which include capital requirements, restrictions 
on bank activities, and official supervisory power. The failure of the banking sector 
would thus increase systemic risk, and cause the possible consequent meltdown of the 
whole financial system. Fratzscher et al. (2016) suggest that bank supervision/regulation 
and institutions tend to be substitutes rather than complements. An obvious example is 
that many governments bailed out financial institutions in the financial crisis of 2008 
and 2009 in order to stabilise them. However, Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) find that 
government’s bailouts lead to higher risk-taking among protected banks’ competitors. 
Acharya et al. (2014) document that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 
2008. Banks’ shareholders benefited from ‘too big to fail’ that was supported by 
regulators, and gained most from shifting risk to other stakeholders (Hagendorff and 
Vallascas, 2011). Williams (2014) finds evidence of risk-seeking due to ‘too big to fail’ 
effects in the Asian region.  
 
Third, market discipline is another mechanism which influences bank risk-taking (Barry 
et al., 2011; Bennett et al., 2015; Hilscher and Raviv, 2014), because the market 
participants have the incentives to monitor the banks and the ability to accurately 
process the disclosed information. In addition, The Basel Accord III has highlighted the 
importance of market discipline and it is one of the three pillars in Basel Accord II. 
However, empirical evidence on the market discipline remains mixed in the banking 
sector. After investigating the effects of issuing contingent capital, Hilscher and Raviv 
(2014) conclude that market discipline is an effective tool for stabilising financial 
institutions. Hou et al. (2016) investigate whether the depositor discipline of banking 
works in the context of an emerging economy under financial repression and implicit 
government guarantee, and they find that bank risk is negatively associated with the 
growth of deposit volumes.  
 
Finally, several studies conclude that the managerial incentive on governance does not 
connect with risk-taking in banking industry. One plausible interpretation is that the 
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boards provide their executives with the incentives necessary to exploit the growth 
opportunities in new products (such as insurance underwriting, securities brokerage, and 
investment banking), but the investment opportunities are limited by regulatory 
restrictions in the banking industry. Therefore, EBC are expected to be lower under 
strict regulations, leading to weaker incentives to take risks.  
 
H4: Corporate governance positively / negatively impacts bank risk-taking while bank 
performance increases. 
Banking theory suggests that corporate governance affects risk-taking in different 
economic environments. Better governed banks can identify risks that are more 
beneficial to shareholders and encourage managers to take higher risks in normal time. 
Bank with strong risk management functions can curtail risk exposures (Ellul and 
Yerramilli, 2013). Minton et al. (2014) claim that financial expertise among the boards 
was associated with more risk-taking prior to the financial crisis. However, it is 
commonly believed that the better governed banks would have limited the excessive 
risks taken by banks’ management and mitigated their fall during the financial crisis. 
Poor bank governance may be a major cause of financial crisis, as banks with more 
shareholder-friendly boards performed worse during the crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 
2012). Thus, it is an empirical question as to whether corporate governance is associated 
with more or less risk-taking while bank performance increasing. 
 
 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Measures of corporate governance 
Following Hass et al. (2014), I construct a parsimonious index to measure the strength 
of bank corporate governance. The index contains three aspects of corporate governance: 
board governance, ownership structure, and the quality of external auditor.  
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First, bank boards should be able to effectively monitor and control bank risks (Berger 
et al., 2014; Minton et al., 2014). Therefore, banks with boards that are more effective in 
monitoring and advising management terms are better governed. A vast number of 
literatures discuss the composition of the board of directors. I argue that three crucial 
aspects regarding the boards of directors need to be emphasised relating to bank 
risk-taking: the fraction of the independence directors, board size and CEO duality. 
Adams and Mehran (2012) find that banks have larger and more independent boards 
than other non-financial firms. More independent board members would improve the 
supervision of management and reduce the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers. The skilled independent directors help to improve the strategic 
decision-making and risk-management control. As a bank grows and diversifies, it faces 
an increasing demand for specialised outside board members who can perform tasks 
such as identifying and monitoring risk. Liang et al. (2013) find that the proportion of 
independent directors positively impacts on a bank’s asset quality in Chinese banks. In 
addition, an advantage of large boards is the ability to assign more people to supervise 
and advise managers’ decisions. Both Pathan (2009) and Wang and Hsu (2013) find that 
small boards lead to additional bank risks, as reflected in market measures of risk. In 
contrast, large boards may encounter problems of coordination, control, and 
decision-making, as well as the concern of the free rider. Small boards, however, may 
not have enough ability to monitor such complexities within the banking business. De 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) confirm a hypothesised inverted U-shaped relation 
between board size and bank performance. Furthermore, Anginer et al. (2016) show that 
separation of the CEO and chairman roles is associated with higher bank risk, in terms 
of bank capitalisation, due to board independence from management. In contrast, Pathan 
(2009) finds that a CEO’s power (a CEO’s ability to control board decisions) negatively 
affects bank risk-taking. 
 
Apart from board governance, the incentives of managers or directors to take risks 
should also be considered within the banking sector. The managers or directors may 
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have incentives to take fewer risks when they hold a small share of the bank’s 
ownership. As managers’ human capital investment and reputation are non-diversifiable, 
they have incentive to lead a bank better performance. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) 
find that the banks managers whose incentives are better aligned with shareholders are 
more likely to affect performance levels. However, Saunders et al. (1990) show that 
stockholder-controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk-taking behavior than 
managerially controlled banks during deregulation periods. In addition, given the 
growing significance of financing across countries, foreign ownership is one of the 
factors that draws considerable attention from corporate governance. Foreign investors 
are in the position of informational disadvantage, as compared to domestic investors 
(Choe et al., 2005). Additionally, foreign investors avoid investing in poorly governed 
corporations because they suffer from asymmetrical information problems (Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008; Leuz et al., 2010). Therefore, they are normally more adverse to risks. 
 
Large controlling shareholders are suggested by concentrating their stakes to monitor 
managers and directly intervene in investment decisions (Porta et al., 1999), which may 
help to mitigate agency costs. However, ownership concentration stimulates 
shareholders’ incentives to seek private benefit of control (Faccio et al., 2001; Peng et 
al., 2011), which could negatively affect firms’ corporate governance. The first reason is 
that relational large shareholders have incentive and opportunity to gain access to 
critical information that benefits them. Second, the relational shareholders provide 
facilities for expropriating benefits from dispensed small shareholders. Thus, the 
presence of the relation between larger shareholders is likely to affect firms’ corporate 
governance.  
 
A regulatory environment can constrain excessive bank risk-taking. More specifically, a 
high quality audit is expected to affect firm governance. The level of monitoring and 
control imposed by external audits and supervisory actions can improve the governance 
and constrain opportunistic of excessive risk-taking (Bouvatier et al., 2014).  
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Based on the above discussion, and consistent with Hass et al. (2014), I filter seven 
relevant characteristics, which are: the percentage of total directors who are independent 
(1INDIV); the number of directors serving on the banks’ boards (2BS); CEO power 
(whether or not the CEO also chairs the board) (3DUAL); whether there are any 
relationships between the largest ten shareholders (4TOP10); the percentage of shares 
owned by directors, supervisors, and executives (5MH); the percentage of shares owned 
by foreign shareholders (6FOREIGN); and the identification of the external auditors 
(7AUDIT). Thereafter, in light of the findings in previous studies (e.g. Adams and 
Mehran, 2012; Anginer et al., 2016; Bouvatier et al., 2014; DeYoung et al., 2013), I 
apply specific criteria for each characteristic. According to Hass et al. (2014), a dummy 
variable is constructed for each characteristic that meets certain criteria. Seven criteria 
specify as follows: whether the board consists of 50% of independent board members; 
whether the board size is greater than 6 but less than 13; whether there is separation 
between the role of CEO and board chairman; whether there are any relationships 
among the top ten largest shareholders; whether there are any holdings of executives 
that are greater than 1% but less than 30%; whether there is any foreign ownership; and 
whether the bank is audited by the joint ventures of the Big Four5 internal audit firms 
and domestic audit firms. Finally, I add the seven criteria into a total score that 
represents the overall governance quality, denoted as CG. Higher scores indicate strong 
corporate governance for individual banks in a particular year.  
 
3.3.2 Measures of bank risk-taking 
A traditional measure of bank risk is the standard deviation of either return on equity or 
return on assets. However, this type of measure has been criticised as being imprecise, 
as it is based on small samples. Two proxies of bank risk are selected to show whether 
strong corporate governance has any impact on bank risk-taking. I primarily measure 
bank risk using the Z-score, which is widely used in the bank literature as a bank 
                                                             
5 The Big Four audit firms are Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC. 
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risk-taking indicator (see, for instance, Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Fu et al., 2014; Minton 
et al., 2014; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Williams, 2014). Z-score is calculated as 
follows: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 =
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
 
(Equation 9) 
where ROA is the return on assets, E/TA is the ratio of equity to total assets, and 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴 
is the standard deviation of return on assets. As the Z-score is highly skewed, following 
Laeven and Levine (2009) and Fu et al. (2014), I use the natural logarithm of the 
Z-score, which is normally distributed.  
 
The Z-score measures the distance from insolvency because a bank becomes insolvent 
when its assets value is less than its debts, as it shows the number of standard deviations 
below the average a bank’s return on assets has to fall in order for that bank’s capital 
reserves to be depleted. So a larger Z-score indicates that the bank is more stable, as it is 
further away from bankruptcy. Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) use Z-score as an insolvency 
risk, and find that banks with a greater number of busy directors exhibit lower 
insolvency risks. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that Z-score is positively associated 
with shareholder-friendly boards. Minton et al. (2014) suggest that boards consisting of 
higher numbers of financial experts are positively associated with bank risk, which is 
measured by Z-score. Fu et al., (2014) investigate the influence of bank competition, 
concentration, and regulation, and of national institutions on individual bank fragility, as 
measured by the bank’s Z-score.  
 
My second measure of risk is the reserve of impairment loans, which reflects the credit 
quality of banks and the overall attitude of the banking system. Banks with poor credit 
quality associate with risky loan portfolios, which in turn results in higher risk-taking. 
This risk measure has been commonly applied in recent banking studies. For instance, 
Haq and Heaney (2012) use loan loss provision as a measure to examine the 
determinants of bank risk.  
 
3.3.3 Other explanatory variables 
Following Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), Fu et al. (2014), Laeven and Levine (2009) and 
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Williams (2014), I include a range of bank specific variables to explain bank risk-taking 
and to obtain consistence parameters. These measures are common and well accepted in 
recent banking literature.  
 
One of the most debatable questions is whether size affects bank risk-taking. Large 
banks benefit from diversification and economies of scales, and would be more stable 
than smaller banks. Pathan (2009) shows that bank size lowers insolvency risks. Haq 
and Heaney (2012) also find that large banks reflect lower credit risks. Additionally, 
smaller banks are more easily liquidated, or are the target of unfavorable takeovers 
when they are in financial distress. However, banks are becoming larger and arguably 
more complex, which may increase difficulties in monitoring their risk levels effectively. 
In a recent study of Asian banks, Fu et al., (2014) find that smaller banks tend to take 
fewer risks. In addition, the concept of ‘too big to fail’ is important to the national 
banking system, as governments are likely to seek means to prevent bank failures 
(Williams, 2014). Given the skewed numbers of size distribution, the logarithm of total 
assets (LNTA) is employed as proxy for a bank’s size, which is consistent with Fu et al. 
(2014), Pathan (2009) and Laeven and Levine (2009).  
 
Diversification provides a credible sign of a bank’s ability to minimise risk. In contrast, 
increased non-interest income also generates agency conflict and increased complexity. 
Broad activities may lead to the bank becoming extremely large and complex, and thus 
extraordinarily difficult to monitor and ‘too big to discipline’ (Laeven and Levine, 2007). 
In addition, diversification might intensify moral hazard problems and present more 
opportunities for banks to take higher risks. As diversification relates to both bank 
risk-taking and corporate governance, I also control for the banks’ diversification 
activities. Following Fu et al. (2014), I employ the return on average assets (ROAA) to 
track the profitability of a bank’s operating activities. 
 
Theory suggests an important role for capital in mitigating agency problems and the 
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attendant uncertainty for outsider stakeholders, especially depositors in the banking 
sector. Bank capital is the main buffer against unexpected default; but the effect of bank 
capital on risk-taking is ambiguous. Greater equity capital encourages prudent 
behaviour and improves the survival probability of banks (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; 
Fratzscher et al., 2016). Both Fratzscher et al. (2016) and Haq and Heaney (2012) find 
that higher capital buffers lower bank risk, which is consistent with the argument that it 
facilitates the stability of the banking system. In addition, Lee and Hsieh (2013) also 
find a negative relationship between capital and bank risk. Konishi and Yasuda (2004) 
find that the implementation of the capital adequacy requirement reduces risk-taking at 
commercial banks. Yet, the moral hazard hypothesis suggests that bank managers have 
incentive to increase risk-taking. Highly capitalised banks may take more risks as the 
deposit is guaranteed. Ghosh (2015) finds a positive relationship between the level of 
capital and bank risk. Moreover, Williams (2014) finds a U-shaped relationship between 
bank risk and capital. I use the ratio of total equity to total asset to measure 
capitalisation, much like Ghosh (2015) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012).  
 
In additional to bank-specific variables, the impact of state-level economic conditions 
on bank risk also needs to be taken into account (Ghosh, 2015). Banks may fail to 
internalise risks stemming from overheated macroeconomic and loose monetary 
conditions (Vazquez and Federico, 2015). Thus, I include three measures of economic 
performance to control for different macroeconomic conditions. 
 
First, the rate of real GDP growth (RGDP), the most natural indicator of the business 
cycle of an economy, is used as a proxy for the fluctuations in economic activity. Ghosh 
(2015) shows that higher state RGDP reduces non-performing loans. The GDP growth is 
expected to have a negative effect on bank risk because the demand for revenue 
increases during cyclical upswings. Alternatively, a positive relationship is expected if 
the level of bank risk is lower in business upturns, given a countercyclical 
materialisation. Both Williams (2014) and DeYoung et al. (2013) find that banks in 
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better economic environments are more likely to implement risk-increasing investment 
strategies. 
 
Second, inflation rates also play an ambiguous role in determining bank risk-taking. 
Inflation variability causes lenders to estimate incorrectly the value of loan collateral 
and borrowers’ loan repayments. Thus, stable and constant inflation rates would reduce 
the real value of debt and, in turn, lower bank risks. However, excessive inflation rates 
may deplete borrowers’ real income and boom bank risk, especially when income does 
not increase with inflation. Ghosh (2015) finds a positive relationship between inflation 
rates and bank risk-taking. 
 
Third, lending interest rates are employed as proxy for the term structure of borrowing. 
Banks normally use short-term deposits to finance long-term lending. Increases in 
interest rates may increase the real value of borrowers’ debt, stimulate debt servicing as 
more expensive, as well as increase loan defaults. Thus, bank risk may be positively 
impacted by lending interest rates. However, Ghosh (2015) shows that interest rate has 
no effect on bank risk, in terms of non-performing loans. 
 
3.3.4 Empirical models 
Panel data analysis is the most efficient instrument to use when the sample is a mixture 
of time series and cross-sectional data. Thus the following regression equation is 
formulated to empirically test the Hypotheses 1 to 3:  
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (Equation 10) 
 
where t and i denote time period and banks, respectively. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term with a 
mean of zero. RISK refers to the i th bank’s risk-taking in year t, proxied by two risk 
variables: Z-score (ZS) and loan loss provision (LLP). CG is the score of corporate 
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governance. In addition, four internal control variables are set as the bank specific 
characteristics: the logarithm of total assets (LNTA); equity to assets ratio (ETA); price 
to earnings ratio (PE); return on average asset (ROAA); and the logarithm of total 
deposit (DEP). Furthermore, three macro control variables are set as the related external 
control variables: GDP growth rate (GDP); inflation rate (INF); and lending interest rate 
(INT).  
 
To test the Hypotheses 4 and 5, the interaction term of GG and ROAA is being included 
in the equation 3: 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝐺 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 11) 
 
The definition of the above bank risk proxies and explanatory variables are summarised 
in Table (11). 
 
3.3.5 Endogeneity and generalised method of moments (GMM) 
Based on the discussions of the dependent and explanatory variables, I employ the 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator as robustness to test my hypotheses 
and estimate the model parameters. The GMM estimator is proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and applied by several recent banking literatures, such as Hou et al. (2016) 
Ghosh (2015), and Bouvatier et al. (2014). As in most empirical corporate finance 
research, the analysis of the relationship between corporate governance and bank 
risk-taking faces the challenge of endogeneity, which can arise from unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, and reverse causality. The GMM estimator enables us to 
tackle the following particular econometric problems: (i) the autoregressive process in 
the data-relating dependent variables; (ii) the presence of unobserved firm-specific 
effects; and (iii) the likely endogeneity of the independent variables. 
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Table 11: Definition of variables 
Variables Symbol Description  Sources 
Corporate governance   
Independent members 1NDIV Whether board is controlled by more 
than 50% independent directors 
Manual collection 
Board size 2BS Whether board size is greater than 6 
but fewer than 13 
Manual collection 
CEO chairman 
duality 
3DUAL The chairman and CEO are not the 
same person 
Manual collection 
Relationship  4TOP10 There are no relationships among the 
top ten shareholders 
Manual collection 
Managerial holding 5MH Management ownership (directors, 
supervisors, and executives) is greater 
than 1% but less than 30% 
Manual collection 
Foreign ownership 6FORE Foreign investor ownership is greater 
than zero 
Manual collection 
Bi4 4 Audit firm 7AUDIT Audited by one of the Big 4 audit 
firm or their joint ventures 
Manual collection 
Internal corporate 
governance 
CG Internal corporate governance score Aggregate above 
seven attributes 
Bank risk-taking    
Z-score ZS [Average (Returns) + Average 
(Equity/Total assets)] / Standard 
deviation (Equity/Total assets) 
Use original 
Bankscope data to 
calculate 
Loan loss provision LLP The natural logarithm of the amount 
of loan loss reserve 
Bankscope 
Bank specific characteristics   
Bank size LNTA The natural logarithm of total assets 
in thousands of USD 
Bankscope 
Capitalisation ETA The ratio of equity to assets Bankscope 
PE ratio PE The ratio of market price to earnings 
per share 
Bankscope 
Return on assets ROAA The ratio of profit to average assets Bankscope 
Depositor  LNDEP The natural logarithm of the amount 
of deposit in thousands of USD 
Bankscope 
Macroeconomics    
GDP growth rate GDP Yearly real GDP growth (%) International 
Monetary Fund 
Inflation rate INF Inflation rate International 
Monetary Fund 
Lending interest INT Lending interest rate International 
Monetary Fund 
 
 
I employ the AR (1) and AR (2), and the Hansen test to check the validity of my 
estimates. AR (1) and AR (2) are the Arellano–Bond tests for first and second order 
autocorrelation of the residuals. The AR (1) test should reject the null hypothesis of no 
first order serial correlation, while the AR (2) test should not reject the null hypothesis 
of no second order serial correlation of the residuals. The Hansen test checks the 
validity of the entire set of instruments as a group.  
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3.4 Data 
3.4.1 Data sources 
The sample examined in this chapter includes the largest commercial listed banks in the 
Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan markets, covering a span of ten years, from 
2006 to 2015. The requirement of my observation is that the bank must be publicly 
traded, making it possible to collect data on board governance as well as other internal 
governance characteristics of the firms from published statements. My sample period 
(2006–2015) is carefully chosen to avoid the impact of the 2005 reform in Mainland 
China.6 In addition, most of the banks in Mainland China are listed in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006. These banks pillar 
contain large nationwide banks and regional banks. Moreover, aggregate data for 
cross-marketing are considered preferable as the risk of non-representativeness of the 
sample is reduced. Meanwhile, studies based on a bank-by-bank basis are useful in a 
micro-prudential context. Therefore, exploiting cross-market variation in risk-taking 
trends is likely to produce more robust results than the analysis of individual markets. 
 
The data used in this chapter comes from three sources. My first source is the 
Bankscope, which is a leading information source for global financial institutions. All 
variables sourced from Bankscope are in US dollars, using the year ending date 
exchange rate. As information on bank governance is particularly difficult to construct, 
my second approach is to hand-collect information on various aspects of the institution 
structure of the corporate governance function at each bank each year, and use this 
information to construct a score to measure the strength of governance. These 
governance data are measured on the date of the proxy at the ending of the 
                                                             
6 The authorities in China initiated a reform to make non-tradable shares become tradable in 2005. The non-tradable 
shares, originally held by the State or by politically connected investors, were issued at the early stages of the 
financial market development. 
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corresponding fiscal year.7 My third source is the International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics, where I obtained macroeconomic data, with the 
exception of Taiwan.8  
 
As discussed in Section 3, I obtain the score of corporate governance by taking the 
principle component of the following seven governance variables: independent directors; 
board size; CEO duality; relationship between the top ten shareholders; managerial 
shareholding; foreign ownership; and external audit firms. The analysis of these 
components effectively performs a singular value decomposition of the strength of bank 
governance. The main advantage of using the sum of all components analysis is that I 
do not have to subjectively eliminate any characteristics of governance, or make 
subjective judgments regarding the relative importance of these characteristics (Tetlock, 
2007). 
 
The dataset comprises of markets with different levels of development, as well as 
different legal, political, and institutional environments. However, my data set is 
comparable with Sun and Chang’s (2011) database; they investigate the role of risk in 
eight emerging Asian countries. There are several advantages associated with my data 
set. The first advantage is that the sample includes different perspectives on corporate 
governance, and thus provides potentially more complete tests of the importance of 
governance structures. Second, the managers of these banks have similar cultural 
background in these markets; thus it offers a unique regional set of data for each year 
over the 2006–2015 period. Third, using panel data allows me to capture the 
market-specific effects and the unobservable differences between markets. While it is 
true that I examine corporate governance only for the very largest banks in these 
markets, these banks hold the vast majority of industry assets. Consequently, these 
                                                             
7 Following Adams and Mehran (2012), we also adjust our data collection procedures to account for the fact that 
some statements disclose some governance characteristics for the previous fiscal year, and some others for the 
following fiscal year. 
8 Taiwanese data is sourced from either the website of the Central Bank of the Republic of China (interest rates) or 
the website of the National Statistics of the Republic of China (all other data). 
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banks command great interest among investors, regulators and other stakeholders. 
 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics for corporate governance components 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Corporate governance attributes    
1NDIV 345 0.074 0.263 0 1 
2BS 345 0.483 0.500 0 1 
3DUAL 345 0.925 0.263 0 1 
4TOP10 345 0.302 0.459 0 1 
5MH 345 0.147 0.354 0 1 
6FORE 345 0.622 0.485 0 1 
7AUDIT 345 0.868 0.338 0 1 
CG 345 3.429 0.939 1.000 6.000 
      
Note: This table contains means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values on the variables included in the main model. ZS is 
the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is loan loss 
provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of market 
price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. GDPG is 
GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board is controlled by more than 50% of 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, and 
0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign investor 
ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if externally audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint ventures, 
and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes.  
 
 
I present summary statistics for the risk measures, governance scores, bank financial 
characteristics and macroeconomic variables in Table (13). The mean Z-score of 3.13 is 
close to the mean Z-score (3.25) reported by Beltratti and Stulz (2012). The mean of 
loan loss provision is 13.113. The mean score of governance is 3.429, and the minimum 
and maximum value ranges between 1 and 6. My governance score is higher than 2.01 
from Hass et al. (2014). As the sample of Hass et al. (2014) excludes the financial sector, 
it is reasonable to believe that governance in the financial sector is stronger than other 
industries. Regarding the bank characteristics variables, bank capital ranges from 1.7% 
to 26.4%, with an average of 9.5%. Bank size and the logarithm of total assets ranges 
from 15.29 to 21.97, with an average of 18.27.  
 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for main model variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
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ZS 345 3.138 0.771 -1.442 5.308 
LLP 345 13.11 1.948 9.603 18.46 
ETA 345 0.095 0.029 0.017 0.264 
LNTA 345 18.27 1.656 15.29 21.97 
PE 345 5.227 0.739 2.838 6.602 
ROAA 345 0.761 0.665 -2.020 2.630 
LNDEP 345 17.88 1.630 14.62 21.78 
GDP 345 5.918 4.195 -2.459 14.16 
INF 345 2.111 1.908 -0.860 5.864 
INT 345 4.625 1.526 2.560 7.900 
Note: This table contains means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values on the variables included in the main model. ZS is 
the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is loan loss 
provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of market 
price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. GDPG is 
GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board is controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, and 
0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign investor 
ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if externally audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint ventures, 
and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
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Table 14: The matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients 
 ZS LLP CG LNTA ETA PE ROAA LNDEP 
ZS 1.0000         
LLP 0.3908* 1.0000        
CG -0.1656* -0.3809* 1.0000       
LNTA 0.0123 -0.2776* 0.0016 1.0000      
ETA 0.4027* 0.9400* -0.3659* -0.2499* 1.0000     
PE 0.4313* 0.7247* -0.4085* -0.0754 0.7577* 1.0000   
ROAA 0.3122* 0.3146* -0.1604* 0.2676* 0.4007* 0.4143*  1.0000   
LNDEP 0.4149* 0.9497* -0.3578* -0.3116* 0.9814* 0.7469* 0.4001* 1.0000  
GDP 0.2462* 0.5207* -0.3951* -0.1803* 0.4423* 0.4138* 0.2551* 0.4718* 
INF 0.1727* 0.2438* -0.1875* -0.0467 0.2771* 0.2436* 0.2182* 0.3008* 
INT 0.3052* 0.4709* -0.4020* -0.1470* 0.4871* 0.4384* 0.3546* 0.5303* 
         
 GDP INF INT      
GDP 1.0000         
INF 0.3198* 1.0000        
INT 0.6077* 0.5529* 1.0000       
         
Note: This table contains means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values on the variables included in the main model. ZS is the 
Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is loan loss 
provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of market price 
to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. GDPG is GDP 
growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board is controlled by more than 50% independent 
directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the chairman and CEO 
are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 
1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign investor ownership is greater than 
zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if externally audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the 
score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients are also calculated and reported in Table (14). 
The correlation coefficients are usually small (less than 0.4), suggesting that the 
correlation between variables is weak. Pointedly, governance scores exhibit a negative 
correlation with Z-score and loan loss reserve. The Pearson pairwise correlation analysis 
can only provide some preliminary information to the following regression analysis 
because of the ambiguous causality of the correlation coefficients and the omission of 
key control independent variables. 
 
 
3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Governance and risk-taking – OLS estimation 
The empirical evidence of the relationship between bank performance and governance 
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is presented in this section. Table (15) reports the estimation results of Equation (10) to 
test the relationship between the corporate governance (CG) and bank risk-taking 
(Z-score) by OLS estimation. In specifications (1) and (2) of Table (15), 
macroeconomic control variables are excluded from the estimations because they are 
statistically insignificant in most specifications. The regression results reported in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table (15) are consistent with those in columns (1) and (2) of 
Table (15). 
 
Table 15: The relationship between bank corporate governance and risk-taking (Z-score) - 
OLS 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
CG   -1.244** -1.355** -1.337** -1.360**  
   (-2.53) (-2.42) (-2.55) (-2.43)    
ETA   2.006*** 1.926*** 1.976*** 1.936*** 
   (15.76) (13.21) (14.45) (13.30) 
LNTA   -8.188*** -9.708*** -8.053*** -9.541*** 
   (-2.77) (-2.94) (-2.58) (-2.92)    
PE   -0.564 0.223 -0.291 0.455 
   (-1.10) (0.36) (-0.51) (0.72) 
ROAA   1.091*** 1.010** 1.180*** 0.979**  
   (2.90) (2.20) (2.84) (2.12) 
LNDEP   9.716*** 10.86*** 10.02*** 11.09*** 
   (3.28) (3.31) (3.21) (3.4) 
GDP     0.027 0.104 
     (0.42) (0.73) 
INF     0.167 0.575*   
     (1.29) (1.96) 
INT     0.322 -0.171 
     (1.15) (-0.33)    
Constant   -1.004 3.668 -11.79 -5.061 
   (-0.10) (0.24) (-1.07) (-0.30)    
       
Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   345 345 345 345 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.547 0.588 0.550 0.590 
       
Note: This table contains means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values on the variables included in the main model. ZS is 
the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is loan loss 
provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of market 
price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. GDPG is 
GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board is controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if externally audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
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With regard to the determinant of Z-score as a dependent variable, I find relatively 
strong evidence that the coefficient estimates on corporate governance are negative and 
significant on all specifications in Table (15). This finding confirms Hypothesis (2). 
This illustrates that, after controlling for other bank characteristics and macro-economic 
factors, a bank with strong governance is associated with higher risk-taking. More 
specification, a 1-standarad deviation increase in CG is associated with around 1.22 to 
1.36 increase in bank risk-taking. This result is consistent with the evidence by Pathan 
(2009) and Elyasiani and Zhang (2015). 
 
The board of directors is widely recognised as the cornerstone of an effective 
governance framework. The board can evaluate whether the current and future 
risk-exposure is consistent with risk appetite by monitoring and advising bank 
operations. Most banks can be viewed as complex and opaque, based on revenue 
diversification and debt intensity. Thus, banks are likely to require more advice from 
their boards. My results confirm that an intermediate board with a greater number of 
independent directors is more effective in monitoring and advising a bank’s 
management team (Liang et al., 2013). This in turn leads bank to undertake riskier, but 
value-enhancing, investments. In a contrary manner, my results also support the claim 
of both Pathan (2009) and Wang and Hsu (2013), who find that a small board is 
associated with higher risks in banks. Also, larger boards are also less effective and 
more susceptible to influence from CEOs. In addition, as independent directors pay 
more attention to regulatory and statutory issues, managers will act more conservatively 
to avoid lawsuits (Pathan, 2009). Bank directors are more likely to be exposed to high 
penalties imposed by regulators for violating fiduciary duties. Additionally, recent 
discussions suggest that independent boards may become less effective as directors 
serve on ‘too many’ boards. However, Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) suggest that many 
directors serve on too many boards to fulfill their duties adequately, and the relationship 
between bank risk and board busyness is negative. Wang and Hsu (2013) also suggest 
that banks with a higher proportion of independent directors are less likely to suffer 
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from fraud or failure to comply with professional obligations to clients. Thus, my results 
are consistent with the findings of Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) and Wang and Hsu 
(2013), which state that boards with more outside members lead to higher risk-taking. 
Moreover, separating the role of CEO and chair could be one explanation for strong 
governance and lower bank risk-taking. As an individual with CEO and chair duality 
has a more complex job, and thus merits a higher equilibrium wage, I might expect 
increases in the level of job complexity and monitoring quality to fall. Thus, these CEOs 
may slack with regard to monitoring duties and advising on bank risk-taking.  
 
Another possible explanation might be that banks with managerial shareholding and 
foreign ownership can serve as a catalyst to control bank risk-taking. Agency problems 
and risk-preference behavior differ depending on the nature and incentive of the 
shareholder (Barry et al., 2011; Saunders et al., 1990). If a bank is managed to maximise 
investor returns, it will choose a level of risk that is consistent with that objective. This 
is because managers seeking to improve profitability might implement certain strategies 
that raise the uncertainty of the firms' income, such as introducing new production 
technologies, cutting expenses and tightening controls on production. In addition, 
shareholders may not be able to commit to monitoring such complex contracts and 
projects (Bolton et al., 2015). Sullivan and Spong (2007) find that managerial 
shareholding is positively linked with bank risk, meaning that under certain conditions, 
hired managers operate their banks more closely in line with stockholder interests. The 
limited liability shareholders have great incentive to increase the risk-taking of the bank 
by increasing leverage to maximise their wealth.  
 
In contrast, managers may act risk-averse, rather than chasing risk, due to 
non-diversifiable human capital. Therefore, banks with part managerial shareholding 
exhibit higher risk-taking behaviours than stockholder-controlled banks (Saunders et al., 
1990). My results are consistent with the findings of Saunders et al. (1990). In addition, 
foreigners have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems (Leuz 
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et al., 2010). Given the financial resources and managerial know-how, foreign investors 
are more likely to improve the level of corporate governance through monitoring 
managers effectively. As a consequence, banks with foreign shareholders would be more 
efficient due to the strength of governance, while operating at higher risk levels.  
 
A third point is DeAngelo and Stulz’s (2015) claim that risk management is central to 
banks’ operating policies, as banks with risky assets use risk management to maximise 
their capacities. The risk-management function is performed by the asset and liability 
management committee of the board of directors. The main function of risk 
management at banks is to limit exposure to risk, and hence to reduce the possibility of 
significant losses. Most operational losses in banks can be characterised as 
consequences of a weak internal control environment (Chernobai et al., 2012). Thus, 
risk-management systems can ensure that the bank has the appropriate risk level; for 
example, ceiling increases risk or eliminating uncover risk. Indeed, risk-management 
systems would strike the balance between helping banks to take risks efficiently and 
ensuring they do not take excessive risks that can destroy their value. For instance, 
banks with a greater percentage of financial experts among their management teams can 
engage in higher risk-taking activities because they have a better understanding of more 
complex investments (Minton et al., 2014). Additionally, the presence of a chief risk 
officer in a bank’s executive board, and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly 
to the board of directors, is associated with better bank performance (Aebi et al., 2012). 
Therefore, consistent with my findings, banks with strong corporate governance are 
normally associated with better risk-management systems, in turn raising risk-taking 
(Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013).  
 
Fourth, depositors’ discipline could also be one of the reasons that explains the positive 
relationship between corporate governance and bank risk-taking. Deposit insurance 
protects the interests of unsophisticated depositors and helps prevent bank failures. The 
banking sector is dominated by large, state-owned banks in emerging economies, 
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especially in China. Those commercial banks are under strict government regulations 
and guaranteed by government safety nets. However, Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2002) find that explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the likelihood of banking 
crises. Anginer et al. (2014) suggest that the moral hazard effect of deposit insurance 
dominates in good times, while the stabilisation effect of deposit insurance dominates in 
turbulent times. Thus, banks with strong governance may focus on mainly maximising 
shareholders’ wealth, and may neglect the interest of the depositor, which would take on 
excessive risks in normal time. 
 
Summing up, as my sample represents all major banks in the three markets, my results 
are consistent with conjecture on corporate firms, which in turn allow these banks to 
monitor and control their risk-taking at an appropriate level. My results are in line with 
corporate firm evidence by Core et al. (1999), who suggest that board and ownership 
structure are associated with the level of firm risk in terms of managerial compensation. 
My results are also consistent with the findings of John et al. (2008), who conclude that 
corporate risk-taking is positively related to the quality of investor protection. The 
results support Hypothesis (2), that better corporate governance increases bank 
risk-taking. This finding is in line with other published papers using data from other 
markets (e.g. Pathan, 2009; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015). 
 
Concerning the control variables, not surprisingly, size is an important determinant of 
bank risk-taking. From table (16), I find that the coefficients of bank size are positively 
and statistically significant. This indicates that larger banks have lower risk levels than 
smaller banks, which is consistent with the finding of Pathan (2009). The results do not 
support the argument for ‘too big to fail’, where large banks have greater incentive to 
take higher risks (Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Haq and Heaney, 
2012). A possible explanation for this is that the larger banks are more likely to have 
strong risk-management functions (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). 
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The coefficients on the ratio of equity to assets are negative and statistically significant 
for all specifications. More specifically, a 1% rise in equity to assets, capturing the 
extent of capitalisation, decreases the Z-score by 1–15%. These findings suggest that an 
increase in bank capital is associated with a rise in bank risk-taking, which is consistent 
with the argument that careful management of bank capital can control bank risk-taking. 
My results are in accordance with some of the prior studies, such as that of Haq and 
Heaney (2012). However, my results are contrary to the results obtained by Konishi and 
Yasuda (2004), who found a positive correlation between capital equity and the level of 
bank risk. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, greater prices to earning ratios negatively influence Z-score, 
suggesting that a higher share price increases bank risk-taking. This implies that banks 
in favoured stock markets engage in less prudent lending, and do not carefully originate 
their loans, in turn increasing risk. A possible explanation is that excess bank risk-taking 
is induced by management compensation based on the stock price performance (Bolton 
et al., 2015).  
 
Turning to the regional economic determinants, the coefficients on the GDP growth are 
negative and statistically significant for two specifications. This suggests that increased 
economic growth is found to be associated with increased bank risk.  
 
Overall, my economic model has strong predictive power: R-square of the regression 
implies that the variables explain between 11.1% and 17.3% of the variation in 
risk-taking, net of any effect they may have through the other independent variables. In 
addition, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on both instruments 
are jointly zero. However, the joint determination of corporate governance and 
risk-taking raises concern that the result could be biased. For instance, high-risk banks 
might be from better governance structures if dispersed shareholders have difficulty in 
monitoring risky investments. In the estimation equation R = b * C + u, R represents the 
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bank risk-taking variable, C the matrix of all independent variables, u the error term, 
and b the vector of estimated coefficients. OLS is consistent only if no unobservable 
factors affect both governance and risk. I attempt to address this concern by using a 
variety of strategies in the following sections.  
 
 
Table 16: The relationship between bank corporate governance and risk-taking (Z-score) - 
FE 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
CG   -1.155** -0.970** -1.173** -1.054**  
   (-2.36) (-2.06) (-2.40) (-2.22)    
ETA   2.027*** 1.971*** 2.017*** 1.962*** 
   (16.01) (16.02) (15.79) (15.77) 
LNTA   -7.998*** -9.854*** -7.799*** -9.697*** 
   (-2.69) (-3.41) (-2.62) (-3.35)    
PE   -0.622 -0.0683 -0.479 0.0443 
   (-1.22) (-0.14) (-0.92) -0.08 
ROAA   1.087*** 0.812** 1.151*** 0.885**  
   (2.93) (2.16) (3.02) (2.31) 
LNDEP   9.358*** 9.225*** 9.335*** 9.426*** 
   (3.14) (3.21) (3.13) (3.26) 
GDP     0.017 -0.075 
     (0.29) (-0.61)    
INF     0.164 0.279 
     (1.38) (1.12) 
INT     0.171 -0.526 
     (0.65) (-1.20)    
Constant   -1.168 31.68** -6.207 28.33*   
   (-0.13) (2.23) (-0.62) -1.77 
       
Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   345 345 345 345 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.548 0.598 0.552 0.602 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of 
market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and, 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
3.5.2 Governance and risk-taking – Fixed-effect within estimation 
The OLS estimation may be not consistent due to not considering the unobservable and 
constant heterogeneity of the bank. Therefore, in the presence of unobserved bank 
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fixed-effects, a panel ‘fixed-effect’ (FE) estimation is commonly suggested (Wooldridge, 
2002, pp. 265–291, for details on FE estimation). By including bank fixed effects, I 
limit both omitted variables’ bias and the effect of potential outliers caused by the fact 
that the number of cross-sectional units in my sample is small. FE estimation is 
consistent only if the independent variables are exogenous, which is not the case in the 
analysis of corporate governance and bank risk-taking. Many other previous papers use 
this estimation in research, either on corporate governance or on risk (Adams and 
Mehran, 2012; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009). 
Finally, the Hausman test is used to identify the optimal model compared with random 
effects. The results shown in Tables (16) suggest that the fixed effects model is the 
optimal one. 
 
Table (16) reports the estimation results of Equation (11) to test the relationship between 
CG and Z-score using the FE estimation. As before, the coefficients on the CG are not 
significantly different from zero. I still find relatively strong evidence that the 
coefficients on CG are negative, and significant on all specifications in Table (16). This 
illustrates that, after controlling for unobserved bank fixed effects, a bank with strong 
governance is associated with higher risk-taking. Thus, the Hypothesis (2) is also 
supported. A 1-standarad deviation increase in CG is associated with around 0.97 to 
1.16 increase in bank risk-taking, which is smaller than the OLS estimation. Corporate 
governance plays a proactive role through directors’ meetings, in discussions and the 
exchange of ideas on how to monitor and advise managers, which could subsequently 
influence bank risk-taking. 
 
3.5.3 Governance and risk-taking – GMM estimation 
The OLS and fixed effect estimators are neither econometrically consistent nor related 
to the theoretical postulates of corporate governance literature. Additionally, those 
estimators could be problematic because risk-taking can be endogenous. The 
endogeneity concern arises because greater risk-taking may be likely in banks operating 
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in markets with higher growth rates; that is, risk-taking and growth could be driven by a 
potential variable. Thus, I need other econometric techniques that are able to take into 
account the individual characteristics of each bank, together with the potential 
endogeneity of governance characteristics.  
 
The two-step system GMM estimator with adjusted standard errors considers the 
unobservable heterogeneity transforming the original variables into first differences, and 
the endogeneity of independent variables using instruments. Table (17) presents the 
two-step system GMM results of bank risk measures as Z-score. I present estimated 
coefficients, and show whether they are statistically different from zero (p-value). In 
addition, the diagnostics tests in Table (17) show that the model is well fitted with 
statistically insignificant test statistics for both second-order autocorrelation in second 
differences (AR 2) and Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions. Also, the 
residuals in the first difference (AR 1) are statistically significant, and are serially 
correlated by way of construction. 
 
With regard to the determinant of Z-score as the dependent variable, I find relatively 
strong evidence that the coefficient estimates on corporate governance are negative and 
significant on all columns. This illustrates that, after controlling for other bank 
characteristics and macro-economic factors, a bank with strong governance is associated 
with higher risk-taking. This result supports Hypothesis (2): that bank governance plays 
a role that is more proactive than reactive. In addition, the results in Table (17) provide 
at least some assurance that the negative association between bank governance and 
risk-taking is not being induced by obvious model misspecification. 
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Table 17: The relationship between bank corporate governance and risk-taking (Z-score) - 
GMM 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   DIFF SYS DIFF SYS 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
Lag.ZS   0.045*** 0.737*** 0.143*** 0.966*** 
   (4.22) (21.76) (6.16) (42.46) 
CG   -0.400** -0.652 -1.002** -0.159*   
   (-2.04) (-1.46) (-2.18) (-1.82)    
ETA   2.323*** 0.177*** 1.476*** -0.118*   
   (11.10) (3.37) (12.25) (-2.00)    
LNTA   -5.010*** 0.31 -4.330** -0.479 
   (-3.63) (0.29) (-2.68) (-1.58)    
PE   -0.526*** -5.251*** 0.905 -0.941**  
   (-5.62) (-6.12) (0.98) (-2.68)    
ROAA   2.258*** 0.471 1.144*** 0.092 
   (16.13) (0.68) (9.18) (0.23) 
LNDEP   6.402*** 2.896** 4.274*** 1.516*** 
   (4.56) (2.40) (3.42) (4.26) 
GDP     -0.275*** -0.416*** 
     (-4.98) (-13.15)    
INF     0.507*** 1.199*** 
     (5.60) (9.49) 
INT     -1.180*** -0.643*** 
     (-4.93) (-3.84)    
Constant    -21.73***  -7.331*** 
    (-5.20)  (-2.75)    
       
Observation   279 321 279 321 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR1   0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
AR2   0.294 0.946 0.805 0.371 
Hansan   0.998 0.828 1.000 0.682 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of 
market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30% and, 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
3.5.4 Governance components and risk-taking – OLS estimation 
As corporate governance components tend to be highly correlated, correlated omitted 
variables remain a concern in this chapter. I attempt to mitigate this concern by focusing 
on how the individual components affect risk-taking. In Table (18), I replace the 
aggregate governance scores with individual components to test the relationship 
between bank governance and risk-taking. The coefficients on these bank attributes 
variables offer some important insights. Among the seven attributes of corporate 
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governance, board size (2BS) has a negative coefficient across different specifications, 
which supports the notion that intermediate board bank boards (greater than 6 but fewer 
than 13) are involved with more risk-taking. This result is consistent with the evidence 
by Pathan (2009) and De Andres and Vallelado (2008) in the banking sector. 
 
The governance literature argues that the optimal board size should balance advisory 
needs with the costs of decision-making. More directors on boards are able to assign 
more people to supervise and monitor management decisions. Independent directors, in 
particular, should be endowed with the knowledge, incentives and abilities to discipline 
and advise managers, thus enabling the reduction of conflicts of interest between 
insiders and shareholders. Large banks have many subsidiary boards, making the role of 
the parent board in dealing with complexity less clear. Adams and Mehran (2012) argue 
that large boards may be beneficial due to the addition of directors with subsidiary 
directorships, who may add value as complexity increases. Small boards may not able to 
monitor the complexity levels in the organisation. Nevertheless, larger boards are not 
more valuable over time. Complexity can explain the positive relationship between 
board size and risk-taking, due to banks engaging in diversifying activities while 
increasing risk exposure over time. In addition, negative a relationship between bank 
performance and board size is a common finding in previous literatures, due to less 
communication and coordination. Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) find a negative 
relationship between BHC market-based risk measures and busy boards, indicating that 
BHCs with more busy directors have lower total, market, and idiosyncratic risks. 
Therefore, since shareholders have incentives to take more risks, strong bank boards 
(measured by board size) can be expected to be associated with bank risk-taking 
positively.
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Table 18: The relationship between the composition of corporate governance and risk-taking (Z-score) – OLS 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable 
varivariable 
 ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS 
           
1INDIV   -0.017       0.628 
   (-0.01)       (0.45) 
2BS    -1.996***      -1.390**  
    (-2.77)      (-1.99)  
3DUAL     6.619***     6.821*** 
     (3.61)     (3.73) 
4TOP10      18.61***    19.50*** 
      (2.95)    (2.74)  
5 MH       -5.644   1.996  
       (-0.73)     (0.24) 
6FORE        0.086  0.659 
        (0.07)  (0.53) 
7AUDIT         -2.474 -3.378**  
         (-1.58) (-2.22)  
ETA   1.881*** 1.844*** 1.825*** 1.889*** 1.881*** 1.884*** 1.896*** 1.832*** 
   (13.09) (13.04) (13.07) (13.28) (13.22) (13.19) (13.35) (13.44) 
LNTA   -9.277*** -8.572*** -9.662*** -10.41*** -9.544*** -9.292*** -9.138*** -9.864*** 
   (-2.90) (-2.71) (-3.11) (-3.25) (-2.98) (-2.91) (-2.88) (-3.23) 
PE   0.190 0.209 0.227 0.155 0.176 0.190 0.168 0.215  
   (0.30) (0.34) (0.38) (0.25) (0.28) (0.31) (0.27) (0.37)  
ROAA   0.961** 1.004** 0.933** 0.915** 0.956** 0.959** 0.931** 0.889**  
   (2.11) (2.26) (2.13) (2.03) (2.13) (2.13) (2.07) (2.09) 
LNDEP   8.704*** 8.091** 8.224*** 9.366*** 8.882*** 8.722*** 9.150*** 8.897*** 
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   (2.69) (2.54) (2.62) (2.91) (2.76) (2.71) (2.85) (2.90)  
GDP   -0.0604 -0.0971 -0.133 -0.0776 -0.0638 -0.0593 -0.0704 -0.183 
   (-0.42) (-0.68) (-0.94) (-0.54) (-0.44) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-1.32) 
INF   0.243 0.290 0.0610 0.205 0.236 0.245 0.247 0.0652  
   (0.82) (1.00) (0.21) (0.70) (0.81) (0.83) (0.85) (0.23) 
INT   -0.519 -0.536 -0.757 -0.458 -0.508 -0.520 -0.477 -0.658  
   (-0.99) (-1.05) (-1.50) (-0.89) (-0.99) (-1.01) (-0.93) (-1.34) 
Constant   20.95 21.13 31.07* 19.28 23.90 20.84 13.16 15.84  
   (1.23) (1.26) (1.85) (1.14) (1.37) (1.21) (0.75) (0.89)  
           
Year effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.594 0.605 0.616 0.594 0.594 0.594 0.601 0.634 
           
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio 
of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending 
interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board controlled by more than 50% independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the chairman and CEO are not the same 
person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign investor 
ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
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An alternative explanation for why banks with more board members experienced high 
risk-taking is that board members encouraged managers to raise equity capital during 
the crisis period to avoid regulatory interventions. However, raising equity capital is 
costly during a crisis period and may cause a wealth transfer from shareholders to 
debtholders. Erkens et al. (2012) find that the wealth transfer from existing 
shareholders to debtholders, due to equity capital raisings, is substantial. Non-equity 
stakeholders, such as debtholders and regulators, who often prefer conservative 
investments, may influence investment policy for their own benefit. The conflicts 
between bank managers and shareholders would lead to risk-taking varying within 
different corporate governance structures (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Strong 
governance dampens the magnitude and the importance of private benefit to those 
stakeholders, resulting in less forgoing of positive net present value risky investment.  
 
The coefficient on board independence is insignificant, which is consistent with the 
finding of Erkens et al., (2012). If a bank has more independent board members, 
strategic decisions should improve due to the counselling skills of the members that 
complement those of the CEO. Adams and Mehran (2012) also find that board 
independence is not related to bank performance. My results are in contrast to the 
work of Minton et al. (2014), who find that the fraction of independent financial 
experts is positively related to several measures of risk for US commercial banks. 
Liang et al. (2013) also suggest that the proportion of independent direct has 
significantly positive impacts on the quality of bank assets. However, I focus 
exclusively on the markets where data about insolvency risk is widely available.  
 
In addition, the Big 4 Audit firms (7AUDIT) also have a negative coefficient across 
different specifications, which support the premise that banks audited by a Big 4 audit 
firm are involved with more risk-taking. Agency theory suggests that managers have 
incentives to avoid risk, while shareholders prefer excessive risk. Firms with weaker 
governance structures have greater agency problems and, as a result, perform worse 
103 
 
 
(Core et al., 1999). If a bank is audited by an industry specialist for the controlling 
accounting quality, this may encourage shareholder-focused corporate risk-taking. 
Shareholders are reluctant to monitor the complex accounting information due to a 
commitment problem that may be exacerbated by unobservable tail risk (Bolton et al., 
2015). Banks audited by a Big 4 audit firm display a high financial stability compared 
with banks audited by non-Big 4 audit firms. My result is thus in line with Bouvatier 
et al. (2014), who find that the Big 4 firms do not contribute to improving the quality 
of banks’ financial statements. Thus, high quality auditing could enhance bank 
governance and therefore act as one of mechanisms associated with higher bank 
risk-taking.  
 
Furthermore, the relationship between the top ten shareholders (4TOP10) has a 
positive coefficient across different specifications. These findings suggest that banks 
with no relationship with the top ten shareholders are associated with lower 
risk-taking. The results are largely consistent with the findings in Laeven and Levine 
(2009), who find that bank risk is generally higher in banks that have large owners 
with substantial cash flow rights. Larger shareholders have power and incentives to 
reduce the discretions enjoyed by managers. Moreover, other stakeholders have less 
incentive in monitoring bank risk-taking for their own self-interest (Bolton et al., 
2015). Better corporate governance mitigates the risk of the taking of private benefits 
from larger shareholder (Morck et al., 2000). Furthermore, the dominant shareholders 
may instruct lower-layer departments to take less risks and tunnel gains to upper-layer 
departments in a pyramid of banks. Therefore, a bank with strong corporate 
governance, and with no relationship with the top ten shareholders, is associated with 
lower risk-taking.  
 
3.5.5 Governance components and risk-taking – GMM estimation 
Following De Andres and Vallelado (2008) and Liang et al. (2013), the generalised 
method of moments (GMMs) is used to control for the potential endogeneity 
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problems for each governance component and risk-taking. Table (19) reports the 
result from the two-step system estimator with an adjusted standard error for potential 
heteroskedasticity, as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998).  
 
It is worth recognising that the GMM estimation can take account of the unobserved 
heterogeneity and the dynamic nature of panel data. I use lagged governance 
component variables and lagged other control variables as instruments. The intuition 
is that governance variables in earlier years could not have resulted from bank 
risk-taking in subsequent years. Therefore, endogeneity concern is unlikely. Since my 
sample size is not large, I use the adjustment for a small sample, as in Windmeijer 
(2005). 
 
Column (2) of Table (19) shows that board size (2BS) has a significantly negative 
relationship with Z-score at the 1% level across different specifications, which is 
consistent with the above OLS finding and a number of empirical studies (e.g. 
Anginer et al., 2016; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Pathan, 2009). The strong 
negative relationships suggest that intermediate boards represent efficient governance 
and align with the shareholder’s preference on bank risk-taking. 
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Table 19: The relationship between the composition of corporate governance and bank risk (Z-score) – GMM 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS ZS 
Lag.ZS   0.950*** 0.943*** 0.955*** 0.949*** 0.952*** 0.952*** 0.949*** 0.895*** 
   (200.32) (81.87) (237.00) (196.44) (158.54) (167.11) (163.89) (24.30)  
1INDIV   -0.139       -0.394 
   (-0.28)       (-0.23)    
2BS    -0.463*      -2.243*   
    (-1.76)      (-1.89)    
3DUAL     -2.003***     -2.221 
     (-4.38)     (-0.75)    
4TOP10      0.166    2.683 
      (0.77)    (1.65) 
5MH       -0.461   -2.244 
       (-1.17)   (-1.51)    
6FORE        0.295  4.302*   
        (1.00)  (1.71) 
7AUDIT         0.167 1.705 
         (0.66) (1.21) 
ETA   -0.099*** -0.129*** -0.104*** -0.096*** -0.100*** -0.113** -0.076*** 0.131*** 
   (-4.76) (-3.47) (-2.90) (-3.82) (-4.95) (-2.67) (-3.37) (5.48)  
LNTA   0.635*** 0.144 0.702*** 0.537* 0.544* 0.813** 0.655** -1.548 
   (2.78) (0.66) (2.88) (1.99) (2.00) (2.69) (2.50) (-1.56)  
PE   -4.045*** -3.009*** -4.128*** -3.954*** -4.101*** -3.974*** -3.825*** -2.042*** 
   (-15.50) (-4.79) (-23.03) (-13.99) (-16.44) (-16.91) (-13.97) (-3.19) 
ROAA   1.946*** 1.833*** 1.783*** 1.923*** 1.869*** 1.816*** 1.592*** 1.139*** 
   (8.26) (5.16) (10.00) (7.84) (8.46) (6.87) (6.29) (3.97)  
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LNDEP   1.089*** 1.165*** 1.017*** 1.130*** 1.148*** 0.896*** 1.028*** 2.558**  
   (4.87) (5.42) (4.24) (4.36) (4.46) (2.99) (4.56) (2.52)  
GDP   0.006 0.046** 0.016 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.017 
   (0.40) (2.39) (0.96) (0.28) (0.40) (0.50) (0.39) (0.81) 
INF   0.079*** 0.141** 0.064*** 0.072*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.054** 0.248*** 
   (5.12) (2.70) (4.30) (4.35) (3.52) (2.84) (2.70) (2.75) 
INT   -0.179** -0.429*** -0.194** -0.164** -0.174** -0.167* -0.0957 -0.493*** 
   (-2.53) (-3.13) (-2.28) (-2.14) (-2.06) (-1.94) (-0.86) (-5.34)  
Constant   -8.068*** -4.483 -5.549*** -7.585*** -7.120*** -8.345*** -8.817*** -5.304 
   (-6.87) (-1.31) (-3.95) (-5.94) (-5.37) (-6.73) (-6.59) (-1.09) 
           
Observations   321 321 321 321 321 321 321 321 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar1   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar2   0.564 0.382 0.565 0.559 0.573 0.539 0.505 0.319  
Hansen   0.746 1.000 0.764 0.738 0.760 0.752 0.732 1.000  
 
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio 
of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending 
interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board controlled by more than 50% independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the chairman and CEO are not the same 
person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign investor 
ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
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Column (3) of Table (19) illustrates the effects of CEO chairman duality (3DUAL) on 
bank risk-taking. The results show that CEO chairman duality has a significantly 
negative effect on bank risk-taking, meaning that banks operating in non CEO 
chairman duality take more risks than those operating in CEO chairman duality 
structures. The result is consistent with the evidence of Pathan (2009), who finds that 
CEO power negatively affects bank risk-taking. The presence of CEO chairman 
duality may result in greater managerial discretion to implement conservative 
investment strategies. This can give rise to a negative relationship between 
governance and risk-taking. In addition, Anginer et al. (2016) also find that banks 
with shareholder-friendly corporate governance, in terms of the separation of CEO 
and chairman roles, is associated with higher risk-taking, and the relationship is 
especially strong for banks located in developed countries. A board not chaired by the 
CEO is less easily captured by management, and expected to choose riskier 
investments as the risk-taking incentives of shareholders. More risky investments may 
increase the expected value of shareholders’ wealth, analogously to the positive effect 
on stock market valuation.  
 
3.5.6 Interactive effects: corporate governance and bank performance 
So far, I have investigated the effect of corporate governance on bank risk-taking, and 
controlling for other control variables. I follow up with additional investigation of 
possible interaction effects of corporate governance and bank performance on 
risk-taking. To do this analysis, I have defined variables to measure the interaction 
effects. I construct one main variable, CG*ROAA, which is constructed by the 
interaction between the score of governance and the return on average assets. Table 
(20) reports the estimation results of Equation (3) to test the relationship between the 
interaction term (CG*ROAA) and bank risk-taking by OLS estimation. 
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Table 20: The relationship between the interaction term and risk-taking (Z-score) – OLS 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
CG   -0.257 -0.415 -0.392 -0.473 
   (-0.42) (-0.59) (-0.60) (-0.67)    
ETA   2.010*** 1.921*** 1.978*** 1.933*** 
   (15.98) (13.30) (14.63) (13.41) 
LNTA   -8.617*** -10.21*** -8.479*** -10.02*** 
   (-2.94) (-3.11) (-2.74) (-3.08)    
PE   -0.392 0.344 -0.164 0.53 
   (-0.77) (0.56) (-0.29) (0.85) 
ROAA   4.734*** 4.467*** 4.666*** 4.187**  
   (3.31) (2.66) (3.02) (2.51) 
LNDEP   10.08*** 11.03*** 10.32*** 11.23*** 
   (3.43) (3.39) (3.34) (3.47) 
CG*ROAA   -0.962*** -0.921** -0.923** -0.857**  
   (-2.64) (-2.14) (-2.34) (-2.00)    
GDP     0.025 0.108 
     (0.38) (0.76) 
INF     0.179 0.508*   
     (1.40) (1.74) 
INT     0.238 -0.15 
     (0.85) (-0.29)    
Constant   -4.400 5.235 -13.42 -2.88 
   (-0.45) (0.34) (-1.22) (-0.17)    
       
Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   345 345 345 345 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.557 0.599 0.560 0.600 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of 
market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
The coefficients of the CG*ROAA variable in Table (20) regressions were negative, 
and significant at least at the 5% level. These results indicate that the increase in bank 
governance levels, while having a better performance, enhance bank risk-taking 
significantly, and the results remain significant even after controlling for size and 
other bank characteristics. This finding confirms Hypothesis (4). Results are 
consistent in the risk estimates, i.e. in Tables (15), (16) and (17) regressions, with the 
expected sign and significant statistical significance. 
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In Table (21), I present the firm fixed effects estimates (with t-statistics adjusted for 
firm level clustering). The fixed effects estimations go a long way toward dismissing 
omitted variable explanations as sources of endogeneity. As the result, there is still 
evidence of a negative relationship between the interaction term (CG*ROAA) and 
bank risk-taking.  
 
Table 21: The relationship between the interaction term and risk-taking (Z-score) – FE 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
CG   -0.172 0.114 -0.201 -0.002 
   (-0.28) (0.19) (-0.33) (-0.00)    
ETA   2.030*** 1.963*** 2.017*** 1.956*** 
   (16.20) (16.16) (15.94) (15.89) 
LNTA   -8.454*** -10.53*** -8.280*** -10.35*** 
   (-2.87) (-3.68) (-2.80) (-3.61)    
PE   -0.447 0.0709 -0.342 0.132 
   (-0.88) (0.14) (-0.66) (0.25) 
ROAA   4.725*** 4.735*** 4.734*** 4.617*** 
   (3.34) (3.44) (3.32) (3.33) 
LNDEP   9.754*** 9.471*** 9.699*** 9.605*** 
   (3.30) (3.33) (3.28) (3.36) 
CG*ROAA   -0.961*** -1.046*** -0.949*** -0.998*** 
   (-2.66) (-2.96) (-2.61) (-2.80)    
GDP     0.0154 -0.073 
     (0.25) (-0.60)    
INF     0.177 0.194 
     (1.50) (0.78) 
INT     0.088 -0.495 
     (0.34) (-1.14)    
Constant   -4.67 34.36** -8.071 32.22**  
   (-0.54) (2.44) (-0.81) -2.02 
       
Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   345 345 345 345 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.558 0.609 0.562 0.612 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of 
market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
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Table 22: The relationship between the interaction term and risk-taking (Z-score) – GMM 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   DIFF SYS DIFF SYS 
Dependent 
variable 
  ZS ZS ZS ZS 
Lag.ZS   -0.100*** 0.907*** 0.084*** 0.915*** 
   (-5.84) (181.90) (3.76) (18.51) 
CG   -1.415* 0.123 2.790*** 0.631 
   (-1.74) (0.47) (7.71) (1.12) 
ETA   3.942*** -0.189*** 1.630*** -0.192**  
   (22.49) (-7.26) (8.04) (-2.68)    
LNTA   5.650*** -0.231 -12.53*** -1.489*   
   (3.18) (-0.74) (-4.35) (-1.85)    
PE   0.069 -1.474*** 1.138 1.477 
   (0.62) (-17.99) (1.61) (1.02) 
ROAA   6.605*** 6.575*** 10.26*** 5.574**  
   (3.95) (12.12) (7.06) (2.11) 
LNDEP   -2.877** 1.457*** 10.99*** 1.844**  
   (-2.03) (4.41) (3.81) (2.15) 
CG*ROAA   -1.634*** -1.261*** -2.218*** -1.107*   
   (-3.48) (-6.82) (-5.39) (-1.87)    
GDP     -0.065 -0.461*** 
     (-1.58) (-3.09)    
INF     0.430*** 1.083*** 
     (3.28) (5.25) 
INT     -1.594*** -0.791**  
     (-5.92) (-2.29)    
Constant    -11.33***  -8.409 
    (-8.24)  (-0.77)    
       
Observation   279 321 279 321 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar1   0.033 0.003 0.027 0.000 
Ar2   0.552 0.631 0.581 0.474 
Hansen   0.732 0.562 1.000 1.000 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of 
market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
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In Table (22), I present the GMM estimates (with difference and system GMM). 
Again, there is evidence of a negative relationship between the interaction term 
(CG*ROAA) and bank risk-taking. The investigations of the combined impact of 
corporate governance and performance on bank risk-taking strengthens my previous 
findings of individual effects of corporate governance on bank risk. Most of the other 
bank-level characteristics enter with their expected signs and are usually consistent 
with the literature on bank risk determinants. 
 
Overall, the estimations presented above are relatively robust under different 
specifications. I am concerned with the fact that the endogeneity problem associated 
with the governance variable in the regression may be a potential limitation to making 
any conclusive comments. I attempt to correct this problem by using the GMM 
estimation, and the result is very close to the OLS and FE estimation. Also this 
chapter may suffer from self-selectivity bias and, again, a lack of data did not give us 
the opportunity to provide further detailed robustness tests. I mitigate this 
selection-bias problem by using the alternative risk-taking variable, and the results are 
similar to those of the Z-score regressions. 
 
 
3.6 Robustness test 
I conduct several additional tests to check the robustness of my results. First, I 
re-estimate equation (10) using pooled-OLS with clustered standard errors on an 
alternative risk-taking measure and loan loss provision (LLP), while controlling for 
the effect on bank characteristics and other macroeconomic factors. In addition, the 
F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on both variables are jointly zero. 
The results of Table (23) shows that governance still has a significant effect on bank 
risk-taking. 
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Table 23: The relationship between bank corporate governance and risk-taking (Loan loss 
provision) – OLS 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  LLP LLP LLP LLP 
CG   -0.106*** -0.041 -0.102*** -0.046* 
   (-3.08) (-1.42) (-2.87) (-1.69)    
ETA   0.015* 0.018*** 0.017** 0.017*** 
   (1.83) (2.84) (2.06) (2.62) 
LNTA   0.656*** 0.347*** 0.388*** 0.358*** 
   (3.62) (2.95) (2.59) (3.03) 
PE   -0.029 -0.015 -0.007 -0.025 
   (-0.75) (-0.42) (-0.17) (-0.68)    
ROAA   -0.087*** -0.064** -0.111*** -0.054*   
   (-3.02) (-2.26) (-3.25) (-1.89)    
LNDEP   0.376** 0.637*** 0.707*** 0.614*** 
   (2.08) (5.22) (4.72) (4.99) 
GDP     -0.001 -0.018**  
     (-0.23) (-2.03)    
INF     -0.007 -0.027 
     (-0.68) (-1.47)    
INT     0.029 -0.026 
     (1.41) (-0.79)    
Constant   -5.070*** -4.424*** -6.365*** -3.927*** 
   (-8.75) (-7.89) (-11.61) (-6.54)    
       
Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   345 345 345 345 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.692 0.718 0.685 0.725 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of 
market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
Second, I re-estimate Equation (10) using the fixed effect estimation on the loan loss 
provision in Table (24), as the pooled-OLS specification could be problematic 
because risk-taking can be endogenous. The results are unchanged after the inclusion 
of firm fixed effects, suggesting that time invariant unobserved firm characteristics 
cannot explain my empirical findings. My results are robust to the alternative 
risk-taking measures in terms of economic and statistical significance. Results show 
that a negative correlation between corporate governance and bank risk-taking 
remains strong after controlling for a long list of possible covariates.  
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Table 24: The relationship between bank corporate governance and risk-taking (Loan loss 
provision) – FE 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variable 
  LLP LLP LLP LLP 
CG   -0.078** -0.065* -0.083** -0.066*   
   (-2.13) (-1.85) (-2.32) (-1.90)    
ETA   0.012 0.011 0.010 0.008 
   (1.34) (1.26) (1.10) (0.87) 
LNTA   1.065*** 0.944*** 1.051*** 0.925*** 
   (4.75) (4.33) (4.75) (4.29) 
PE   -0.041 -0.009 -0.027 -0.023 
   (-1.08) (-0.24) (-0.72) (-0.59)    
ROAA   -0.070** -0.060** -0.052* -0.050*   
   (-2.51) (-2.13) (-1.83) (-1.77)    
LNDEP   -0.112 -0.060 -0.116 -0.122 
   (-0.50) (-0.28) (-0.52) (-0.57)    
GDP     -0.015*** -0.025*** 
     (-3.31) (-2.80)    
INF     -0.001 -0.040**  
     (-0.12) (-2.19)    
INT     0.032 -0.003 
     (1.65) (-0.11)    
Constant   -3.800*** -2.699** -3.578*** -0.92 
   (-5.82) (-2.52) (-4.80) (-0.77)    
       
Year effect   No Yes No Yes 
Observation   345 345 345 345 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.698 0.730 0.709 0.739 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of 
market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
 
Third, to further control for path dependence in the series of the loan loss provision, 
and to remove the strict exogeneity assumption for independent variables and 
eliminate the unobserved bank-specific effects, I employ the GMM estimator for 
hypothesis testing. Table (25) presents the dynamic panel regression results of 
corporate governance and alternative risk-taking, LLP. All specifications can pass, at 
the 5% significance level, the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in the 
first-differenced errors and the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. The 
evidence in Table (25) suggests that strong corporate governance is still associated 
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with higher bank risk-taking. 
 
Table 25: The relationship between the interaction term and risk-taking (Loan loss 
provision) – GMM 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   DIFF SYS DIFF SYS 
Dependent 
variable 
  LLP LLP LLP LLP 
Lag.LLP   0.270*** 0.622*** 0.354*** 0.862*** 
   (4.34) (13.23) (4.95) (11.13) 
CG   -0.138*** -0.016* -0.060** -0.096**  
   (-7.70) (-1.81) (-2.21) (-2.39)    
ETA   -0.032** 0.009*** -0.021 -0.009**  
   (-2.16) (2.96) (-1.31) (-2.32)    
LNTA   2.201*** 0.042 1.796*** -0.059 
   (7.10) (0.86) (3.53) (-1.58)    
PE   -0.128*** -0.094 0.0845** 0.026 
   (-2.80) (-1.54) (2.58) (0.56) 
ROAA   -0.062** -0.082** -0.026 0.001 
   (-2.57) (-2.51) (-0.54) (0.02) 
LNDEP   -1.375*** 0.394*** -1.309** 0.147 
   (-5.40) (10.14) (-2.69) (1.47) 
GDP     -0.013*** 0.010**  
     (-3.33) (2.04) 
INF     -0.013* -0.018*   
     (-1.94) (-1.71)    
INT     0.022 0.010 
     (0.84) (0.59) 
Constant    -2.249***  0.673 
    (-9.64)  (0.76) 
       
Observation   279 321 279 321 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar1   0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Ar2   0.051 0.235 0.224 0.375 
Hansen   0.603 0.718 1.000 1.000 
       
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP 
is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of 
market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. 
GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board controlled by more than 50% 
independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the 
chairman and CEO are not the same person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, 
and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign 
investor ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint 
ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
Fourth, I turn to empirically assess the relationship between governance individual 
components and loan loss provision (LLP) in Table (26), while controlling for the 
effect of bank characteristics and other macroeconomic factors. Consistent with above, 
I find that my results continue to be qualitatively similar to those reported in previous 
studies. Thus, my conclusion on the relationship between risk-taking and governance 
is not sensitive to an alternative measure of risk.
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Table 26: The relationship between the composition of corporate governance and risk-taking (Loan loss provision) – OLS 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable 
varivariable 
 LLP LLP LLP LLP LLP LLP LLP LLP 
           
1INDIV   -0.247***       -0.260*** 
   (-2.82)       (-2.94)    
2BS    0.005      -0.006 
    (0.13)      (-0.15)    
3DUAL     -0.217**     -0.238**  
     (-1.99)     (-2.16)    
4TOP10      -0.123    -0.107 
      (-1.22)    (-0.96)    
5 MH       0.078   0.092 
       (0.66)   (0.71) 
6FORE        0.033  -0.033 
        (0.53)  (-0.49)    
7AUDIT         -0.077 -0.039 
         (-0.94) (-0.46)    
ETA   0.0192*** 0.0180*** 0.0188*** 0.0171*** 0.0183*** 0.0178*** 0.0172*** 0.0198*** 
   (2.99) (2.76) (2.87) (2.63) (2.78) (2.73) (2.62) (2.98) 
LNTA   0.363*** 0.362*** 0.369*** 0.397*** 0.385*** 0.377*** 0.368*** 0.414*** 
   (3.13) (3.08) (3.13) (3.29) (3.17) (3.14) (3.11) (3.36) 
PE   -0.028 -0.021 -0.027 -0.018 -0.019 -0.021 -0.023 -0.032 
   (-0.77) (-0.57) (-0.72) (-0.49) (-0.52) (-0.56) (-0.62) (-0.85)    
ROAA   -0.062** -0.054* -0.053* -0.051* -0.054* -0.054* -0.055* -0.058**  
   (-2.16) (-1.89) (-1.86) (-1.77) (-1.89) (-1.90) (-1.92) (-2.03)    
LNDEP   0.620*** 0.611*** 0.610*** 0.591*** 0.592*** 0.598*** 0.612*** 0.596*** 
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   (5.15) (5.01) (4.98) (4.82) (4.76) (4.83) (4.98) (4.77) 
GDP   -0.016* -0.016* -0.015* -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* -0.017* -0.014 
   (-1.79) (-1.83) (-1.70) (-1.80) (-1.83) (-1.81) (-1.93) (-1.61)    
INF   -0.022 -0.02 -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.016 
   (-1.20) (-1.51) (-1.30) (-1.42) (-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.54) (-0.90)    
INT   -0.039 -0.027 -0.017 -0.029 -0.028 -0.028 -0.025 -0.028 
   (-1.18) (-0.84) (-0.52) (-0.90) (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.76) (-0.85)    
Constant   -4.238*** -4.145*** -4.085*** -4.338*** -4.242*** -4.195*** -4.186*** -4.454*** 
   (-7.32) (-6.99) (-6.94) (-7.21) (-6.80) (-6.93) (-7.04) (-6.94)    
           
Year effect   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 
F test   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R   0.727 0.722 0.726 0.721 0.722 0.722 0.723 0.732 
           
Note: ZS is the Z-score, calculated as [Average (Returns) + Average (Equity/Total assets)] / Standard deviation (Equity/Total assets). LLP is loan loss provision in natural logarithem. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. ETA is the ratio 
of equity to asset. PE is the ratio of market price to earnings per share. ROAA is the ratio of profit to average assets. LNDEP is natural logarithm of the amount of deposit. GDPG is GDP growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. INT is the lending 
interest rate. 1NDIV is 1 if the board controlled by more than 50% independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 2BS is 1 if the board size greater than 6 but less than 13, and 0 otherwise. 3DUAL is 1 if the chairman and CEO are not the same 
person, and 0 otherwise. 4TOP10 is 1 if there are no relationships among the top ten shareholders, and 0 otherwise. 5MH is 1 if management ownership is greater than 1% but less than 30%, and 0 otherwise. 6FORE is 1 if foreign investor 
ownership is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. 7AUDIT is 1 if external audited by one of the Big 4 audit firm or their joint ventures, and 0 otherwise. CG is the score of internal corporate governance by aggregate seven attributes. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
Banking crises are crucial, not just because of the destruction on a particular sector, but 
also because typically the shock waves strike the entire economy. Thus, the substantial 
portions of banks’ wealth should be operated and managed in a safe and sound manner. 
However, the relative opacity of banks provides some justification for regulator and 
investor suspicion. Therefore, the effectiveness of the top management team and 
ownership structure, and its corporate governance systems in determining appropriate 
risk-taking, is a critical issue in a modern commercial bank. The main objective of this 
chapter is to study empirically the impact of various governance mechanisms on bank 
risk-taking. Although it is well recognised that corporate governance can affect firm 
value, in this chapter, I combine the external and internal characteristics of corporate 
governances and study them by linking bank risk-taking to managerial behaviour on the 
stock markets. 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between bank corporate governance and 
risk-taking, using a wide ranging and most recent panel data, which covers 345 bank 
observations over the period from 2006 to 2015. The empirical results indicate that the 
effect of strong corporate governance on bank risk is significantly negative, which 
suggests that corporate governance that favours the interests of its shareholders is 
associated with higher levels of bank risk-taking. Despite with OLS and fixed effects 
estimations, this chapter also applies the recent two-step system GMM dynamic panel 
data techniques as the robustness test. The dynamic model specification allows for 
dependent variable persistence and controls for possible endogeneity issues. 
 
While my sample is unique in terms of the prudential regulations, and similar cultural 
backgrounds, the financial incentives analysis may also play a role in explaining risk in 
other businesses and stock markets. Other businesses are likely to face many of the 
same governance issues, such as board composition, designing appropriate incentives 
for top managers, and ownership structure. All of these issues need to be taken into 
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consideration when establishing the appropriate governance structures of other banks 
and businesses. In addition, given the differences in institution and business 
environments, it is certainly possible that governance provisions may work differently 
in nonfinancial firms. Further exploration of nonfinancial firms’ specific governance 
attributes and criteria may be useful. 
 
In response to the financial crisis, global authorities were tightened to strengthen 
corporate governance and the resilience of the banking industry. Thus, an improved 
understanding of bank risk is essential for a range of financial market participants. My 
findings highlight several important issues for policymakers in relevant economic 
authorities. First, to prevent excessive risk-taking, regulators should adopt a more 
cautious approach to evaluating and approving bank-engaged activities at the national 
level. If banking regulators are committed to safeguarding banks’ asset qualities, 
elimination of explicit protection might be a sufficient condition. Second, to promote 
the stability of the economy, regulators should encourage banks to build a high standard 
of risk management systems. Third, regulators should consider using recent innovations 
in the financial markets to reduce risk-taking by bank executives (Bolton et al., 2015). 
The push for increased market discipline of banks may shed light on limiting risk-taking. 
Indeed, market forces, rather than regulation, may have been more effective in 
mitigating moral hazard problems (Keys et al., 2009).  
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Chapter 4: Ownership structure and bank 
performance: An emerging market 
perspective  
4.1 Introduction 
Explaining performance differences among banks is a prevailing theoretical and 
empirical issue in the field of finance literature. Ownership structure is widely accepted 
in the finance and economics study as an instrumental determinant of bank performance. 
Indeed, considerable literature has developed on the relationship between ownership 
and performance. More specifically, examining state ownership versus private 
ownership has received much attention in the banking sector.  
 
This chapter falls within a broad research programme, focusing on ownership in general. 
There are commonly three types of shareholder in governance literature: state, private 
investors and foreign investors. There have been a number of empirical studies showing 
how differences between owner types influence bank performance (for 
government-owned banks, see Iannotta et al., 2013 and Berger et al., 2015; for 
ownership by privately owners, see Cornett et al., 2010; for ownership by foreign 
owners, see Lensink et al., 2008; for managerial owners, see DeYoung et al., 2013). The 
results of these studies are mixed, but overall they suggest that types of owners differ in 
their contributions to performance variation over time. The aim of this chapter is to 
reconcile these conflicting results by enriching the analysis of the bank's ownership 
structure using the Chinese case. 
 
I limit this chapter to the significance of owner type in countries making the transition 
to some form of capitalism, and focus specifically on China. China’s bank reform is still 
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ongoing, so it is hard to reach conclusions on how it may affect the whole financial 
system. In particular, China’s banking sector is the most important component of the 
financial system (with 69% of total financial assets in 2016), and yet it has long 
remained undercapitalised and presented with non-performing loans. In addition, bank 
capitalisation, solvency and profitability are still below the average of international 
counterparts. As China's importance in the world economy grows, improved 
understanding about the banking sector in China has enormous practical implications 
for regulators and other stakeholders. Moreover, studies on ownership differences have 
to be grounded in an environment where banks of different ownership types coexist and 
compete; China's transition economy presents such an ideal context.  
 
While ownership itself is an objective structure, I contend different ownership types that 
lead to different managerial cognitions. The main findings regarding the static effects of 
bank ownership on performance suggest that, consistent with much of the literature, 
banks with more state shareholders tend to have poorer performance levels. In addition, 
banks with higher domestic private shareholders generally operate more profitably. 
Furthermore, higher foreign ownership may negatively affect bank performance. 
Moreover, ownership type diversity is positively associated with bank performance, 
while banks with concentrated ownership are worse performing. The results are 
robustness under the different measures of bank performance. My findings have 
implications for the design of appropriate corporate governance systems for Chinese 
commercial banks. Moreover, my results provide information that can inform policy 
debates within the China regulators.  
 
This chapter makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. First, it analyses 
the effects of ownership reforms, enriching the literature from the perspective of 
transitional, as well as developing, countries. The type of privatisation and the form of 
state ownership are some of the major concerns in these countries. Second, this chapter 
exploits how banks function in an economy that combines rapid economic growth and 
state-owned banks serving political goals. In other words, it examines the role of 
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corporate governance in the banking sector of emerging markets using a unique sample 
of Chinese banks. Third, it expands beyond the narrow confines of ownership 
concentration and performance by incorporating issues related to bank reform. Thus, it 
adds to the literature that aims to examine the determinants of bank profitability. 
Additionally, this is the first study that considers both concentration and diversity of 
ownership structure (i.e. ownership distribution and the nature of the owners) in the 
banking sector. As there have been recent calls to consider the multiple dimensions of 
diversity simultaneously, this chapter extends the literature to explore the effects of 
shareholder diversity on bank performance. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief outline of the current 
Chinese banking system, followed by a literature review in Section 3. Section 4 
discusses the methodology and the data used. Section 5 presents the results of the tests, 
followed by the robustness test in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 summarises and presents 
the implications of the results for China’s banking sector in its new regulatory 
environment. 
 
 
4.2 Chinese banking background 
From 1949 to 1978, China was a central planned economy and the People’s Bank of 
China (PBC) was the only bank in the country that acted as both a central bank and a 
commercial. The majority of companies were owned by the government or state-related 
organisations. Under the traditional communist system, the Chinese government 
gathered revenues from these organisations and provided financial support to the society, 
as per government planning. 
 
In 1978, the fundamental economic reforms transferred the state-owned, low efficiency 
and policy-driven organisations to a multi-ownership and market-oriented corporation. 
In the banking system, the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, and the 
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Agricultural Bank of China were all established in 1979. In 1984, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China was separated from the PBC and became the fourth national 
specialty bank. Thus, the ‘big four’ state-owned banks make up the fundamental 
foundation of the commercial banking system in China. The PBC began to function as 
the central bank and the main regulatory agency of China’s banking system.  
 
Chinese banking systems were further reformed by introducing a number of joint-stock 
or joint equity banks (Liang et al., 2013) during 1980s. The first nationwide joint-stock 
commercial bank was set up and named the Bank of Communications in 1986. Other 
nationwide joint-stock commercial banks, and urban and rural credit cooperatives were 
established during this period, such as Shenzhen Development Bank Co Ltd and China 
Merchants Bank Co Ltd. Shenzhen Development Bank Co Ltd, now renamed as Ping 
An Bank, was the first publically listed bank in 1988. China Merchants Bank Co Ltd is 
the first nationwide enterprise-owned bank. These nationwide and joint stock 
commercial banks were established in an attempt to decrease the monopoly power of 
the ‘big four’ state-owned banks in the market. These banks are the second most 
important group in the Chinese banking market.  
 
In 1994, the reform of the commercial banking system in China progressed further with 
the establishment of three policy banks: the China Development Bank (CDB), the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), and the Export-Import Bank of 
China (China Eximbank). These policy banks took over most of the policy loan activity 
from the ‘big four’ state-owned banks. Whilst financial liberalisation helped to integrate 
Chinese markets with global markets, it constituted a major challenge for domestic 
banks and their systems of governance. However, the weak state of law and regulation 
in China are major limitations on the efficiency of financial institutions. In 1995, the 
Central Bank Law and the Commercial Bank Law, both of which construct a legal 
commercial banking system, came into effect. These regulations require that 
commercial banks must operate individually, take their own risks, and assume their own 
losses. 
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Alongside the introduction of the concept of the new banking regulations in the Chinese 
economy, the urban credit cooperatives accumulated a large proportion of 
non-performing loans. Thus, PBC allowed those urban credit cooperatives and local 
financial institutions to merge and consolidate into the joint-stock banks, i.e. city 
commercial banks. These city commercial banks emerged as the third most important 
group, and compete with the ‘big four’ state-owned banks and joint-stock commercial 
banks in the Chinese banking market. These banks are normally shareholding ownership 
structures and are restricted geographically within their own localities; they are required 
to conduct business within their own administrative provinces.  
 
The ‘big four’ state-owned banks have been criticised for their larger amount of 
impairment loans due to their political lending practices. Specifically, inefficient 
state-owned corporations are normally the largest borrowers for Chinese banks. 
Therefore, the Chinese government has established the assets management companies 
that liquidate majority bank assets at high discounts. In 1999, four assets management 
companies (AMC) were established to transfer the non-performing assets from the 
banks. 
 
In 2003, a large number of commercial banks were still owned or controlled by the state, 
either directly through central or local government institutions, or indirectly through 
marketised SOEs. Thus, the government has been implementing a series of reforms to 
improve the efficiency and profitability of the state banks, particularly given the 
impending opening of the domestic financial sector to foreign investors under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was 
established and assumed most supervisory functions from the PBC. The main role of the 
CBRC is to regulate and supervise banking-related financial institutions through 
formulating and implementing supervisory rules and policies to maintain a safe and 
sound banking system. The role of the PBC focuses on monitoring and regulating the 
macro economy and currency policies. In addition, new accounting principles that 
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follow the International Accounting Standards were implemented in 2005, which aims 
to provide comparable financial information integrated with the normal financial 
market.  
 
Conventional state-owned, joint-stock and city commercial banks have started to 
transform into modern corporate systems to improve their efficiency and 
competitiveness by attracting strategic investors and going public. First, attracting 
domestic and foreign strategic investors is an important strategy for enhancing 
governance and performance. In 2005, three of the ‘big four’ state banks were changed 
from fully state-owned banks to corporations owned by public and private shareholders. 
However, the state still remains the largest shareholder. Foreign investors have been 
allowed to take a few ownership shareholdings in the state banks. Second, going public 
is another important strategy for maintaining competitiveness. Some larger banks went 
public in Hong Kong’s capital market, such as the China Construction Bank listed, in 
Hong Kong in 2005, and the Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, cross listed in Hong Kong and Shanghai in 2006. All the ‘big four’ state-owned 
banks successfully issued IPOs in the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges during 
the 2005 to 2010 period. 
 
Beyond the ‘big four’ state-owned banks, reforms have also spread to joint-stock banks 
and city commercial banks. For example, the Bank of Beijing was listed on the 
Shanghai stock exchange in 2007. Since 2007, some large city commercial banks have 
gradually expanded by setting up branches outside their own provinces, and this was 
allowed by the CBRC. The joint-stock and city commercial banks have also taken 
further steps by attracting public funds as capital to improve their governance. 
 
At present, after more than three decades of reform, the Chinese banking sector has 
been the primary source of financing for the economy’s growth, with the banking and 
other financial institutions accounting for over 80% of the whole country’s financial 
assets. The banking system consists mainly of three groups of domestic banks. The ‘big 
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four’ state-owned banks still held over 50% of the banking sector’s assets, as of June 
2016. The banking sector’s assets of joint-stock banks and city commercial banks are 
nearly 16% and 6%, respectively, while other relevant financial institutions, such as 
policy banks, urban and rural credit cooperatives, and other finance companies account 
for the remaining per cent. 
 
Over the last few decades, China has become the world’s most rapidly developing 
economy. The Chinese banking system has largely withstood the financial crisis without 
an emergence of systemic risk, despite the fact that the majority of Chinese commercial 
banks are controlled by government entities with minority individual shareholders. In 
spite of these efforts, many inherent drawbacks still remain in the Chinese banking 
system. For instance, the ownership of foreign investors is relatively minor, and their 
involvement in efficient corporate governance remains limited. Also, Chinese banks are 
forced to meet multiple and contradictory goals to support local economic growth, 
employment and political lending. 
 
 
4.3 Literature review and hypothesis development 
4.3.1 Ownership and performance  
Academic interest in bank performance has shifted from developed economies to 
developing and transitional markets. Bank governance structure is a critical and 
well-explored topic of relevant studies. For example, the study on bank governance is 
dominated by research focused on how insiders versus outsiders can affect a bank’s 
performance. However, in addition to insider versus outsider equity holders, another 
important dimension of ownership structure is state or public ownership versus private 
ownership structure. In particular, the study examines the impact of equity ownership by 
different shareholder groups on manager behavior, which in turn would affect bank 
performance. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that ownership is a key determinant 
underlying different corporate governance regime.  
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A bank’s ownership structure influences its performance for several reasons. First, 
differences in ownership type identity, concentration, diversity, and resource 
endowments among shareholders determine incentives and the ability to monitor bank 
managers. Shareholdings by state, state-owned enterprises (SOE), and domestic private 
and foreign investors are typical examples of this phenomenon. Second, as shareholders 
have divergent interests, consequently they have different impacts on bank behaviour.  
 
The relationship between the shareholder and management is complicated due to their 
interests not aligned. The effect that ownership structure has on bank performance may 
be considered through the principal-agent framework (Altunbas et al., 2001).  
 
The effectiveness of governance is determined by ownership mechanisms and, as a 
consequence, these affects firm performance. Several studies have analysed whether 
ownership and governance actually impact bank performance. 
 
4.3.2 Chinese banking literature  
Although many sudies on banking in transition countries exist, they focus mainly on 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and primarily investigate the relationship 
between bank ownership and performance. 
 
Despite the growing interest of researchers worldwide in the banking sector, there are 
few studies on Chinese bank corporate governance. Lin and Zhang (2009) analyse the 
impact of bank ownership reform on performance (where performance is measured by 
simple accounting ratios) over the period from 1997 to 2004. Liang et al. (2013) analyse 
the impact of board characteristics on bank performance and bank asset quality in China 
from 2003 to 2010. Berger et al. (2009) analyse the profit and cost efficiency of banks 
operating in China between 1994 and 2003. 
 
4.3.3 State ownership  
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State ownership refers to equity investments by central or local governmental 
institutions. The state has become increasingly important as an owner of domestic firms 
as well as foreign firms (Carney and Child, 2013). Generally, government-owned banks 
have multiple (often conflicting) goals other than commercial considerations. They are 
forced to meet the contradictory objectives of supporting employment and changing into 
modern commercial banks. Therefore, state-owned banks may not be independent 
organisations governed by shareholders with return maximisation. Barth et al. (2013) 
present cross-country statistics on the degree of state ownership of the banking sector, 
without providing detailed information on the ownership structure of banks. 
 
Banks with majority government ownership are normally beneficiaries of either implicit 
or explicit regulatory support from the authorities (Faccio et al., 2006). For instance, 
these banks are likely to benefit from a lower cost of funding when issuing debt or 
equity securities in capital markets. Cornett et al. (2010) find that the deterioration in 
the cash flow returns, core capital, and credit quality of state-owned banks was 
significantly greater than that of private banks, especially for the countries that were 
hardest hit by the Asian crisis. Chen et al. (2016) find that government banks have 
higher loan growth rates than privately owned banks. Zhu and Yang (2016) find that 
state-owned banks have relatively lower risk-taking after foreign acquisitions. Zhang et 
al. (2013) suggest that banks taking a lower level of risks perform better. Tan (2016) 
finds that compared to the state-owned commercial banks, the joint-stock commercial 
banks and city commercial banks in China have lower profitability. Beuselinck et al. 
(2017) suggest that in countries with good investor protection and low corruption the 
benefits of government ownership increase relative to the costs of government 
ownership. 
 
On the other hand, the bulk of the evidence on government ownership of banks suggests 
that it is associated with poor bank performance due to weak managerial incentives, 
political lending and misallocation of resource (Berger et al., 2005; Lin and Zhang, 
2009; Micco et al., 2007). First, state shareholding is argued to be intrinsically 
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inefficient because of agency problems (Williams and Nguyen, 2005). The 
agent-principal problem becomes more significant under government ownership. 
Managers are likely to pursue their own benefit rather than acting in the best interest of 
owners, which may lead to negative effects on bank performance. Ashrf (2017) suggests 
that government ownership in banks is likely generating moral hazard problems due to 
the expectation of government bailouts during negative economic conditions. Therefore, 
governance of banks is more relevant for performance in bad times rather than in good 
(Martin-Oliver et al., 2017). 
 
Second, the state invests in a particular bank because of its political and strategic value 
(Iannotta et al., 2013). As such, governments tend to own equity in firms and industries 
that usually are not the most competitive ones. Iannotta et al. (2013) find that 
government-owned banks have higher operating risks than private banks, indicating that 
the presence of governmental protection induces higher risk-taking. For instance, 
state-owned banks are likely to grant loans to socially valuable investment projects with 
low financial returns. State ownership of banks has led to ownership bias in lending 
(Lin et al., 2015). As a consequence, these lending behaviours will inevitably deteriorate 
their assets quality and increase their risk profile. Dong et al. (2014) also find that 
government-controlled banks tend to take more risks than those controlled by 
state-owned enterprises or private investors. Allen et al. (2017) find that 
government-owned banks relatively increased their credit supply during the global crisis. 
Iannotta et al. (2007) find that government-owned banks exhibit a lower profitability 
than privately owned banks. Indeed, stated-owned banks with lower profitability may be 
related to the situation that those banks finance projects with high social benefit.  
 
Furthermore, within state-owned banks there is a lack of market discipline , as well as 
inadequate punishment for managerial misbehaviour (Zhang et al., 2016). Bailey et al. 
(2011) find that poor financial performance and high managerial expenses increase the 
likelihood of obtaining a bank loan in China. Additionally, the government’s nominees 
on the board are typically bureaucrats with minimal skill or expertise in the banking 
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sector. Micco et al. (2007) find that state-owned banks located in developing countries 
tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their private counterparts. Shaban 
and James (2017) find that state-owned banks tend to be less profitable and more 
exposed to risk than private and foreign banks. 
 
H1: Banks with high state-ownership are negatively related to performance. 
 
4.3.4 State-owned enterprise (SOE) ownership  
Although an SOE’s ultimate controlling shareholder is the local or central government, 
as the shareholder of a bank, SOEs are different from government shareholders in many 
respects. First, despite SOEs’ need to serve some politicians’ interests, they are more 
empowered and have large autonomy. Second, SOEs have some financial policy 
constraints and may not obtain sufficient support from the government. Furthermore, 
banks in China give preferential treatment to SOEs and discriminate against non-SOEs, 
when making lending decisions (Lu et al., 2013). Therefore, SOEs are willing to hold 
higher ownership and maintain good relationships with banks. Chen et al. (2009) find 
that SOE-controlled Chinese listed firms perform better than privately controlled firms. 
SOEs may change their organisational goals following partial privatisation; in turn, this 
affects firm performance as higher levels of profit orientation are instituted by the 
private investors. 
 
In theory, SOEs are owned by all citizens in a country. However, in practice they are 
controlled and managed by government bureaucrats and politicians. SOEs are able to 
obtain additional finances from government if they make losses, and get rescued with 
public money when threatened with bankruptcy. In this way, the managerial view of 
SOEs posits that these banks are inefficient because their managers are not adequately 
monitored (leading to poor incentive structures). The predominant view is that SOEs 
may not have enough resources and financial expertise to monitor and discipline bank 
managers, and thereby reduce agency problems. Therefore, managers of these banks 
have little incentive to minimise costs or maximise profit. Banks owned by SOEs are 
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not run by their owners; therefore the owners cannot tell how much of the performances 
are due to managerial failures or external factors. Furthermore, organisational slack can 
readily inform the understanding of organisations’ behavior is possible due to SOEs 
prioritise goals such as social welfare different than other privately owned firms (Stan et 
al., 2014). Saghi-Zedek (2016) finds that banks with no controlling shareholders yield 
diseconomies on activity diversification.  
 
Given that they are less sensitive to market pressures, economic performance and 
operation efficiency are not necessarily the priority concerns of SOE managers. In 
particular, direct monitoring from shareholders is either unavailable or is an ineffective 
tool for mitigating agency costs in SOEs. Thus, in the absence of appropriate 
monitoring, bank managers may prefer to take riskier activities in order to maintain or 
increase their remuneration.  
 
H2: Banks with high SOE ownership are negatively related to performance. 
 
4.3.5 Domestic private investors  
The third type of shareholder is the domestic private shareholder. In many emerging 
countries, domestic private investors are among the largest group of blockholders 
(Claessens et al., 2000). Lu et al. (2009) show that Chinese domestic investors have a 
greater propensity to hold significant ownership in commercial banks due to less 
suffering from bank discrimination for political reasons. These shareholders usually 
have a long investment horizon. Shaban and James (2017) find that domestic investors 
tend to select the best performers for acquisition.  
 
Domestic private ownership is anticipated to reduce agency problems and enhance 
operating performance through various mechanisms, such as managerial ownership and 
attractive remuneration packages. These investors tend to have maximum equity returns 
as their primary investment objective. Thus, they are typically tied to the firm only with 
their equity stakes and mostly operate at arm’s length from managers. In response to the 
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greater competitive and liberalised environment, these investors closely monitor and 
pressurise managers to improve operations, as inadequate managers can be changed. 
Their monitoring incentives, as well as their abilities, are substantially greater than other 
domestic institutions. Jiang et al. (2013) show that the privatisation of banks has 
improved performance with respect to revenue inflow and efficiency gains, in the short- 
or long-run in China. Saghi-Zedek (2016) also finds that banks with more domestic 
shareholders display higher profitability, as these shareholders bring additional skills to 
manage activity diversification and yield economies.  
 
H3: Banks with high domestic private ownership are positively related to performance. 
 
4.3.6 Foreign shareholders 
Financial globalisation has further opened banking sectors that were previously 
off-limits to international investment. Increased openness to foreign equity investors 
generally enhances the information environment, such as increasing analyst coverage 
and decreasing earnings management.  
 
Foreign shareholding is expected to have a positive impact on performance. First, 
foreign shareholders are less prone to political pressure and more likely to participate in 
company negotiations and monitoring from arm's-length (Huang and Zhu, 2015). 
Second, foreign shareholders are likely to bring in new technology, modern techniques 
and effective managerial skills. As foreign investors often invest in similar corporations 
in different jurisdictions, they tend to have the relevant experience and know-how to set 
appropriate benchmarks for performance. Gillan and Starks (2003) observe that foreign 
owners play a more active role than local investors in advocating better firm-level 
governance, which may influence corporate performance. Empirical studies (i.e. Berger 
et al., 2009; Lin and Zhang, 2009) suggest that there are improvements in domestic 
bank performance after involvement with foreign strategic investors. Additionally, 
foreign investors may choose to invest in better performing banks, or, alternatively, the 
government sells the equity of better performing banks first in an effort to attract foreign 
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investors. These foreign investors could help local banks employ advanced banking 
strategies to enhance operating efficiency. Furthermore, foreign shareholders may insist 
on having board members that represent their interests. Having foreign directors on the 
boards would bring diversity of expertise that may result in enhancing bank 
performance, and may be more effective than having members from similar local 
business environments.  
 
However, there are some inherent limitations for foreign shareholders improving bank 
performance. Firstly, it may be more difficult to closely monitor foreign investors from 
a long distance, and they may have limited access to local information. Indeed, these 
shareholders are generally disadvantaged with regard to understanding the local 
country’s economy, language, laws and politics. Second, foreigners and nationals may 
receive different treatment from local governments, consumers and suppliers. Lensink et 
al. (2008) find that foreign ownership negatively affects bank efficiency. Additionally, 
Berger et al. (2009b) claim that foreign ownership is not helpful for bank stability in 23 
developed nations. Lee and Hsieh (2014) show that domestic banks are better than 
foreign banks. 
 
H4: Banks with higher foreign ownership are positively related to performance. 
 
4.3.7 Ownership diversity 
Ownership diversity is the distribution of equity type with regard to votes and capital, 
which includes the state, SOE, domestic private, and foreign owners. Ownership 
diversity can influence firm performance in several ways. First, these diversities have an 
impact on corporate governance structures because they determine the incentives of 
managers and the economic efficiency of the corporations. Second, enhancing 
performance is a common avenue for state, private, and foreign investors to alleviate 
conflicts of interest between each shareholder. More diversity equity ownership may 
increase corporate performance because it means better alignment of monetary 
incentives between the manager and other equity owners. Theories from economics, 
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organisational behaviour, and social psychology can provide some understanding of the 
nature of the link between ownership diversity and financial performance. Diversity 
incentives of shareholders hold the potential conflict to improve the information 
provided by the board to managers. Thus, differences in the backgrounds of 
shareholders are very likely to produce unique information sets that are available to 
management for better decision-making. However, decision-making may be slower and 
more conflicted with diverse shareholders. Garcia-Meca et al. (2015) shows that 
directors’ diversity increases bank performance.  
 
Therefore, relying on above arguments, it is reasonable to believe that a bank with 
different types of owners (state, SOE, domestic private, and foreign) is more capable of 
securing the complementary set of key resources for improving operations. 
 
H5: Ownership type diversity is positively related to bank performance. 
 
4.3.8 Ownership concentration 
Ownership concentration is a generally used structure through which investors aim to 
ensure reasonable returns on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). After 
examining the separation of ownership and control in public corporations in East Asian 
countries, Claessens et al. (2000) find that more than two-thirds of the firms are 
controlled by a single shareholder. In particular, Caprio et al. (2007) find that banks are 
not widely held and tend to be controlled by a family or the State. It is a commonly held 
belief that concentrated ownership offers the best protection to shareholders. 
 
Evidence from previous studies on the effect of ownership concentration on bank 
performances are mixed and complex. The different national systems of corporate 
governance reflect differences in ownership structure of firms in distinct economies and, 
particularly, in ownership concentration too (Shleifer and Vishney. 1997; Caprio et al., 
2007). Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that more concentrated banking systems are not 
associated with better performance.  
134 
 
 
It is not necessarily the case that greater ownership concentration means better 
alignment of interests of management with shareholders and thus enhances performance. 
DeYoung et al. (2001) indicate that banks with large ownership concentrations face 
classic monitoring problems. Garcia-Herrero et al. (2008) find that a more concentrated 
banking system is associated with a lower profit. Indeed, controlling shareholders could 
use control of a bank to benefit their related entities and easily extract private benefits. 
Also, controlling shareholders may abuse their power, which could be detrimental to the 
value maximisation goals of the firm. Large bank shareholders can fire managers, and 
such shareholders can use their power to ensure that managers engage in related lending 
(Caprio et al., 2007). Battaglia and Gallo (2017) find that greater shareholder influence 
results in more systemic risk during crises. Indeed, although a few larger shareholders 
might have the power to induce management to run the firm to their interests, these 
interests may not converge with those of minority shareholders.  
 
In contrast, some empirical evidence shows that a bank with higher ownership by few 
shareholders performs better because a large ownership concentration has more 
incentive to enhance firm performance and to discipline managers. Heugens et al. (2009) 
find a significant positive association between concentrated ownership and firm 
financial performance in Asia. Iannotta et al. (2007) find that ownership concentration 
has no effect on banks’ performance, but is associated with better loan quality. Caprio et 
al. (2007) find that concentrated ownership reduces incentives for insiders to 
expropriate bank resources, which can boost valuations. In contrast, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that with more dispersed shareholding, the firm value increases.  
 
More concentrated ownership can exploit strong bargaining powers with mangers and in 
turn reduce managerial initiatives. Thus, my sixth hypothesis is as follows: 
H6: Ownership concentration is negatively related to bank performance.   
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4.4 Methodology and data  
4.4.1 Data and sample selection 
My sample is an unbalanced panel of 132 Chinese banks over the 2005–2015 period. 
These banks are the top banks, based on their total assets according to the annual China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) ranking. 
 
To investigate the impact of ownership structure on banks' performance, I collect my 
dataset from two sources. I hand-collect the information about the sample banks' 
ownership structures from annual reports, such as the percentage of ownership held by 
the top ten owners. In addition, the bank-specific accounting data is retrieved from the 
BankScope database and the banks' annual reports. Whenever Bankscope and the annual 
report do not have sufficient information, or have a questionable amount, I retrieve or 
double-check the data from other official sources, such as annual issues of the Almanac 
of China’s Finance and Banking.  
 
Table (27) shows the top ten largest shareholders’ ownership structures of the banks in 
my sample over the period 2005 to 2015. 
 
Table 27: The ownership structure of Chinese banks 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Largest shareholder 830 21.82 15.64 4.23 92.01 
Second shareholder 830 12.25 6.49 1.83 50.00 
Third shareholder 830 7.87 3.53 0.90 20.00 
Fourth shareholder 830 6.07 3.02 0.07 20.00 
Fifth shareholder 830 4.92 2.36 0.06 11.67 
Sixth shareholder 830 4.17 2.22 0.06 10.08 
Seventh shareholder 830 3.61 1.94 0.04 10.00 
Eighth shareholder 830 3.06 1.69 0.04 9.90 
Ninth shareholder 830 2.66 1.51 0.03 8.00 
Tenth shareholder 830 2.33 1.35 0.01 8.00 
Ownership of top ten 
shareholders 
830 
67.18 18.23 38.54 100 
      
Note: This table presents the percentage of a bank's equity share capital owned by the top ten largest shareholders individually and their 
total shareholding. 
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I delete the observations in the top 0.5% and in the bottom 0.5% of bank performance 
and ownership structure, as did Chen et al. (2014). 
 
4.4.2 Model 
Several studies analyse whether ownership and governance do matter for bank 
performance. For example, Lin and Zhang (2009) assess the effect of bank ownership 
on performance using a panel of Chinese banks over the 1997–2004 period. Berger et al. 
(2009) analyse the efficiency using 266 annual observations, over the 1994–2003 period, 
on 38 commercial banks in China with different majority ownerships. Iannotta et al. 
(2007) investigate whether any significant difference exists in the performance of 
European banks with different ownership structures. 
 
Following previous studies (Iannotta et al., 2007; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Jiang 
et al., 2013; Lin and Zhang, 2009), I focus on two traditional performance measures. 
First, I use the measures of bank profitability, return on assets (ROA). ROA is 
calculated as the income before extraordinary items, interest expense and taxes, divided 
by the average of the two most recent years of total assets. Following Elyasiani and 
Zhang (2015) and Berger et al. (2005), the second performance variable is return on 
equity (ROE), defined as profits (net income after taxes) relative to equity, which is 
used as the robustness test.  
 
In line with prior studies that examine the relationship between ownership and bank 
performance (e.g. Berger et al., 2009; Iannotta et al., 2009; Lin and Zhang, 2009), I use 
the following regression specification: 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛴𝑘𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 12) 
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where the dependent variable PERF is one of the two bank performance measures: the 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). 
 
STATE, SOE, DPO and FOR indicate the percentage of equity shares held by the 
shareholders for government, state-owned enterprises, domestic private owners and 
foreign investors, respectively. State ownership refers to equity investments by central 
or local governmental institutions. In China, for historical reasons, a large number of 
commercial banks are owned or controlled by the state, either directly through central or 
local government institutions or indirectly through marketised SOEs. Governments have 
conflicting objectives other than profit maximisation. The model captures the 
contribution of state ownership, SOE ownership, domestic private ownership, foreign 
ownership, ownership diversity, and ownership concentration on the performance 
measured by return on asset and return on equity of conglomerate banks. 
 
DIV and CONC represent the ownership type diversity and concentration. First, 
following Chen et al. (2014), I use the Herfindahl measure, a commonly used approach 
of computing the level of diversification for ownership type diversity.  
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 1
∑ 𝑖 [(
𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑖 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 )
2
]⁄
  
(Equation 13) 
where i can be one of the state, SOE, domestic private, or foreign investors. 
 
In addition, ownership concentration equals the sum of the squared ownership shares of 
the ten largest shareholders of the bank (Dong et al., 2014). It is the proportion of shares 
owned by a certain number of shareholders. I argue that the higher the number of equity 
owned by the block holders, the more manger actions will be monitored to act in the 
interest of the shareholders. 
 
A greater value of ownership diversity indicates a more diverse presence of ownership 
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types among those larger shareholders, while a higher value of ownership concentration 
indicates more concentrated control by larger shareholders. 
 
4.4.3 Control variables  
Bank size: Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of the bank's total assets. This 
variable includes the total assets to take account for differences in bank size. Large 
banks normally have diversified geographies, setting up branches around the world in 
countries, and with many different sources of income. As large and complex 
organisations have multiple and overlapping layers of hierarchy, they may suffer from 
complex agency problems. However, DeYoung et al. (2013) find that the larger banks 
were able to take advantage of these opportunities when industry deregulation expanded 
these banks’ growth opportunities. Bertay et al. (2013) show that bank returns increase 
with absolute size because large banks are subject to greater market discipline, yet 
decline with systemic size.  
 
Loans: Over the past decades, deposits and loans have been regarded as the most 
important businesses for Chinese banks. Banks obtain low cost funds by giving lower 
interest rates for deposits. A large portion of these funds is loaned to enterprises and 
individual borrowers to generate interest income. Jiang et al. (2013) find that Chinese 
banks are more efficient in generating interest revenue than non-interest income. 
Moreover, loans might be more profitable than other types of assets, such as securities 
and other types of investment; therefore, a positive coefficient sign is expected for this 
variable in the regression.  
 
Capital adequacy: Better capitalised banks may reflect higher management quality, 
thereby generating a higher profit. As pointed out by Berger and Bouwman (2013), well 
capitalised banks face lower expected bankruptcy costs, which in turn increase their 
shareholders’ return. Moreover, regulators require banks to hold a minimum level of 
capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. Higher levels of capital may therefore 
indicate banks with riskier assets. 
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Non-performing loans: This variable is used to proxy for asset quality. Lower loan 
quality typically indicates more resources on credit underwriting and loan monitoring, 
thus reducing profitability.  
 
Block shareholder numbers: This variable is the number of shareholders whose single 
holding exceeds 5% of total shares outstanding of the bank. Block shareholders may 
have incentive to extract private benefits from banks, and have a negative effect on a 
bank’s profitability.  
 
Board size: Corporate governance plays a special role due to the uniqueness of the 
banking sector. The consensus is that complex firms, which need a greater level of 
advising and monitoring, have larger boards. Small boards may have difficulty in 
monitoring managers due to the idiosyncratic nature of the banking business. However, 
more board members would increase the free rider problem. De Andres and Vallelado 
(2008) find an inverted U-shaped relation between bank performance and board size. 
Jiang et al. (2013) find that board size has a significantly negative impact on bank 
performance.  
 
Independent directors: It is not enough merely to appoint more executive directors to 
safeguard the efficacy of supervision and advising for a bank. Independent directors 
should be appointed to monitor and discipline mangers. De Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
suggest that that larger and not excessively independent boards might prove more 
efficient in monitoring and advising functions, and thus create more value. Jiang et al. 
(2013) find the proportion of independent directors has a significantly positive impact 
on both bank performance and asset quality. 
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Table 28: Definition of variables 
Variables Symbol Description  Sources 
Performance variables    
Return on assets  ROA The ratio of profit to total assets Bankscope 
Return on equity ROE The ratio of profit to equity Bankscope 
    
Ownership variables    
Government 
ownership 
STATE The percentage of shares held by 
government 
Manual collection 
SOE ownership  SOE The percentage of shares held by 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
Manual collection 
Domestic private 
ownership  
DPO The percentage of shares held by 
domestic private owners 
Manual collection 
Foreign ownership FOR The percentage of shares held by 
foreign investors 
Manual collection 
Ownership type 
diversity 
DIV The diversification for ownership 
type diversity and calculated from 
Equation 2 
Use original 
ownership data to 
calculate 
Ownership 
concentration 
CONC The sum of the squared ownership 
shares of the top ten largest 
shareholders of the bank 
Use original 
ownership data to 
calculate 
Top 3 ownership  TOP3 The sum of the percentage of equity 
shares owned by the top three 
shareholders 
Use original 
ownership data to 
calculate 
    
Control variables     
Bank size LNTA The natural logarithm of total assets 
in thousands of Chinese Yuan 
Bankscope 
Loans LTD Ratio of total loans to total deposit Bankscope 
Capital adequacy CAR Risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio Bankscope 
Non-performing loan  NPL Ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans 
Bankscope 
Block shareholder 
numbers 
BLO The number of block shareholders, 
whose holding exceeds 5% of total 
shares outstanding of the bank 
Annual reports 
Board size BS The number of board members Annual reports 
Independent board 
members 
IND The number of non-executive 
directors in the board 
Annual reports 
 
It is reasonable to believe that the role played by the different types of owners in banks' 
performance behaviours is conditional on their incentives, as reflected by the ownership 
type diversity and concentration, i.e. the relationship between performance and the 
ownership type diversity and the degree of ownership concentration. To explore this 
issue, I use the following regression model: 
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𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀1𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀3𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀5𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀6𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀7𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀8𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛴𝑘𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 14) 
 
where the interaction terms are included in the model as the output of the ownership 
type diversity (DIV) and concentration (CONC), with the percentage of each ownership 
type, respectively. Other control variables are defined as above. If the coefficients of the 
interaction terms are statistically significant, it implies that the impacts of ownership 
type diversity and concentration on performance varies across those ownership types. 
 
4.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table (29) presents statistics for all variables. The mean (median) of ROA is 1.13% 
(1.12%) with standard deviation of 0.42%, and minimum and maximum values of 0.05% 
and 2.39%, respectively. This is similar to the value given by Lin and Zhang (2009). 
The mean (median) ROE is 17.71% (17.64%). 
 
Regarding ownership structure, the state ownership has a mean of 7.21% with standard 
deviation of 10.18%, and minimum and maximum of 0% and 39%. In addition, the SOE 
owners hold an average stake of 25.18% in commercial banks. The domestic private 
investors and foreign investors hold an average stake of 14.37% and 3.89%. 
Furthermore, the mean (median) of the ownership type diversity is 1.80 (1.80). The 
mean (median) of the ownership concentration is 0.21 (0.15), with a small degree of 
variation across the sample. 
 
With regard to the control variables, the range of capital adequacy ratio is from 5.77% 
to 30.14%, with an average of 13.19%. This figure is comparable to the figure reported 
in Dong et al. (2014). The mean (median) NPL is 1.31% (1.03%). 
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Table 29: Descriptive statistics for main model variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Performance variables     
ROA 830 1.14 0.43 0.05 2.39 
ROE 830 17.87 6.86 0.63 39.72 
      
Ownership variables 
STATE 830 7.22 10.18 0.00 39.21 
SOE 830 25.16 22.66 0.00 90.15 
DPO 830 14.36 17.02 0.00 67.33 
FOR 830 3.88 7.14 0.00 20.00 
DIV 830 1.81 0.6 1.00 2.99 
CONC 830 0.21 0.14 0.00 0.74 
TOP3 830 0.42 0.18 0.16 0.92 
      
Control variables     
LNTA 830 16.32 1.79 13.19 21.19 
LTD 830 60.76 10.64 28.34 78.45 
CAR 830 12.96 3.18 5.77 30.14 
NPL 830 1.31 1.18 0.00 8.21 
BLO 830 4.22 2.15 0.00 10.00 
BS 830 12.88 2.94 6.00 19.00 
IND 830 3.09 1.85 0.00 7.00 
      
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared ownership 
shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three shareholders. LNTA is 
the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to total deposit. CAR is 
risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of total loans. BLO is the 
number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent members on the board.  
 
The correlation between variables is used to identify whether there is a significant 
relationship between the ownership type and the performance. Table (30) shows the 
correlation matrix, which shows the relationship between all pairs of variables in the 
regression model. The correlation matrix indicates that state ownership (STATE) is not 
significantly related to the two performance measures: the return on assets (ROA), and 
the return on equity (ROE).  
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Table 30: The matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients 
 ROA ROE STATE SOE DPO FOR DIV CONC 
ROA 1.000        
ROE 0.6835* 1.000       
STATE 0.0256 0.0367 1.000      
SOE -0.2905* -0.1922* -0.1908* 1.000     
DPO 0.2195* 0.0971* -0.0272 -0.3855* 1.000    
FOR -0.1966* -0.0261 -0.1087* 0.1146* -0.2816* 1.000   
DIV 0.1244* 0.0911* 0.4770* -0.2431* 0.1090* 0.2375* 1.000  
CONC -0.1660* -0.0835* 0.0338 0.6410* -0.3978* 0.0998* -0.3075* 1.000 
TOP3 -0.2134* -0.1232* 0.1884* 0.7436* -0.2477* 0.2305* -0.0646 0.7885* 
LNTA -0.1346* 0.0655 -0.0483 0.2801* -0.4228* 0.3179* -0.1244* 0.4500* 
LTD -0.0336 -0.0329 -0.1146* -0.0133 -0.0852* 0.1245* -0.03 0.0147 
CAR 0.2160* -0.1602* -0.0157 -0.0022 0.1425* -0.0774* 0.0736* -0.0696* 
NPL -0.3412* -0.2524* 0.0850* 0.0032 -0.1801* 0.0313 -0.0247 0.0851* 
BLO 0.0441 -0.0186 0.0721* -0.0366 0.6979* -0.0928* 0.2743* -0.4306* 
BS -0.1284* -0.0382 -0.1001* -0.0073 -0.1839* 0.2494* -0.0116 -0.0137 
IND -0.1176* -0.0385 -0.0841* 0.0765* -0.3162* 0.2771* -0.0547 0.1768* 
         
 TOP3 LNTA LTD CAR NPL BLO BS IND 
TOP3 1.000        
LNTA 0.3000* 1.000       
LTD -0.0695* 0.2277* 1.000      
CAR -0.0054 -0.2204* -0.1305* 1.000     
NPL 0.0484 0.0093 0.0849* -0.2916* 1.000    
BLO -0.2031* -0.3931* -0.0780* 0.1273* -0.1546* 1.000   
BS -0.1124* 0.5084* 0.2436* -0.0911* -0.0013 -0.0730* 1.000  
IND 0.0394 0.6735* 0.2591* -0.0949* -0.0629 -0.2699* 0.6725* 1.000 
         
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared ownership 
shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three shareholders. LNTA is 
the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to total deposit. CAR is 
risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of total loans. BLO is the 
number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent members on the board. 
 
SOE ownership (SOE) is significantly negatively related to ROA and ROE. Foreign 
ownership (FOR) is also significantly negatively related to ROA, but not significantly 
related to ROE. In addition, private domestic ownership (PDO) is significantly 
positively related to both ROA and ROE. Furthermore, ownership type diversity (DIV) 
is significantly positively related to ROA and ROE, and ownership concentration 
(CONC) is significantly negatively related to both ROA and ROE. Although I observe 
significant correlation among the measures of performance variables, they are not used 
in same model. In general, there is no evidence of severe multicollinearity. 
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4.5 Empirical results  
4.5.1 OLS estimation results 
These regressions for the estimations of the relationship between the ownership 
structure and performance are presented in Table (31).  
 
Table 31: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (full model) – OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
STATE  0.002    -0.005*** 
  (0.98)    (-3.00) 
SOE   -0.007***   -0.007*** 
   (-8.23)   (-6.33) 
DPO    0.007***  0.001 
    (6.18)  (-0.28) 
FOR     -0.011*** -0.011*** 
     (-5.53) (-5.25) 
DIV  0.058** 0.047** 0.092*** 0.112*** 0.131*** 
  (2.11) (2.06) (3.91) (4.57) (4.59) 
CONC  -0.434*** -0.384** -0.339*** -0.406*** -0.509*** 
  (-3.26) (-2.41) (-2.61) (-3.13) (-2.76) 
LNTA  -0.003 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.016 
  (-0.27) -0.3 -0.28 -0.73 -1.32 
LTD  0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.002* 0.002 
  (1.70) (1.54) (1.48) (1.85) (1.39) 
CAR  0.014*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
  (3.09) (3.50) (3.04) (3.09) (3.42) 
NPL  -0.131*** -0.133*** -0.120*** -0.126*** -0.125*** 
  (-9.86) (-10.42) (-9.19) (-9.67) (-9.79) 
BLO  -0.021*** 0.003 -0.056*** -0.024*** 0.004 
  (-2.69) -0.37 (-5.87) (-3.07) -0.3 
BS  -0.012* -0.012** -0.01 -0.01 -0.011* 
  (-1.89) (-1.99) (-1.51) (-1.60) (-1.82) 
IND  -0.015 -0.017 -0.013 -0.014 -0.016 
  (-1.29) (-1.50) (-1.15) (-1.21) (-1.48) 
       
Constant  1.303*** 1.121*** 1.144*** 1.022*** 0.834*** 
  (6.00) (5.34) (5.35) (4.66) (3.92) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  18.225 26.377 22.77 21.843 23.426 
R  0.182 0.244 0.218 0.211 0.272 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
members on the board. 
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There is a significant relationship between performance and the different types of 
ownership. I present the full model by adding all control variables as Equation (12), 
while the table also presents the results for individual type shareholders from column (1) 
to (4). Again, the signs of the coefficients on STATE, SOE, DPO and FOR are relatively 
consistent with regression results in previous specifications. The coefficient for STATE 
is negative and significant at the 1% level in column (5), instead of column (1) of Table 
(31). In addition, the coefficients for SOE are negative and significant at the 1% level in 
both column (2) and column (5) of Table (31). Moreover, the coefficient for DPO is 
positive and significant at the 1% level in column (3) of Table (31). However, for 
column (5) of Table (31), this result breaks down. It is still positive, yet no longer 
significant. Furthermore, the coefficients for FOR are negative and significant at the 1% 
level in both column (4) and column (5) of Table (31). 
 
First, this result indicates that state shareholders may not create enough of an 
incentive-based environment for managers that is conducive to knowledge transfer for 
enhancing performance. These results are in line with Altunbas et al. (2001) and Micco 
et al. (2007), who find no evidence that state-owned banks are less profitable than 
private banks. In addition, this result further extends the findings of Fu and Heffernan 
(2009), who investigate the relationship between market structure and performance in 
China’s banking system from 1985 to 2002, and find no evidence to support the 
quiet-life hypothesis in state-owned banks. The influence of government ownership on 
bank performance is especially complex, as governments impose non-profit-maximising 
social and political objectives, yet also provide implicit guarantees against default. 
Moreover, this evidence also can be explained by the fact that state-owned banks do not 
enjoy monopoly profits, probably because of strict interest rate controls.  
 
Second, the result is not surprising as in many cases SOE shareholders tend to satisfy 
their personal interests instead of aligning their interests with that of the bank. Thus, 
agency problems could be a source of negative performance, and this explains why 
external pressures, which influence the efforts of management, may fail to coerce 
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maximum effort from managers. In highly competitive markets, external pressures are 
expected to strengthen management’s incentive to operate efficiently. In addition, 
increased SOE shareholding may encourage a lack of discipline and greater risk-taking 
behaviour. The notion of economically efficient SOE-owned banks is contentious and 
revolves around alternative views of government benevolence. Hypothesis (2) is fully 
confirmed by these results: banks with high SOE ownership are associated with worse 
performance. 
 
Third, the result indicates that banks with more private domestic shareholders perform 
better. The finding is consistent with the literature; for example, following the studies of 
Williams and Nguyen (2005). Domestic private owners might require that management 
implement certain operational strategies in order to achieve their returns. This, in turn, 
results in better performance. In addition, this result can be explained by the findings of 
Jiang et al. (2013), who claim that bank performance is improved after privatisation, 
with respect to revenue inflow and efficiency. Domestic shareholders in the bank’s 
control chain are an advantageous source of skills and expertise that can help banks with 
activity diversification (Saghi-Zedek, 2016). Moreover, Altunbas et al. (2001) also 
conclude that privately owned banks are more efficient than their counterparts. Indeed, 
private domestic ownership is expected to reduce agency problems, thereby promoting 
profitability because these shareholders exercise due diligence and monitor managers 
efficiently. Shaban and James (2017) find that domestic investors tend to select the best 
performing banks. Hence, the results confirm Hypothesis (3).  
 
Fourth, this result is in line with the findings of Lensink et al. (2008), who also find that 
foreign ownership negatively affects bank performance. In addition, this result can be 
interpreted in that foreign owners may find it more difficult than domestic owners to 
deal with a host country’s regulations or related banking supervision requirements. 
Indeed, foreign shareholders may face strong domestic networks and may also 
encourage managers to increase shareholder returns through greater risk-taking 
(Garcia-Meca et al., 2015). Consistent with the findings of Lee and Hsieh (2014), they 
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find that the home field advantage hypothesis is in existence. The results confirm 
Hypothesis (4). 
 
However, these results are contrast with the findings of Berger et al., (2005) who state 
that foreign ownership helps mitigate loss of profit or increase in costs from 
diversification. Jiang et al., (2013) also find that a high level of cost efficiency is 
associated with more shares of foreign ownership. Micco et al. (2007) also offer 
evidence that foreign ownership improves a bank’s performance through profit 
increases and cost downs. 
 
More generally, firms with few large, undiversified shareholders, such as founding 
owners, may forgo maximum profits because they are unable to separate their financial 
preferences from those of outside or minority shareholders. Founding owners often limit 
executive management positions to the members who may have relation. These suggest 
restricted human resourcees from which to obtain qualified and capable talent, 
potentially leading to competitive disadvantages in relation to other firms. 
 
The results can be explained by the views regarding the expropriation of minority 
shareholders in banks, which is contrast with the findings of Caprio et al. (2007). 
Although the dispersed owners lack both the means and the motive to address 
managerial agency problems, the incentives of the controlling shareholders are more 
likely to expropriate resources from the corporation. This situation is generally known 
as ‘tunneling’, and is commonly defined as ‘the transfer of assets and revenues out of 
firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders’.  
 
A stream of corporate governance research indicates the attempts of large shareholders 
to expropriate smaller shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) claim that combining 
ownership and control allows concentrated shareholders to exchange profit for private 
rent. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that large premiums associated with superior 
voting shares or control rights provide incentives, and that larger shareholders seek to 
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extract private benefits from the firm. Indeed, higher ownership concentration may 
increase the power for shareholders to monitor management, but it may also increase the 
risk for the abuse of power by large controlling shareholders.  
 
The political view claims that government control of financial institutions politicises 
resource allocation for the sake of advancing certain political agendas and, by pursuing 
such objectives, economic efficiency is impaired (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In other 
words, state ownership of commercial banks is used to assist national economic 
development policies. In fact, political views should not be seen as corner solutions 
without any intermediate possibility; it is possible that state-owned banks are mandated 
to engage with some political lending. In addition, the state shareholders may act as 
both owner and regulator of state-owned banks. As a consequence, some banks might be 
either too-big-to-fail or too-important-to-fail, which would allow worse performing 
banks to survive. This view can be support by the findings of Faccio et al. (2006), who 
find that politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than 
similar non-connected firms. Furthermore, the free-rider problem becomes obvious in 
government-owned banks. State ownership means that every citizen is a shareholder, 
which suggests that shareholders may have no power or incentive to monitor the 
managers. Indeed, the inferior performance of state-owned banks may due to the 
perverse incentives of political bureaucrats who influence the operation of state-owned 
banks. My findings provide further support for the political view of public banks and 
corroborate previous findings by Micco et al. (2007), who find that state-owned banks 
tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their private counterparts in 
developing countries.  
 
Regarding the control variables in the efficiency equation, it appears that most variables 
are in line with expectations. The coefficients on the majority control variables are 
significant, except for that of LNTA and IND. The coefficients of loan to deposit ratio 
(LTD) have a statistically significant and positive effect on performance in column (1) 
and (4) of Table (34), which suggests that banks with more loans are likely to associate 
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with higher returns for the shareholders. The result is in line with the findings of Jiang 
et al. (2013). In addition, the coefficients of the non-performing loan ratio (NPL) have a 
statistically significant and negative effect on performance in column (1) and (4) of 
Table (34), which suggests that banks with lower non-performing loans perform better 
and are more profitable. Furthermore, consistent with the findings of Liang et al. (2013), 
board size has a significantly negative impact on bank performance. 
 
The coefficients of bank sizes (LNTA) have no statistical significance. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Micco et al. (2007), who state that there is no correlation 
between absolute bank size and ROA for banks located in developing countries. 
 
Adding these control variables greatly increases the explanatory power of the model, 
but leaves the significance levels and relative magnitudes of the various ownership 
coefficients unchanged. Although the control variables together explain the different 
types of owners’ share of the total variation in performance across banks, marginal 
changes in diversity and concentration are still statistically significant. The R2 values 
increase significantly after control variables are added in the estimations (e.g. R2 
increases from 18.2% in Column 1 to 27.2% in Column 5), meaning that these control 
variables are reasonable explanatory factors determining bank performance. 
 
4.5.2 Fixed effect estimation 
In Table (32), the results still clearly suggest that bank ownership matters. In both 
column (1) and (5), the coefficient on STATE is negative and significant at 10% and 5%. 
The results confirm the previous findings that banks with more percentage shareholding 
by government are associated with lower profitability. In addition, the coefficient on 
DPO is positive and significant at 5% and 10% on column (3) and (5), respectively. The 
results confirm the previous findings that banks with more shares holding by domestic 
provide investors are associated with better performing. Moreover, the coefficient on 
DIV is positive and significant at 1% on all five columns. 
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Table 32: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (without control 
variables) – Fixed effect  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
STATE  -0.006*    -0.007**  
  (-1.75)    (-2.00)    
SOE   -0.001   -0.002 
   (-0.97)   (-1.25)    
DPO    0.004**  0.003*   
    (2.18)  (1.71) 
FOR     0.000 0.000 
     (0.12) (0.04) 
DIV  0.209*** 0.204*** 0.193*** 0.198*** 0.213*** 
  (4.91) (4.78) (4.57) (4.56) (4.77) 
CONC  0.021 -0.08 -0.076 -0.151 0.236 
  (0.08) (-0.30) (-0.29) (-0.58) (0.78) 
       
Constant  0.793*** 0.818*** 0.747*** 0.805*** 0.759*** 
  (8.00) (8.19) (7.30) (8.11) (7.28) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  8.84 8.101 9.411 7.784 5.433 
R  0.036 0.033 0.039 0.032 0.045 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
members on the board. 
 
The results of Table (33) indicate that controlling for these other bank-specific 
characteristics does not change previous findings. In particular, NPL enters negatively 
and significantly, as expected. 
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Table 33: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (full model) – Fixed 
effect 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
STATE  0.003    -0.001 
  (0.90)    (-0.15)    
SOE   -0.004***   -0.004**  
   (-2.86)   (-2.12)    
DPO    0.003*  0.00 
    (1.71)  (0.01) 
FOR     -0.001 -0.002 
     (-0.30) (-0.43)    
DIV  0.172*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.181*** 0.188*** 
  (4.25) (4.61) (4.61) (4.42) (4.49) 
CONC  -0.129 0.243 -0.083 -0.061 0.251 
  (-0.48) (0.90) (-0.33) (-0.24) (0.75) 
LNTA  0.024 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.02 
  (1.25) (1.16) (1.06) (0.99) (1.01) 
LTD  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.85) (-0.71) (-0.78) (-0.82) (-0.69)    
CAR  0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 
  (1.38) (1.45) (1.33) (1.30) (1.43) 
NPL  -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.115*** 
  (-10.02) (-10.19) (-9.92) (-9.96) (-10.10)    
BLO  0.016 0.025** -0.001 0.015 0.024 
  (1.51) (2.21) (-0.08) (1.41) (1.31) 
BS  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (-0.20) (-0.11) (-0.13) (-0.29) (-0.11)    
IND  -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
  (-0.10) (0.02) (0.06) (-0.07) (-0.02)    
       
Constant  0.54 0.552 0.615* 0.650* 0.581 
  (1.41) (1.51) (1.68) (1.77) (1.51) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  16.917 17.836 17.182 16.828 13.68 
R  0.197 0.205 0.199 0.196 0.206 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
members on the board. 
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4.5.3 Interacting different types of owners with ownership type diversity and 
concentration  
 
Table (34) reports the results of Equation (14) that examines how the different types of 
owners in banks' performance behaviours are conditional on ownership type diversity 
and concentration. In other words, the marginal effect of percentage of shareholding by 
different owners may depend on the ownership type diversity and the level of ownership 
concentration.  
 
In column (1) of Table (34), the coefficient on the interaction between STATE and DIV 
is not significantly affected. However, CONC is negative and significant at 5%, while 
the interaction term STATE and CONC enters negatively and significantly at 1%. The 
result can be explained by the fact that the negative impact of STATE shareholders on 
bank performance is pronounced among banks with concentrated ownership. 
 
In column (2) of Table (34), the coefficient on the interaction between SOE and DIV is 
positive and significant at 5%, while the interaction term SOE and CONC enters also 
positively and significantly. The results suggest that the negative impact of SOE 
shareholders on bank performance is reduced on banks with ownership type diversity 
and concentrated ownership.  
 
In column (4) of Table (34), the coefficient on the interaction between FOR and CONC 
is positive and significant at 1%, while the coefficient of interaction between FOR and 
DIV is not significantly affected. The result indicates that that FOR and CONC reduce 
bank performance, but the marginal effect of each diminishes as the other increases. In 
other words, the results suggest that the negative impact of FOR shareholders on bank 
performance is reduced in banks with concentrated ownership.  
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Table 34: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (interaction without 
control variables)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
DIV  0.034 -0.000 0.027 0.108*** 0.048 
  (0.89) (-0.00) (0.77) (3.82) (0.70) 
CONC  -0.265** -0.757*** -0.154 -0.482*** 0.544 
  (-2.20) (-2.73) (-1.27) (-3.98) (1.24) 
STATE  0.007    -0.003 
  (1.10)    (-0.45)    
STATE * DIV 0.001    0.001 
  (0.44)    (0.54) 
STATE * CONC -0.035***    -0.025**  
  (-3.59)    (-2.28)    
SOE   -0.015***   -0.013*** 
   (-4.57)   (-3.59)    
SOE * DIV  0.004**   0.004**  
   (2.10)   (2.26) 
SOE * CONC  0.018***   0.002 
   (3.93)   (0.39) 
DPO    0.001  0.000 
    -0.21  (-0.11)    
DPO * DIV   0.002  0.002 
    (1.39)  (1.01) 
SOE * CONC   0.004  -0.008 
    (0.20)  (-0.41)    
FOR     -0.025*** -0.007 
     (-2.84) (-0.75)    
FOR * DIV    -0.001 -0.005 
     (-0.41) (-1.54)    
FOR * CONC    0.069*** 0.024 
     (3.53) (1.14) 
       
Constant  1.111*** 1.387*** 1.030*** 1.087*** 1.127*** 
  (14.71) (16.25) (13.45) (17.11) (7.70) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  8.135 18.742 12.354 16.58 11.637 
R  0.047 0.102 0.069 0.091 0.166 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
members on the board. 
 
The results in column (5) of Table (34) indicate that the inclusion of all variables does 
not change previous findings. For example, the coefficient on interaction term STATE 
and CONC is still negative and significant at 1%. The coefficients on interaction term 
SOE and DIV is positive and significant. 
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Perhaps as a result of so many inconsistencies, previous researchers have typically 
pointed out that the fragile relationship between ownership and performance may be 
explained in terms of certain ‘conditional factors’. To determine which variable affects 
the relationship between ownership and performance, and whether these factors enhance 
or weaken this relationship, I further adopt Equation (14) to investigate the interaction 
effects of the variables for different types of ownership, ownership diversity, and 
concentration on bank performance on Table (35). 
 
In particular, ownership type diversity continues to have a consistently positive effect on 
bank performance (Column 4 of Table 38), and ownership concentration has a 
consistently negative effect on bank performance (columns 1, 3 and 4 of Table 35). 
 
Table (35) results indicate that controlling for these other bank-specific characteristics 
does not change the findings. In addition, these control variables enter significantly, as 
expected, but this does not affect the chapter’s core results on the impact of ownership 
structure on bank performance.  
 
The other control variable, for example, the effects of capital adequacy ratio, 
non-performing loan, and board size on bank performance, are all significantly negative, 
meaning bank profitability will drop. More specifically, the coefficients on CAR are still 
positive and significant at 1% in all specifications, while the coefficients on NPL are 
still negative and significant at 1%. 
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Table 35: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (interaction with 
control variables)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
DIV  0.025 -0.004 0.054 0.122*** 0.025 
  (0.70) (-0.11) (1.61) (4.57) (0.39) 
CONC  -0.418*** 0.034 -0.374*** -0.639*** 0.561 
  (-3.06) (0.11) (-2.78) (-4.68) (1.30) 
STATE  0.001    -0.009 
  (0.11)    (-1.54)    
STATE * DIV 0.003    0.003 
  (1.13)    (1.20) 
STATE * CONC -0.020**    -0.009 
  (-2.01)    (-0.81)    
SOE   -0.013***   -0.014*** 
   (-4.26)   (-3.87)    
SOE * DIV  0.003**   0.004**  
   (2.06)   -2.36 
SOE * CONC  0.008*   0.000 
   (1.67)   (0.00) 
DPO    0.005  -0.003 
    (1.40)  (-0.62)    
DPO * DIV   0.003*  0.003 
    (1.89)  (1.43) 
SOE * CONC   -0.021  -0.012 
    (-1.13)  (-0.57)    
FOR     -0.024*** -0.003 
     (-2.89) (-0.35)    
FOR * DIV    -0.003 -0.008**  
     (-0.97) (-2.46)    
FOR * CONC    0.088*** 0.039**  
     (4.73) (1.97) 
LNTA  0.003 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.013 
  (0.21) (0.33) (0.42) (0.09) (1.04) 
LTD  0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
  (1.65) (1.39) (1.35) (1.43) (0.57) 
CAR  0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
  (3.26) (3.17) (2.99) (2.73) (2.94) 
NPL  -0.126*** -0.134*** -0.117*** -0.133*** -0.131*** 
  (-9.27) (-10.34) (-8.91) (-10.30) (-10.01)    
BLO  -0.023*** -0.001 -0.063*** -0.028*** -0.004 
  (-2.94) (-0.08) (-6.18) (-3.57) (-0.29)    
BS  -0.013** -0.011* -0.012* -0.012* -0.014**  
  (-1.97) (-1.79) (-1.89) (-1.96) (-2.22)    
IND  -0.019 -0.017 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 
  (-1.57) (-1.47) (-0.91) (-0.94) (-1.21)    
Constant  1.261*** 1.281*** 1.231*** 1.276*** 1.191*** 
  -5.66 -5.75 -5.63 -5.72 -4.74 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  15.685 22.481 19.424 20.937 16.288 
R  0.187 0.248 0.222 0.235 0.297 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
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shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
members on the board. 
 
Some prior research has concluded that there are nonlinear relationships between 
ownership concentration and bank performance. To test this on our data, I add squared 
terms for each of the ownership variables (e.g. STATE, SOE, DPO and FOR). However, 
the model specifications are rather weak when the squared terms are included, and so 
the results are not tabulated in this chapter. The evidence for a non-linear effect is weak. 
 
4.6 Robustness test   
Next, I replicated my main regressions using alternative bank performance measures to 
examine whether my previous results would be affected by measurement errors. These 
regression estimates of the relationship between ownership structures and performance 
are shown in the Tables. In the majority of the estimations of this section, I still found 
that there was a significant relationship between bank performance and the different 
types of owners. 
 
4.6.1 Alternative bank performance  
Table (36) presents the regression results when return on equity (ROE) is used as the 
dependent variable. The results imply that the significantly positive relationship 
between ownership type diversity and performance remains obvious. 
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Table 36: The relationship between ownership and alternative bank performance (only 
individual type ownership) – OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
STATE  0.025    0.001 
  (1.07)    (0.05) 
SOE   -0.058***   -0.055*** 
   (-5.68)   (-4.79)    
DPO    0.039***  0.01 
    (2.83)  (0.65) 
FOR     -0.025 0.002 
     (-0.76) (0.06) 
       
Constant  17.693*** 19.351*** 17.304*** 17.971*** 19.108*** 
  (60.94) (55.56) (55.98) (66.77) (32.06) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  1.137 32.314 8.02 0.573 8.166 
R  0.001 0.037 0.009 0.001 0.037 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
members on the board. 
 
Using alternative bank performance ROE in Table (37), I re-estimate the baseline model 
without including control variables, and find that the results are similar to the 
benchmark regression in Table (31). The results suggest that the significantly positive 
relationship between ownership type diversity and performance remains in most 
specifications. 
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Table 37: The relationship between ownership and alternative bank performance (without 
control variables) – OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
STATE  0.011    -0.03 
  (0.42)    (-1.02)    
SOE   -0.066***   -0.065*** 
   (-4.98)   (-4.61)    
DPO    0.040***  0.022 
    (2.64)  (1.36) 
FOR     -0.033 -0.017 
     (-0.98) (-0.45)    
DIV  0.757 0.728* 0.888** 0.972** 1.072**  
  (1.60) (1.81) (2.19) (2.29) (2.09) 
CONC  -2.559 -4.070* -0.264 -2.106 -5.791**  
  (-1.42) (-1.87) (-0.14) (-1.18) (-2.44) 
       
Constant  16.868*** 17.275*** 15.638*** 16.597*** 16.245*** 
  (16.85) (18.30) (15.10) (17.25) (15.06) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  3.005 11.288 5.299 3.267 6.299 
R  0.011 0.039 0.019 0.012 0.044 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
members on the board. 
 
After including control variables in Table (38), I still find similar impacts of state, SOE, 
domestic private and foreign ownership on bank performance, as well as the measure of 
ownership type diversity and concentration. Specifically, ownership type diversity has a 
significantly positive effect on bank performance, while ownership concentration has a 
consistently negative effect on bank performance. The coefficient estimate for CAR is 
negative and significant in all columns of Table (38). This result suggests that well 
capitalised banks are relatively more profit efficient than poorly capitalised banks. This 
is in line with the conventional view of capital playing a role of implicit deposit 
insurance, which improves depositor confidence and attracts more deposits, thus 
improving bank profits. Our results are broadly consistent with the findings of 
Garcia-Herrero et al. (2009) and Barth et al. (2013b), who all find that well capitalised 
banks have higher levels of efficiency.  
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Table 38: The relationship between ownership and alternative bank performance (full 
model) – OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
STATE  0.024    -0.026 
  (0.93)    (-0.89)    
SOE   -0.075***   -0.071*** 
   (-5.65)   (-3.79)    
DPO    0.079***  0.014 
    (4.28)  (0.55) 
FOR     -0.057* -0.039 
     (-1.67) (-1.06)    
DIV  0.913** 0.846** 1.351*** 1.322*** 1.267*** 
  (2.04) (2.22) (3.51) (3.28) (2.64) 
CONC  -6.089*** 3.304 -4.922** -5.745*** 3.342 
  (-2.82) (1.25) (-2.31) (-2.69) (1.08) 
LNTA  0.672*** 0.751*** 0.750*** 0.733*** 0.802*** 
  (3.30) (3.75) (3.71) (3.55) (3.93) 
LTD  -0.011 -0.016 -0.016 -0.012 -0.017 
  (-0.53) (-0.73) (-0.75) (-0.57) (-0.81)    
CAR  -0.532*** -0.519*** -0.539*** -0.536*** -0.524*** 
  (-7.05) (-7.00) (-7.23) (-7.11) (-7.06)    
NPL  -1.967*** -1.977*** -1.832*** -1.926*** -1.919*** 
  (-9.11) (-9.37) (-8.55) (-8.96) (-8.93)    
BLO  -0.199 0.078 -0.598*** -0.213* -0.017 
  (-1.54) (0.57) (-3.79) (-1.65) (-0.08)    
BS  -0.109 -0.111 -0.08 -0.102 -0.103 
  (-1.03) (-1.08) (-0.76) (-0.96) (-0.99)    
IND  -0.500*** -0.522*** -0.479** -0.496*** -0.515*** 
  (-2.62) (-2.78) (-2.53) (-2.60) (-2.74)    
       
Constant  20.217*** 18.136*** 18.395*** 18.796*** 16.950*** 
  (5.74) (5.21) (5.24) (5.20) (4.73) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  15.216 18.897 17.287 15.444 14.727 
R  0.157 0.187 0.174 0.159 0.190 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
members on the board. 
 
Total asset (LNTA) is positively correlated with return on equity at 1% significance 
level in all specifications in Table (38). It suggests that banks with larger assets are 
likely to be more profit-efficient than their counterparts. This might be the case if the 
banks were to take advantage of economies of scale (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). 
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As our sample represents all the top banks in each market, these banks are likely to be 
viewed as too-big-to-fail and therefore enjoy better credibility than other small 
competitors. Additionally, large sized banks are likely to be more diversified. Indeed, 
more diversification would allow for the maintenance or enhancement of performance, 
while lowering risk. Other banking literatures, such as Peni and Vahamaa (2012), Fu et 
al. (2014) and Goddard et al. (2004), also find that very large banks tend to be more 
profitable in industrial countries. 
 
4.6.2 Alternative bank concentration   
In Table (39), the ownership concentration is replaced by the cumulative top three 
(TOP3) shareholding as one of the robustness tests. 
 
Table 39: The relationship between alternative ownership concentration and bank 
performance (without control variables) – OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
STATE  0.001    -0.009*** 
  (0.81)    (-4.24)    
SOE   -0.005***   -0.008*** 
   (-5.20)   (-6.03)    
DPO    0.005***  0.000 
    (5.42)  (0.29) 
FOR     -0.012*** -0.016*** 
     (-5.66) (-6.41)    
DIV  0.069** 0.043* 0.068*** 0.115*** 0.148*** 
  (2.50) (1.75) (2.89) (4.76) (4.91) 
TOP3  -0.478*** 0.005 -0.348*** -0.344*** -0.531*** 
  (-5.73) (0.04) (-4.24) (-4.20) (-3.38) 
       
Constant  1.199*** 1.183*** 1.088*** 1.116*** 0.969*** 
  (19.36) (20.65) (18.2) (19.15) (15.08) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  15.623 24.893 25.741 26.655 23.052 
R  0.054 0.083 0.085 0.088 0.143 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
members on the board. 
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In Table (40), after including control variables, I find similar impacts of state, SOE, 
domestic private and foreign ownership on bank performance, as well as ownership type 
diversity and concentration variables.  
 
Table 40: The relationship between alternative ownership concentration and bank 
performance (full model) – OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
STATE  -0.003*    -0.009*** 
  (-1.84)    (-3.26)    
SOE   -0.005***   -0.010*** 
   (-5.57)   (-4.51)    
DPO    0.006***  -0.004 
    (5.80)  (-1.51)    
FOR     -0.009*** -0.016*** 
     (-4.40) (-5.25)    
DIV  0.065** 0.044* 0.105*** 0.121*** 0.126*** 
  (2.49) (1.84) (4.66) (5.12) (4.44) 
TOP3  -0.563*** -0.036 -0.471*** -0.453*** -0.656**  
  (-6.56) (-0.30) (-5.67) (-5.34) (-2.55) 
LNTA  0.007 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.025**  
  (0.60) (1.06) (1.10) (1.11) (2.08) 
LTD  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002*   
  (1.34) (1.45) (1.08) (1.44) (1.67) 
CAR  0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
  (3.52) (3.67) (3.41) (3.36) (3.48) 
NPL  -0.132*** -0.130*** -0.120*** -0.126*** -0.123*** 
  (-10.06) (-10.14) (-9.27) (-9.79) (-9.65)    
BLO  -0.017** -0.007 -0.051*** -0.019*** 0.017 
  (-2.26) (-0.90) (-5.48) (-2.60) -0.99 
BS  -0.017*** -0.015** -0.014** -0.014** -0.011*   
  (-2.63) (-2.45) (-2.25) (-2.21) (-1.77)    
IND  -0.018 -0.019 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 
  (-1.56) (-1.63) (-1.42) (-1.42) (-1.54)    
       
Constant  1.308*** 1.118*** 1.153*** 1.086*** 0.629*** 
  (6.13) (5.26) (5.46) (5.00) (2.75) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  22.003 25.489 25.824 24.026 23.173 
R  0.212 0.238 0.24 0.227 0.27 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
members on the board. 
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4.6.3 System GMM estimation 
 
Table 41: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (full model) – GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Lag.ROA  0.392*** 0.371*** 0.355*** 0.368*** 0.379*** 
  (12.34) (12.28) (10.68) (11.00) (11.94) 
STATE  0.002**    0.001 
  (2.54)    (0.81) 
SOE   -0.004***   -0.003*** 
   (-6.39)   (-3.12) 
DPO    0.005***  0.002 
    (5.93)  (1.58) 
FOR     -0.005*** -0.003* 
     (-4.55) (-1.93) 
DIV  0.042** 0.058*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.064*** 
  (2.17) (3.18) (4.71) (5.18) (3.02) 
CONC  -0.132* -0.427*** -0.08 -0.128 -0.238*   
  (-1.67) (-3.89) (-1.02) (-1.65) (-1.79) 
LNTA  -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 
  (-0.62) (-0.51) (0.06) (0.79) (0.010) 
LTD  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.30) (-1.11) (-1.16) (-0.07) (-0.89)    
CAR  0.034*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
  (9.36) (9.28) (8.55) (9.47) (8.89) 
NPL  -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.100*** 
  (-11.20) (-12.33) (-9.45) (-11.43) (-8.89)    
BLO  -0.028*** -0.013* -0.056*** -0.033*** -0.029*** 
  (-4.34) (-1.91) (-8.53) (-5.31) (-2.72)    
BS  0.015*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
  (3.72) (3.42) (4.45) (3.90) (4.27) 
IND  -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.034*** 
  (-4.10) (-4.36) (-4.79) (-4.76) (-4.82)    
       
Constant  0.419** 0.337** 0.387** 0.242 0.308*   
  (2.47) (2.21) (2.21) (1.37) (1.87) 
       
Observation  691 691 691 691 691 
F test  138.797 129.139 555.814 125.463 230.406 
AR1  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
AR2  0.852 0.944 0.872 0.833 0.872 
Hansen  0.150 0.206 0.187 0.158 0.195 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from Equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
members on the board. 
 
System GMM estimator is employed as another robustness test. This methodology 
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controls for potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and the persistence of the 
dependent variable measuring bank performance. This methodology also yields 
consistent results. For instance, a higher shareholding from domestic private owners is 
found to be significant in increasing bank performance in the column (3) specification. 
Additionally, more diversity of ownership structure is positive with bank performance in 
all specifications. 
 
Using different model specifications and alternative performance indicators, the 
robustness checks suggest that the above relationships are consistent. In summary, the 
empirical results of the robustness tests indicate that bank ownership structure is not 
influenced by bank performance, and reverse causality does not appear to be a problem 
for my study. Thus, my results provide new perspectives on the impact of governance 
mechanisms on bank performance. 
 
4.7 Conclusion  
Ownership structure is widely recognised in financial studies as an instrumental 
determinant of firm performance. This chapter has provided empirical evidence in 
support of the typical hypothesis that bank ownership governance is an important 
determinant of performance. Specifically, this chapter examines how ownership type 
and distribution in a country’s banking system affect bank performance. 
 
This chapter compares all foreign-owned banks, private domestic, and 
government-owned banks to assess the impact of ownership on performance in an 
emerging market. The main findings regarding the static effects of bank ownership on 
performance suggest that banks with more state shareholders tend to have poorer 
long-term performance, consistent with much of the literature. The result can be 
explained by greater government involvement and political corruption in the banking 
system. In addition, banks with higher private shareholders generally operate more 
profitably. Furthermore, higher foreign ownership may negatively affect bank 
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performance. Moreover, ownership type diversity is associated with better bank 
performance, while banks with concentrated ownership are worse performing. I check 
the robustness of the results by using different model specifications and ownership 
indicators.  
 
I believe that my findings contribute to a better understanding of how ownership 
structure influences the efficient operation of Chinese banks. However, many questions 
pertaining to the impact of well-developed governance on the performance of banks 
have yet to be answered. A drawback of the analysis presented in this chapter is that it 
only examines the extent to which ownership structure influences bank performance, or, 
in other words, to what extent governance explains the gap from the accounting ratio. 
However, it may also be possible that ownership structure affects bank efficiency, i.e. 
may lead to shifts in accounting measures. This would be the case if ownership structure 
has an impact on the efficiencies that are most suited for individual banks. In my 
opinion, future research on this issue is highly relevant. 
 
I acknowledge that the findings also could be consistent with other explanations. For 
instance, state shareholders may be more exposed to a different set of bank regulations, 
such as small banks have more intensive monitoring. It is also possible that subsidies to 
poor borrowers may have been funneled through government banks to improve social 
welfare. My findings are of interest to a variety of academics, and policymakers, and 
contribute to dealing with problems ranging from improving banking supervision and 
regulations to market discipline, such as the recent large bank initial public offerings 
(IPOs) from China. The positive impact of ownership diversity presence on a bank’s 
performance enhances its economic prospects, opening new pathways for the 
flourishing of the banking sector.  
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Chapter 5: Political connection and bank 
lending: Evidence from China’s banking 
sector 
 
5.1 Introduction  
An increasing body of economic studies focuses on the implications of politics in the 
business world. The traditional view indicates that government ownership of financial 
institutions should benefit from economic development. However, the link between 
politics and economic development remains strongly debated in transitional countries. 
Financial institutions may use political connections to enhance firm competition 
advantage or expropriation, perhaps by affecting relevant regulations. Unlike most firms, 
banks have a significant role in the allocation of credit, which affects the entire economy. 
The extent to which banks are politically connected, and whether this is associated with 
the allocation of credit, remains unexplored. In other words, research on the effect of 
financial intermediaries’ political connections on lending behavior has been very limited. 
This chapter fills this void by employing bank-level information to examine the relation 
between political connections and lending decision in an emerging market. 
 
China’s financial system is particularly interesting for this area because most major 
financial institutions are state-owned or state-connected enterprises. The largest banks 
are likely politically orientated and are dominated by the government through direct or 
indirect channels. Hence, these politically connected banks are likely to allocate and 
price lending according to government preferences. Such behaviours of banks would 
affect the entire financial system. In addition, the Chinese government has been moving 
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forward with further reforms in financial institutions with the goal of building global 
competitive banks. Nevertheless, state ownership and political pressure likely affect the 
performance of these banks. Furthermore, the degree of political influence on bank 
activity is important from both a policy and regulatory perspective, particularly in an 
economy where government ownership monopolises the financial system. It is therefore 
timely to investigate the extent of political issues in the Chinese banking sector and 
consider how it might relate to decisions concerning resource allocation. 
 
This chapter analyses the banks’ overall loan portfolios, as well as corporate and 
consumer loans. The results show that politics plays a role in the lending decisions of 
commercial banks. More specifically, banks with political connections supply more 
credit in terms of gross loans. In addition, the relation is prominent when considering 
economic conditions, and this indicates that lending behavior is pro-cyclical in an 
emerging market. My evidence is robust to different model specifications and 
estimation techniques. 
 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, my chapter 
provides manifest from China, a country whose transition to a market economy has 
been more gradual than those in Western countries. Greater government involvement, 
gradual ownership reform, political corruption, and less developed legal systems 
capture the influence of the prevailing government-related shareholders, and the 
Chinese market thus offers a potentially interesting contrast to most other economies. 
Therefore, we fill the gap where there has been insufficient prior evidence concerning a 
direct link between banks’ political connections and banks’ lending behaviours in China. 
Second, my evidence enriches the extant literature on the implications of political 
influences, particular political connections. The chapter not only provides new manifest 
about the role of political connections in credit growth, but also shows the different 
effects of political connections between corporate loans and consumer loans. Thus, this 
chapter extends previous studies by shedding further insights into the role played by 
governance structure on bank lending behaviour. Third, the relationship between banks 
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and firms through credit supply has recently been explored, but resulting in mixed 
evidence. This chapter expands the literature connecting the effect of corporate 
governance of banks on credit supply. Existing studies focus more on bank ownership 
type; little is known about how political institutions affect bank-lending behaviour. This 
chapter proposes that banks’ political connections are more important in justifying 
credit supplies than ownership type preferences. In addition, unlike prior evidence, 
which uses a pooled sample of all listed banks (with a dummy measure to control for 
the effect of ownership type), this chapter disentangles the effects of political 
connections between state-owned and non state-owned banks by considering them 
independently. 
 
In this chapter, the used approach is similar to that of Jackowicz et al. (2013); however, 
unlike their study, I control for possible endogeneity problems of political connections 
to lending by using the system GMM estimation. In addition, I consider the largest 
emerging market sample of banks for the period from 2005 to 2015, including the recent 
ownership reform period. Furthermore, unlike previous studies, I consider the dynamics 
of the main categories of bank credit to better understand the political preferences that 
influence bank lending over long periods. Moreover, the study attempts to combine 
empirical designs employed by de Haas and van Lelyveld (2014) and Dinc (2005) to 
analyse the lending behaviour of politically connected banks in an emerging market.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the evolution of 
banks’ political connections and the bank credit exercised; Section 3 develops the 
hypotheses; Section 4 describes the employed data and methodology; Section 5 presents 
the empirical evidence; Section 6 addresses robustness issues; and Section 7 presents 
the chapter’s conclusions and discusses the policy implications of the evidence. 
 
 
5.2 Literature review 
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Corporate political connections are relatively widespread in the banking sector. The 
relationship between the banking sector and politics is not only close, but also intimate. 
La Porta et al. (2002) find a great degree of government-owned banks, particularly in 
less-developed countries. Gonzalez-Garcia and Grigoli (2013) show that governments 
control around 21 per cent of assets in the banking sector globally. Braun and Raddatz 
(2010) show that, based on the 150 countries dataset, former cabinet members, central 
bank governors, and financial regulators are more likely to become board members or 
senior officers of banks. This evidence shows that the political nature of the impact of 
the banking sector is obvious in different economies. Therefore, political influence is 
one facet of the relationship between banks and economic development. 
 
Political connections are a double-edged sword for business. Some of the empirical 
literature documents several benefits that political connections and governments can 
play in improving economic efficiency. First, politically connected enterprises appear to 
get preferential access to credit. Indeed, easy access to bank finance is an important 
benefit for enterprises through which political connections operate (Boubakri et al., 
2012; Claessens et al., 2008; Cull and Xu, 2005; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012).  
 
Second, the connection between politicians and firms would generate better outcomes 
by the sharing of knowledge, ability and experience. Faccio (2006) shows that the 
announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase in firm 
value. In the banking sector, Braun and Raddatz (2010) find that politically connected 
banks are more profitable than non-politically connected banks. Nys et al. (2015) find 
that politically connected banks are able to attract more deposits than their 
non-connected counterparts. In contrast, after examining the hazard rate, the results of 
Liu and Ngo (2014) show that financial institution failure is about 45 per cent less likely 
prior to an election year. 
 
Third, political institutions affect investor perceptions of risk, and the cost of equity 
financing should be lower for firms with strong political connections. Borisova et al., 
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(2015) and Boubakri et al. (2012; 2014) provide strong evidence that investors require a 
lower cost of capital for politically connected firms. Infante and Piazza (2014) also 
conclude that politically connected firms gain lower interest rates when the political link 
is at a local government level. In addition, Sapienza (2004) finds that state-owned banks 
charge lower interest rates than do privately owned-banks to similar or identical firms. 
Additionally, politically connected firms have higher credibility in promising future 
recapitalisation in the case of recessions. 
 
On the other hand, corporate governance problems in politically connected firms are 
also obvious, and some empirical studies claim several drawbacks of political 
connections. Indeed, political influence will inevitably change the objective function of 
firms to that preferred by the government, which leads to operating inefficiencies and 
worse performance. First, politically connected firms likely appoint managers and 
directors with lower qualifications and capabiilties, resulting in a misallocation of 
valuable economic resources. As a consequence, risk of expropriation by government 
agencies is prevalent in political connections at the firm level. Boubakri et al. (2012) 
suggest that managers of politically connected firms are not concerned with improving 
the quality of earning and accounting information. Chen et al. (2011) find that firms 
with concentrated control structures on top management facilitate rent-seeking and 
allow the controlling shareholders to retain the benefits arising from connections with 
politicians. Faleye and Krishnan (2017) claim that banks with more effective boards are 
less likely to lend to riskier borrowers. In addition, governments may appoint officials 
to state-owned firms as a means to enhance control.  
 
Second, Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that borrowing and default may be higher for 
firms with political connections. Both Cornett et al. (2010) and Micco et al. (2007) find 
that state-owned banks located in developing countries tend to have lower profitability 
and higher costs than their private counterparts. Kostovetsky (2015) finds that 
politically connected financial firms have higher leverage and are more likely to 
increase their leverage. Indeed, higher leverage is associated with worse performance 
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during financial crises. Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find that investments in politically 
connected firms underperform compared with those in non-politically connected firms. 
Both Beuselinck et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2017) find a negative relation between 
political connection and firm value. Chen et al. (2011) also finds a negative relationship 
between government intervention and investment efficiency.  
 
Third, politicians likely extract rents from connected firms, especially when there is less 
prudential regulation and supervision. Thus, the moral hazard problem is the rational 
consideration or expectation by market participants for politically connected firms (Jia, 
2009; Kostovetsky, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016). The CEO or chairman are normally 
appointed by the relevant authorities of banks where governments are the controlling 
shareholder. These managing boards do not bear the consequences of any inefficient 
decisions they make or lack of proper incentives. Therefore, government officials might 
exert political pressure to engage in rent-seeking activities (Chen et al., 2017), while the 
existence of agency problem. In addition, stronger politically connected firms increase 
their risk taking and exacerbate moral hazard problems due to their expectation of 
government bailouts during worst economic conditions (Ashraf, 2017; Faccio et al., 
2006). Akins et al. (2017) argue that government banks have a higher probability of 
being bailed out of trouble due to poor loans.  
 
Political connections play a significant role in economic activities, especially in 
developing countries with intensive government regulation and weaker investor 
protection (Claessens et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 2002). From 1979, China started 
moving from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented economy. During this 
transition, one of the main challenges of the Chinese government was to create a healthy 
financial system as a prerequisite for stable economic growth. Thus, China’s banking 
system has been gradually transformed from a wholly government-owned and 
government-controlled provider of loans into an increasingly competitive market. There 
is a two-tier ownership structure consisting of state-owned banks and privately-owned 
banks in China. The shareholders of privately-owned banks are normally domestic and 
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foreign investors, which is same as other emerging markets. The senior management of 
government-owned banks are normally members of the Chinese Communist Party and 
they also generally serve the government authorities (Martin, 2012). Sapienza (2004) 
finda that lending of Italian public banks is driven by political incentives.  
 
Political connection studies in the literature have largely focused on non-financial firms, 
while the impact of political connections on banks is relatively limited. Banks are likely 
to use political influence to improve their competitive advantage, perhaps by affecting 
relevant regulations. This consequence would easily appear where governments are 
relatively more powerful. Thus, the issue of political connection in the banking sector is 
of particular interest. A growth number of studies have analysed the lending activities of 
state-owned and private banks during election years (Claessens et al., 2008; Cull and Xu, 
2005; Dinc, 2005; Onder and Ozyildirim, 2013; Sapienza, 2004). For example, Dinc 
(2005) provides cross-country, bank-level empirical evidence about political influences 
on bank-lending behaviors. Cull and Martinez Peria (2013) examine the impact of bank 
ownership on credit growth in Latin American and Eastern European, and find mixed 
results. Cull and Martinez Peria (2013) also find that the link between loan growth and 
bank ownership is not homogenous across developing countries. Liu and Ngo (2014) 
show that US bank failure is lower in the 12 months leading up to an election than in 
normal periods. Jackowicz et al. (2013) analyse the impact of political factors on the 
banking sector in Central European countries. Ferri et a. (2014) analyse the differences 
in lending policies across banks characterised by different types of ownership and 
suggest that ownership type has an impact on bank lending. Allen et al. (2017) examine 
the interactions of bank lending dynamics and ownership structures in the banking 
systems for Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Carvalho (2014) 
investigates lending by government banks, as well as firms’ employment decisions. 
Dong et al. (2014) examines government ownership structures and risk 
management-related corporate governance for Chinese banks. 
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5.3 Hypothesis development 
H1: Bank lending is higher for politically connected banks than for those which are 
non-politically connected. 
Governments might require politically connected banks to ensure more lending so as to 
avert unemployment and social instability. For example, politically connected banks are 
able to maintain higher rates of loan growth to maintain or stimulate the economy 
during recessions. The government's role in financial markets is obviously significant in 
the market when there are credit supply shortages. In other words, politically connected 
banks may wish to achieve multiple goals, and have both political and economic 
objectives (Cull and Xu, 2005). State-owned or politically connected banks are likely to 
facilitate the financing of projects that private banks are unable or unwilling to finance, 
particularly issuing loans that could favorite society benefit. Indeed, politically 
connected banks would absorb negative shocks to lending growth in abnormal periods. 
Bertay et al. (2015) find that state-owned banks can play a useful role in stabilising 
credit over the business cycle, as well as during periods of financial instability, 
indicating that state banks expand their credit relatively more during crisis periods. Cull 
and Martinez Peria (2013) also find similar results. Additionally, government banks 
form a stabilising objective by increase their lending, and do not amplify financial 
shocks (Brei and Schclarek, 2013; Merilainen, 2016; Micco and Panizza, 2006; Onder 
and Ozyildirim, 2013). Such lending may be used as a complement to general monetary 
and fiscal policies. In particular, governments may use politically connected banks to 
smooth gross credit when private banks began to reduce their leverage (De Haas et al., 
2014).  
 
In addition, government bank credit growth is politically motivated, especially in an 
election year (Carvalho, 3014; Onder and Ozyildirim, 2013; Sapienza, 2004). The 
reasons for increased lending include enhancing re-election chances or avoiding 
political unrest. Dinc (2005) finds that heightened lending by government banks in 
election years appears to support political goals. Claessens et al. (2008) find that, after 
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each election, contributing companies substantially increased their bank financing 
relative to a politically connected group. In fact, election outcomes are relevant to 
politically connected banks’ activities as they have impacts on relevant regulation and 
monetary policies, and, in more extreme circumstance, the possible expropriation or 
nationalisation of banks.  
 
Alternatively, stakeholders might worry that higher-risk banks could fail, but they also 
appear to believe that banks with political connections can be relatively safe in event of 
crisis because of the higher possibility of government bailouts or the injection of 
additional capital. Dong et al. (2014) find that Chinese government-owned banks tend 
to take more risks than their counterparts because of the severe political interventions 
and weak incentives to follow prudent bank management practices. Indeed, politically 
connected banks are likely to accept riskier lending in an economic downturn because 
their objective is not only to maximise return for shareholders, but also to maintain 
credit growth by the supply of lending. Also, these banks may suffer relatively less 
deposit withdrawals in financial crises. Hence, the supply of funds is higher for 
politically connected banks compared with non-politically connected banks (Nys et al., 
2015). Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that banks cut their lending less if they 
have better access to deposit financing.  
 
Political connections can affect bank-lending channels by credit market competition. 
The economic environment affects the availability of alternative sources of finance for 
borrowing firms. Governments might encourage more financial institutions to enter the 
credit market, especially politically connected banks. In particular, banks in developing 
countries would be encouraged to undertake more lending activities and help increase 
competition in the banking sector. Thus, the competition in the bank credit market 
would become intensive, while more options for borrowers and the importance of risk 
management might have less focus, and lending decisions become less prudent. Jia 
(2009) show that lending by state-owned banks has been less prudent than lending by 
joint-equity banks. Kostovetsky (2015) find that politically connected financial 
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institutions have higher leverage and their stocks have higher volatility and beta. Indeed, 
government-controlled banks tend to take more risks than those controlled by 
state-owned enterprises or private investors (Akin et al., 2017; Dong et al., 2014; Zhu 
and Yang, 2016). Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that state-owned banks lend more to 
firms with politically connected directors.  
 
H2: Bank lending is lower for politically connected banks than for those which are 
non-politically connected. 
As per the findings of Cornett et al. (2010), banks with political connections are likely 
to be less profitable compared with privately-owned banks. The financial position of 
connected banks has come under stress; in particular their balance sheets have 
significant write-downs on assets, which leads to reductions in capital. As a 
consequence, these banks are more difficult to issue new shares to raise capital and meet 
regulatory requirements. Thus, a reduction in the supply of funding is a result of the 
bank’s high risk-taking (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). In other words, forgoing 
lending opportunities would be the optimal choice in order to reduce the risk of capital 
inadequacy. 
 
In addition, financial crises and other debt crises may cause negative financial shocks to 
lending growth. Procyclical lending behaviour could exacerbate the shocks in the 
financial system, making it more difficult for borrowers to continue relying on bank 
finance. The economic cycle is more pronounced for firms’ lending decisions that are 
considered sensitive to political influence. The impact of financial shocks is aggregated 
due to bank tendancies to reduce loan supplies after those shocks materialise 
(Merilainen, 2016). However, politically motivated lending is not only associated with 
stimulating economies in recession, but it is also linked to lower credit supplies in 
non-crisis periods. Therefore, governmentowned bank may tend to be linked with lower 
levels of lending. La Porta et al. (2002) find that government ownership of banks is 
related to lower subsequent economic growth. They argue that politicians use 
state-owned banks to further fulfill their political goals, rather create economic value. 
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Thus, the projects financed by government are likely to be inefficient and have negative 
effects on productivity and growth. Barth et al. (2014) suggest that 
government-ownership of banks does not retain independence, and is negatively 
correlated with favorable banking outcomes. The findings of Brei and Schclarek (2015) 
indicate that politically connected banks play a counter-cyclical role, while private 
banks play a more pro-cyclical role in banking systems. 
 
Third, Jackowicz et al. (2013) find that government-owned banks report significantly 
smaller amounts of lending during election years. The profitability of state-owned banks 
is reduced, in comparison with the profitability of privately-owned banks in emerging 
countries during election years. Lending corruption, as a widespread appearance, may 
reduce the banking system's efficiency in allocating scarce resources. Julio and Yook 
(2012) suggest that political uncertainty affects real economic outcomes, and firms may 
reduce investment expenditures until the electoral uncertainty is resolved.  
 
H3: Bank lending is not relative with politically connected banks. 
Moreover, change in the economic environment may impact the role played by political 
connections with regard to credit allocation. The bank credit literature has long held that 
the influence of external shocks is exacerbated because banks tend to adjust their loan 
supply as those shocks materialise. Better economic conditions would increase credit 
demand by households and firms. Micco and Panizza (2006) suggest that 
government-owned banks’ credit is less sensitive to business cycle fluctuations than 
private banks’.  
 
Governments are normally unlikely to allow an enterprise in which they hold a larger 
portion of ownership or are closely connected with to fail. An optimal bank lending 
decision leads to investment efficiency for borrowing firms, and the effect of political 
connection is determined by bank ownership structure. In addition, capital injections 
would play a role in maintain bank lending. 
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Clarke et al. (2012) find that banks with government ownership were not related to 
financial constraints for firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Additionally, 
Detragiache and Gupta (2006) illustrate that political connections do not explain the 
discrepancy in the profitability of Malaysian banks. 
 
 
5.4 Data and methodology 
I construct an unbalanced panel dataset to test the hypothesis by using both bank-level 
and macroeconomic data. The source for the bank-level variables is from Bankscope, a 
common-use database in the banking sector, provided by Bureau van Dijk. Bankscope 
consists of bank-level financial statements, including income statements, balance sheets 
and cash flow data. Annual panel data are used in the study, and the study period is from 
2005 to 2015. This chapter composes commercial, savings, mortgage, and long-term 
credit banks, and excludes centre banks, investment banks, securities houses, and 
nonbank institutions. I start my sample from 2005, because the first Chinese larger 
state-owned bank was listed in 2005, and collect a total of 849 firm-year observations. 
 
To track the politically connected information regarding ownership, my primary source 
is the information available in Bankscope. I complement this information with 
information from other sources, including banks’ annual reports, holding company 
websites and annual reports, and regulatory agency websites. Following Allen et al. 
(2017), I removed the outliers with respect to loan dynamics growth from the dataset. 
For example, banks with real loan growth rates of more than 300 per cent are excluded. 
I collect bank-specific information about total loan volumes and loan amounts by type 
of loan (corporate, consumer, and residential mortgages). I also gather information on 
bank size, capitalisation, liquidity and profitability. To avoid the impact of outliers, 
every continuous variable is being winsorized at the 2.5 top and bottom percentiles of 
their distributions. 
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Corporate political connections are well explored in the finance study. There are many 
channels to create a political connection. I develop the politics measure for this chapter 
by referring to previous literatures on the discipline and examining the institutional 
setting in emerging countries (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Faccio, 2006; Infante and 
Piazza, 2014; Nys et al., 2014). I manually collect directors’ employment histories in 
annual reports and identify the chairman and directors who have a connection with 
politics. Following a study in China from Chen et al. (2011), board members who fulfill 
any one of the following three criteria are defined as politically connected directors: (1) 
previous work in the government agency; (2) member of the People's Congress; and (3) 
member of the People's Political Consultative Conference. These criteria have some 
restrictions as connections may also be built through family members, business partners, 
shell entities or figureheads; but these would lead to a lower level of the degree of 
political connection as China is a relationship-based economy. Hence, political 
connections may be multidimensional. Following Infante and Piazza’s (2014) method, I 
reduce this bias by focusing only on directors becoming politicians.  
 
To identify which bank with political connections is important for this study, I introduce 
four measures for corporate political connections. The first political variable is whether 
the chairman or CEO has served as a current or former officer of the central or local 
government. This measure has been used in some previous studies, such as Chen et al. 
(2017) and Nys et al. (2014). The second political variable is the number of current or 
former government bureaucrats and politicians on the board. The third political variable 
is the percentage of the number of current or former government bureaucrats and 
politicians on the board. Lastly, the fourth political variable is the cumulative 
government shareholding from the top ten shareholders. Those four variables are 
supposed to capture the impact of political connection. 
 
Bank credit is measured by the amount that a bank is able to supply in terms of gross 
loans. Bank gross loans generally consist of retail lending, corporate, and consumer 
loans. 
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Our baseline empirical model to examine the impact of banks’ political connections on 
credit growth follows the equation: 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛴𝑘𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 15) 
where LOAN i,t is the natural logarithm of total gross loans (or corporate, or consumer 
loans) for bank i at time t. Loans are expressed in thousands of CNY. PC is the indicator 
variable for whether a bank is politically connected. CONTROL i,t, is a matrix of bank 
characteristics that can also impact loan growth, such as size, capital, liquidity, 
profitability, and funding structure.  
 
To examine the cyclicality of lending by politically connected banks, I specify a model 
where the dependent variable is the gross loan variable, and where the set of 
independent variables comprise the political connection, GDP growth rate, and an 
interaction of these two variables. 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶 𝑥 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛴𝑘𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (Equation 16) 
where GDP t is the GDP growth in year t, and its interaction with the political 
connection variables (PL × GDP growth rate) to test sthe relationship between bank 
credit and political connection in economic condition by the interaction variables, while 
the same set of control variables includes as Equation (15).  
 
Previous studies indicate (at least using US data) that specific characteristics of size, 
undercapitalisation, profitability and relatively illiquidity would affect economic 
outcome through the lending mechanism. Allen et al. (2017) find that bank-specific 
characteristics, such as deposit growth and profitability ratios, are significant 
determinants of lending growth during both normal economic times and crisis periods. 
Therefore, a number of time-invariant bank and country features might be correlated 
with the explanatory variables. 
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The size of banks has been accounted as an important determinant for bank lending. 
Large banks have more diversification revenue and richer resources, and thus can 
minimise the level of bad loans. Indeed, larger banks have relative advantages in 
providing wide range of products and services. Yet, small banks are also likely to 
distribute more credit to enhance or maintain their competitive advantage and build 
good relationship with borrowers. Thus, the expected coefficient of bank size is 
ambiguous. The logarithm of total assets is included to control for bank size, as per Cull 
and Martinez Peria (2013).  
 
Equity is the ratio of equity to total assets, to capture for bank soundness. Kim and Sohn 
(2017) suggest that bank capital exerts a significantly positive effect on lending when 
banks retain sufficient liquid assets. Indeed, limited capital would be a key element 
restricting banks’ ability to issue loans. Following previous studies, such as Ferri et al. 
(2014) and Cull and Martinez Peria (2013), bank capital is controlled to ensure that the 
outcomes are not driven by differences in the level of bank capital in the firm-level 
regression. Thus, the level of capital may play an ambiguous role with respect to bank 
lending.  
 
Deposit/loan ratio represents the liquidity risk. Banks with more deposits (and less on 
bond and money markets) tend to disburse more loans, as the liquidity risk is lower. In 
other words, banks that have relatively more liquid assets on their financial statements 
are able to shield their lending activities.  
 
Profitability is measured as the ratio of net profit after taxes to total assets. Banks with 
high profitability are likely to have more credit distribution, because profitability is 
connected to the quality and quantity of interest income.  
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Table 42: Definition of variables 
Variables Symbol Description  Sources 
Bank credit    
Gross loan LOAN The natural logarithm of total 
gross loan in thousands of CYN 
Bankscope 
Corporate loan CORP The natural logarithm of total 
corporate loans in thousands of 
CYN 
Manual collection 
Consumer loan CONS The natural logarithm of total 
consumer loans in thousands of 
CYN 
Manual collection 
Interest income  INTI The natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of 
CYN 
Bankscope 
    
Political connection     
Political dummy PCD 1 if the chairman or CEO is 
politically connected and 0 
otherwise 
Manual collection 
Politics board 
member 
PCB The number of board members has 
political connection 
Manual collection 
Politics percentage on 
board 
PCP The percentage of board members 
has political connection 
Manual collection 
Government 
ownership 
PCGO The percentage of government 
shareholding.  
Manual collection 
    
Control variables     
Capital ratio ETA The ratio of total equity to total 
asset 
Bankscope 
Bank size LNTA The natural logarithm of total 
assets in thousands of USD 
Bankscope 
Liquidity DEP The ratio of total deposits to total 
loans 
Bankscope 
Non-performing loan NPL Ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans 
Bankscope 
Return on assets  ROA Ratio of return on average assets Bankscope 
    
GDP growth  GDP Gross domestic product (GDP) 
change (in percentage points) 
World bank  
Inflation rate INF Inflation rate World bank  
Lending interest LINT One-year loan interest rate World bank  
    
 
Given the literature on political influences, several macroeconomic variables from the 
World Development Indicators database are used in this chapter. These variables 
represent the attractiveness of the spreading of bank credit. These are lending interest 
rate, and inflation rate measured as the percentage change in the GDP deflator. 
Economic conditions would affect banks’ lending activities through the quality of credit 
(Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009). Banks are likely to hold less reserves and make 
more credit during an economic boom. In addition, Tan and Floros (2013) report that 
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inflation and GDP growth rates have impacts on bank productivity in China. 
Furthermore, a one-year bank loan rate is included to control the effect of interest 
fluctuation on lending and changes in monetary policy. Banks can make more profit 
through lending when the interest rate spread is large. However, the coefficient is also 
negative as corporates and consumers are unwilling to borrow when there is a high 
interest rate. Lastly, following Dong et al. (2014) and Bertay et al. (2015), the crisis 
variable is a dummy variable indicating the financial crisis. Table (42) contains 
definitions of all the variables used in this chapter. 
 
Table (43) presents the descriptive statistics of the variables that are used in this chapter. 
For the sample, 76 per cent of banks have a connection with politics. On average, the 
number of political board members is five. 
 
Table 43: Descriptive statistics for main model variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
LOAN 814 15.54 1.80 12.60 20.57 
CORP 659 15.64 1.79 12.70 20.24 
CONS 659 13.88 2.31 8.76 19.42 
INTI 814 13.29 1.79 10.02 17.93 
PCD 814 0.76 0.42 0 1 
PCB 814 5.13 2.33 1 11 
PCP 814 0.39 0.15 0.07 0.73 
PCGO 814 0.08 0.17 0 1 
ETA 814 12.96 3.18 5.77 30.14 
LNTA 814 16.32 1.79 13.19 21.19 
DEP 814 60.76 10.64 28.34 78.45 
NPL 814 1.31 1.18 0.00 8.21 
ROA 814 1.14 0.43 0.05 2.39 
GDP 814 8.76 1.86 6.9 14.16 
INF 814 2.41 2.02 -0.70 5.86 
LINT 814 5.73 0.74 4.35 7.47 
Note: This table contains means, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values on the variables included in the main model. 
LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in thousands 
of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total interest income 
in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of board members 
with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of government 
shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. DEP is the 
ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on average assets. 
GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan interest rate. 
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The indicator of capital risk is the ratio of bank equity to total assets, and averages close 
to 13 per cent. Bank liquidity is captured by the ratio of deposit to total liability, and 
averages at 60 per cent. The average of profitability is 1.14 per cent. The average 
(median) NPL ratio is 1.31 per cent, with a large degree of variation across banks. This 
is comparable with the figure given by Dong et al. (2014). 
 
I employ three estimation methods for the panel regressions: general pool OLS, random 
effects, and a dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel estimator. A 
concern that influential banks may use their influence to obtain preferential lending and, 
meanwhile, attract former government officials or politicians as board members, 
increased (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Likewise, Claessens et al. (2008) documented that 
causality may go from higher firm value to larger campaign contributions (their measure 
of political connection), rather than the other way around. In addition, referring to some 
update studies (Allen et al., 2017; Bertay et al., 2015), two main tests are used to 
identify the appropriateness of the dynamic GMM estimations. First, the Hansen test of 
the over identifying restrictions is used to evaluate the over identifying for the set of 
instruments, and ensure the instruments used are valid; while the null hypothesis is that 
the instruments are appropriate. In addition, the Arellano Bond test is used for 
autocorrelation of the errors, whether there is no perceptible second-order serial 
correlation and is not subject to serial correlation of order, with a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation in differenced residuals. By first differencing the regressors, the fixed 
effects are removed because they are time-invariant.  
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Table 44: Correlations 
 LOAN CORP CONS INTI PCD PCB PCP 
LOAN 1.000       
CORP 0.9945* 1.000      
CONS 0.9328* 0.9045* 1.000     
INTI 0.9807* 0.9727* 0.9245* 1.000    
PCD 0.0817* 0.1233* 0.1217* 0.0893* 1.000   
PCB 0.4680* 0.4539* 0.4440* 0.4553* 0.3059* 1.000  
PCP 0.1961* 0.2035* 0.1992* 0.1955* 0.3328* 0.8437* 1.000 
PCGO -0.0554 -0.035 0.0152 -0.0679 -0.0238 -0.0831* -0.0382 
ETA -0.2480* -0.2944* -0.2966* -0.2208* 0.0098 -0.0671 -0.0347 
LNTA 0.9862* 0.9830* 0.9213* 0.9863* 0.0710* 0.4521* 0.1947* 
DEP 0.3381* 0.4058* 0.3754* 0.2583* -0.0019 0.1329* -0.0075 
NPL 0.0303 0.1762* 0.1795* -0.0115 0.0102 -0.0396 -0.0358 
ROA -0.1238* -0.1191* -0.0642 -0.0849* -0.0095 -0.0331 0.0169 
GDP -0.0417 0.0707 0.0203 -0.1368* 0.0593 0.1116* 0.0772* 
INF -0.0658 -0.0245 -0.0423 -0.0631 0.0606 0.0898* 0.0736* 
LINT -0.0702* -0.0351 -0.055 -0.0808* 0.0476 0.0996* 0.0802* 
 PCGO ETA LNTA DEP NPL ROA GDP 
PCGO 1.000       
ETA 0.0031 1.000      
LNTA -0.0599 -0.2204* 1.000     
DEP -0.0422 -0.1305* 0.2277* 1.000    
NPL 0.0894* -0.2916* 0.0093 0.0849* 1.000   
ROA 0.0594 0.2160* -0.1346* -0.0336 0.3412* 1.000  
GDP 0.0377 -0.1083* -0.0898* 0.1019* 0.3517* -0.1715* 1.000 
INF 0.0492 0.0552 -0.0791* 0.0121 0.0211 0.1283* 0.4732* 
LINT 0.042 0.0045 -0.0871* 0.0058 -0.0021 0.0926* 0.6079* 
 INF LINT      
INF 1.000       
LINT 0.6520* 1.000      
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans 
in thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of 
total interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the 
number of board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is 
the percentage of government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total 
assets in thousands of USD. DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. 
ROA is the ratio of return on average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the 
Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan interest rate. * indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
Table (44) reports the correlations between the main variables used in this study. The 
correlations between the measures of gross loan, corporate loan and consumer loan are 
quite high. 
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5.5 Empirical result 
Table (48) presents the regression of the analyses of the association between political 
connections and bank-lending behaviour. In the four columns of Table (45), I show the 
results of the baseline specification, as in Equation (15), without control variables. The 
coefficients for various political connections are significantly different from 0. The 
results consistently indicate that political connections generally ensure ceteris paribus –  
higher loans for connected banks. 
 
Table 45: The relationship between bank credit and political connection – OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
     
PCD 0.345***                
 (2.69)                
PCB  0.360***               
  (15.34)               
PCP   2.294***              
   (5.61)              
PCGO    -0.572 
    (-1.65)    
Constant 15.302*** 13.727*** 14.637*** 15.559*** 
 (145.98) (119.98) (96.46) (240.49) 
     
Observation 814 814 814 814 
F test 7.212 235.273 31.441 2.711 
R 0.007 0.219 0.038 0.003 
     
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on 
average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan 
interest rate. 
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Table 46: The relationship between bank credit and political connection – OLS with control 
variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
     
PCD 0.035**    
 (2.35)    
PCB  0.006**               
  (1.98)               
PCP   0.115***              
   (3.14)              
PCGO    0.050*   
    (1.69) 
ETA -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 (-3.49) (-3.50) (-3.48) (-3.57)    
LNTA 0.960*** 0.957*** 0.958*** 0.961*** 
 (144.41) (150.45) (144.93) (147.72) 
DEP 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (22.90) (22.47) (22.76) (22.37) 
NPL 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 
 (5.35) (5.41) (5.39) (5.09) 
ROA 0.086*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.078*** 
 (4.10) (4.04) (3.98) (3.66) 
INF -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.87) (-0.82) (-0.83) (-0.68)    
LINT 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (3.04) (2.84) (2.95) (3.00) 
Constant -1.605*** -1.550*** -1.597*** -1.582*** 
 (-12.54) (-12.11) (-12.22) (-12.20)    
     
Observation 814 814 814 814 
F test 6658.865 6459.638 6256.295 6604.588 
R 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 
     
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on 
average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan 
interest rate. 
 
In Table (46), when more independent variables are included in the regressions of gross 
loan variables, there is a significant rise in the coefficients of the bank’s political 
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connection variable. This indicates that, to some extent, the other independent variables 
complement the effect of political influence on bank lending and the change in lending 
pattern of the banks. Hence, the findings provide further evidence for the political view 
of public banks and corroborate previous studies by Dinc¸ (2005), Sapienza (2004), and 
Khwaja and Mian (2005). Sapienza (2004) finds that politically connected firms had 
better access to state-owned bank lending. As a consequence, in contrast to Cull and 
Martinez Peria (2013), I find some evidence for the claim that politically connected 
banks engage with relatively more lending. Additionally, De Haas et al. (2014) reports 
some weak evidence that politically connected banks reduce less credit supply than their 
counterparts in CEE emerging countries. 
 
There are several explanations for these results. First, the credit might be used to finance 
socially beneficial infrastructure, as these banks could be a policy choice to comply with 
certain economic or political goals. It is reasonably claimed that politically connected 
banks support the investment of projects that other banks are unwilling to finance, 
especially projects that could facilitate local economic development. In other words, 
lending by politically connected banks is associated with government-induced 
investment distortions.  
 
In addition, governments are likely to implement expansionary fiscal policies on 
upcoming elections to enhance re-election prospects. Sapienza (2004) suggests that 
government-owned banks are affected by the electoral results of the related party. In 
addition, higher loan growth applied to connected banks could be lent to their cronies 
and political use from state-owned bank loans. Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that 
Pakistan state-owned banks tend to lend more to companies with politically connected 
directors. 
 
Moreover, Brei and Schclarek (2013) suggest that governments can play an active 
counter-cyclical role in their banking systems directly through government-owned 
banks. The state-owned banks would increase their lending in the credit market in crisis 
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periods (Onder and Ozyildirim, 2013). The evidence shows that government 
intervention is another type of friction that drives bank credit decisions in an emerging 
market. Additionally, politically connected banks could suffer less deposit withdrawals 
than non-connected banks, because the public might expect those banks to be safer 
given that they are government related. 
 
The results with respect to the control variables are similar to the other studies in 
previous literature. For example, capital ratio has a negative coefficient and is 
statistically significant in the regressions for most specifications. This indicates that 
better-capitalised banks decrease their lending; this contrasts with the findings of Dinc 
(2005). In other words, sufficient of bank capital would be a factor limiting banks’ 
ability to issue credit. The bank size variable Total Assets has a positive but statistically 
significant coefficient in the regressions for the whole sample. Larger banks dedicate a 
significantly greater proportion of lending to enterprises compared with smaller banks. 
Indeed, larger banks have comprehensive branches and subsidiaries around the world, 
and the amount and variety of business they engage with are relatively greater than 
smaller banks. Therefore, larger banks have the ability and advantage to distribute more 
lending from economies of scale and scope. The results are consistent with the findings 
of Ferri et al. (2014) and Cull and Martinez Peria (2013). Furthermore, profitability 
appears to be an important variable in explaining bank credit allocation, while banks 
with greater profitability are likely to distribute more lending.  
 
The national macroeconomic factors do not have very marked influences on credit 
patterns. Better economic conditions increase financial lending demands by households 
and firms. Allen et al. (2017) find that inflation is negative with bank lending. However, 
inflation rate is not significant in any of four regressions. Lending interest rate also 
seems to be a very good explanatory regressor, being significant in most of the 
specifications at the one per cent level. This suggests that a higher one-year loan interest 
rate can induce banks to lend more. The result is consistent with the findings of Jia 
(2009) and Ferri et al. (2014).  
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Overall, the results stand by Hypothesis (1) that the supply of credit is higher for 
politically connected banks. Governance considerations appear to have direct 
consequences through their influence on the financial institution to allocate credit.  
 
Table 47: The relationship between bank corporate loan and political connection – OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable CORP CORP CORP CORP 
     
PCD 0.513***    
 (3.21)    
PCB  0.341***   
  (13.17)   
PCP   2.346***  
   (5.33)  
PCGO    -0.365 
    (-0.90) 
Constant 15.260*** 13.816*** 14.678*** 15.624*** 
 (109.89) (90.73) (78.54) (208.94) 
     
Observation 659 659 659 659 
F test 10.334 173.353 28.38 0.813 
R 0.015 0.206 0.041 0.001 
     
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on 
average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan 
interest rate. 
 
In what follows, I discuss results from regressions, replacing the total gross loans with 
the corporate and consumer loans. Tables (47) and (48) report results of regressions for 
the corporate loans as dependent variables. Again, a positive and significant coefficient 
on political connected bank is obtained for most models, regardless of being 
economically negligible. 
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Table 48: The relationship between bank consumers loan and political connection – OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable CONS CONS CONS CONS 
     
PCD 0.650***                
 (3.17)                
PCB  0.429***               
  (12.81)               
PCP   2.956***              
   (5.21)              
PCGO    0.204 
    (0.39) 
Constant 13.413*** 11.601*** 12.685*** 13.818*** 
 (75.11) (58.91) (52.67) (142.93) 
     
Observation 659 659 659 659 
F test 10.058 164.014 27.134 0.152 
R 0.015 0.197 0.040 0.001 
     
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on 
average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan 
interest rate. 
 
After including the control variables in Tables (49) and (50), the results of the regression 
analysis are in line with the univariate evidence in Tables (47) and (48). Based on the 
result of regressions with corporate and consumer loans as the dependent variable, I can 
conclude that previous evidence of gross loan growth was not driven by aggregation 
bias across different loan categories. There is little prior evidence about how particular 
characteristics of bank financial statements would affect loan growth across different 
types of loans (corporate and consumer loans). I expect that the empirical models will 
reveal patterns for the financial statement variables, making it easier to interpret why 
some banks are likely to change lending behaviours for certain types of loans. From the 
result of the analysis, banks with high capital ratios and ceteris paribus were able to lend 
less to consumers. In addition, I find that banks with higher profitability ratios lend 
more to corporates and consumers. 
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Table 49: The relationship between bank corporate loan and political connection – OLS with 
control variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable CORP CORP CORP CORP 
     
PCD -0.013    
 (-0.56)    
PCB  0.007*   
  (1.68)   
PCP   0.071  
   (1.09)  
PCGO    -0.088 
    (-1.54) 
ETA -0.006* -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (-1.95) (-2.02) (-2.04) (-2.19) 
LNTA 0.947*** 0.942*** 0.945*** 0.946*** 
 (157.33) (143.58) (152.79) (157.34) 
DEP 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (20.68) (20.59) (20.65) (20.29) 
NPL 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.061*** 
 (4.86) (4.90) (4.81) (4.66) 
ROA 0.073*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.071*** 
 (2.89) (2.99) (2.93) (2.76) 
INF -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.19) (-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.15) 
LINT 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 
 (3.30) (3.16) (3.33) (3.38) 
Constant -1.783*** -1.736*** -1.795*** -1.752*** 
 (-11.12) (-10.59) (-11.13) (-10.87) 
     
Observation 659 659 659 659 
F test 4079.191 4075.774 3974.007 4023.029 
R 0.981 0.981 0.98 0.98 
     
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on 
average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan 
interest rate. 
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Table 50: The relationship between bank consumers loan and political connection – OLS with 
control variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable CONS CONS CONS CONS 
     
PCD 0.032    
 (0.42)    
PCB  0.039**               
  (2.52)               
PCP   0.25              
   (1.13)              
PCGO    0.427**  
    (2.19) 
ETA -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.027**  
 (-2.86) (-2.99) (-2.85) (-2.44)    
LNTA 1.140*** 1.118*** 1.135*** 1.144*** 
 (55.87) (50.40) (54.02) (55.93) 
DEP 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (6.49) (6.39) (6.50) (6.66) 
NPL 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 0.174*** 
 (3.73) (3.75) (3.70) (3.89) 
ROA 0.416*** 0.429*** 0.415*** 0.433*** 
 (4.84) (4.99) (4.79) (4.97) 
INF -0.015 -0.017 -0.015 -0.017 
 (-0.67) (-0.77) (-0.69) (-0.78)    
LINT 0.033 0.019 0.029 0.027 
 (0.53) (0.31) (0.46) (0.43) 
Constant -6.843*** -6.553*** -6.821*** -7.025*** 
 (-12.59) (-11.84) (-12.46) (-12.81)    
     
Observation 659 659 659 659 
F test 521.277 525.124 504.772 514.059 
R 0.865 0.866 0.862 0.864 
     
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on 
average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan 
interest rate. 
 
I also examine the cyclicality of lending by politically connected banks relative to 
nonpolitically connected banks. To do this, I specify a regression where the dependent 
variable is the gross loan variable, and where the set of independent variables include 
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the growth rate of GDP, the political connection variable, and the interaction of these 
two variables. The coefficient on the growth rate of GDP implies the cyclicality of 
lending by politically connected banks, while the sum of this coefficient and the 
coefficient on the interaction of GDP growth and the political connection variable 
measures the cyclicality of lending by those banks. The result indicate that higher GDP 
rate leads to bank distributing more lending. In the last two specifications of Table (49), 
the GDP growth rate enters with positive coefficients that are significant at the one per 
cent level, suggesting that lending by banks is pro-cyclical. The estimated coefficients 
vary from 0.029 to 0.032, indicating that a one per cent increase in GDP growth is 
associated with 2.9–3.2 per cent increase in lending. A reasonable explanation is that 
lending increases because it is correlated with the nominal value of the project or 
investment under management (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009). To a certain extent, 
this relationship might be more descriptive than causal because firms in high growth 
economic environments would like to borrow more to improve their operations. 
 
The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant in most specifications, 
suggesting that banks with political connections are likely to distribute more credit in 
better economic conditions. This result indicates that political considerations 
systematically affect the channels of financial markets’ allocation of scarce resources. 
Indeed, governance considerations seem to have direct impact through their influence 
on the allocation of credit. Lending, by these banks, might be politically motivated, as 
they provide financing on non-commercial terms to economically underdeveloped 
provinces to improve economic development. The results contrast with the findings of 
Bertay et al. (2015), who find that credit growth is less pro-cyclical for state banks in 
countries with good governance. 
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Table 51: The relationship between bank credit and political connection dummy– OLS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
      
PCD x GDP 0.028* 0.006*** 0.026*** 0.004* (-0.001) 
 (1.86) (3.56) (4.76) (1.92) (-0.04)    
PCD   0.190***  0.035 
   (3.80)  (0.44) 
GDP    0.029*** 0.032*** 
    (5.25) (3.62) 
ETA  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (-3.98) (-4.01) (-3.91) (-3.89)    
LNTA  0.960*** 0.961*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 
  (228.84) (230.06) (231.19) (231.05) 
DEP  0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  (29.35) (28.96) (29.04) (29.02) 
NPL  0.045*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
  (6.28) (5.31) (4.44) (4.42) 
ROA  0.090*** 0.101*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 
  (5.06) (5.65) (6.00) (5.98) 
INF  -0.005 -0.007 -0.008* -0.008*   
  (-1.10) (-1.52) (-1.83) (-1.83)    
LINT  0.027** 0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
  (2.12) (0.57) (-0.58) (-0.59)    
Constant 15.375*** -1.575*** -1.458*** -1.633*** -1.661*** 
 (128.56) (-13.62) (-12.27) (-14.28) (-12.72)    
      
Observation 814 814 814 814 814 
F test 3.471 7989.197 7220.684 7337.165 6596.873 
R 0.004 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.988 
      
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on average 
assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan interest 
rate. 
 
Tables (52), (53) and (54) all report the results of the GDP interaction variable and three 
alternative variables of political connections in the OLS estimation. Consistent with 
previous results, all alternative political connections are found to increase bank loan 
significantly in most specifications. In addition, the coefficients of GDP growth are 
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generally positive, and magnitudes and statistical significance are greater for most 
specifications. In line with the expectation that agency problems may amplify the effect 
of political connections, connected banks receive a relatively higher degree of autonomy 
from the government and are characterised by low accountability to stakeholders. 
Moreover, they might fill the credit gap during distress periods. The results suggest that 
the financing decisions made by banks are influenced by regulatory constraints, and that 
these banks may be trying to maximise broader social objectives. 
 
Table 52: The relationship between bank credit and political connection board – OLS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
      
PCB x GDP 0.028*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.000 
 (12.09) (3.59) (5.11) (1.04) (0.14) 
PCB   0.033***  0.002 
   (3.97)  (0.11) 
GDP    0.030*** 0.031*** 
    (4.97) (2.96) 
ETA  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (-4.04) (-4.20) (-3.89) (-3.85)    
LNTA  0.954*** 0.959*** 0.961*** 0.961*** 
  (209.40) (206.16) (204.58) (204.45) 
DEP  0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  (29.05) (29.14) (28.86) (28.77) 
NPL  0.045*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
  (6.24) (5.00) (4.49) (4.49) 
ROA  0.092*** 0.101*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 
  (5.09) (5.61) (5.97) (5.97) 
INF  -0.005 -0.006 -0.008* -0.008*   
  (-1.08) (-1.34) (-1.73) (-1.74)    
LINT  0.021 0.003 -0.009 -0.009 
  (1.64) (0.19) (-0.65) (-0.66)    
Constant 14.284*** -1.459*** -1.377*** -1.600*** -1.607*** 
 (118.02) (-11.98) (-11.25) (-12.98) (-11.11)    
      
Observation 814 814 814 814 814 
F test 146.232 7928.144 7177.826 7256.725 6523.06 
R 0.15 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.988 
      
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
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thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total interest 
income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of board 
members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on average 
assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan interest 
rate. 
 
Table 53: The relationship between bank credit and political connection board percentage – OLS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
      
PCP x GDP 0.158*** 0.020*** 0.060*** 0.010** 0.002 
 (4.17) (4.29) (5.18) (1.98) (0.10) 
PCP   0.436***  0.073 
   (3.75)  (0.33) 
GDP    0.027*** 0.030*** 
    (4.64) (2.71) 
ETA  -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (-3.95) (-4.10) (-3.91) (-3.86)    
LNTA  0.958*** 0.960*** 0.961*** 0.961*** 
  (223.53) (223.39) (223.27) (223.11) 
DEP  0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  (29.38) (29.03) (28.90) (28.88) 
NPL  0.044*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
  (6.09) (4.85) (4.48) (4.49) 
ROA  0.091*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 
  (5.03) (5.58) (5.88) (5.89) 
INF  -0.005 -0.007 -0.008* -0.008*   
  (-1.12) (-1.46) (-1.74) (-1.76)    
LINT  0.021 0.002 -0.008 -0.008 
  (1.65) (0.15) (-0.57) (-0.58)    
Constant 14.987*** -1.538*** -1.410*** -1.609*** -1.639*** 
 (103.55) (-13.16) (-11.67) (-13.82) (-11.16)    
      
Observation 814 814 814 814 814 
F test 17.407 7783.025 7032.354 7096.735 6379.995 
R 0.021 0.987 0.987 0.988 0.988 
      
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total interest 
income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of board members 
with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of government 
shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. DEP is the ratio 
of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on average assets. GDP is the 
gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan interest rate. 
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Table 54: The relationship between bank credit and political connection government ownership – 
OLS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
      
PCGO x GDP 0.073** 0.006* 0.007 0.004 0.026*   
 (2.03) (1.83) (0.50) (1.30) (1.87)    
PCGO   -0.009  0.280**  
   (-0.07)  (2.08) 
GDP    0.032*** 0.034*** 
    (6.62) (6.78) 
ETA  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
  (-3.56) (-3.55) (-3.75) (-3.80)    
LNTA  0.961*** 0.961*** 0.964*** 0.964*** 
  (147.75) (147.37) (147.04) (146.83) 
DEP  0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  (22.38) (22.30) (21.83) (21.88) 
NPL  0.044*** 0.044*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
  (5.06) (5.09) (3.85) (3.92) 
ROA  0.079*** 0.079*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 
  (3.69) (3.65) (4.70) (4.62) 
INF  -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 
  (-0.69) (-0.69) (-1.57) (-1.59)    
LINT  0.032*** 0.032*** -0.009 -0.008 
  (2.92) (2.86) (-0.70) (-0.64)    
Constant 15.565*** -1.579*** -1.579*** -1.626*** -1.647*** 
 (243.14) (-12.18) (-12.18) (-12.49) (-12.59)    
      
Observation 814 814 814 814 814 
F test 4.127 6608.099 5867.103 6105.507 5521.216 
R 0.004 0.987 0.987 0.988 0.988 
      
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total interest 
income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of board members 
with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of government 
shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. DEP is the ratio 
of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on average assets. GDP is the 
gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan interest rate. 
 
Note that the specifications include bank fixed effects, which control for all the 
time-independent differences between politically connected banks and non-politically 
connected banks; thus the differences related to lending channels with regards to 
operating efficiencies are unlikely to be due to the general differences between private 
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firms and government-connected firms. Compared with OLS and the fixed effect 
estimator, the random effects estimator has an advantage as the tool for inference of 
static panel models. Table (55) presents the results for the determinants of bank lending 
using the random effect estimator. The results of regression still are consistent with 
previous findings, which point to a positive and significant effect of political 
connections on bank credit. 
 
Table 55: The relationship between bank credit and political connection – Random effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
     
PCD 0.023    
 (1.18)    
PCB  0.008*               
  (1.94)               
PCP   0.115*              
   (1.94)              
PCGO    0.077 
    (1.64) 
ETA -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006**  
 (-2.65) (-2.66) (-2.62) (-2.51)    
LNTA 0.921*** 0.918*** 0.921*** 0.924*** 
 (142.05) (134.43) (140.49) (142.48) 
DEP 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (21.46) (21.41) (21.42) (21.37) 
NPL 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 
 (2.88) (2.77) (2.81) (2.66) 
ROA 0.03 0.031 0.03 0.027 
 (1.51) (1.53) (1.49) (1.34) 
INF -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
 (-1.30) (-1.35) (-1.30) (-1.18)    
LINT 0.019* 0.017* 0.018* 0.019*   
 (1.93) (1.68) (1.80) (1.85) 
Constant -0.637*** -0.588*** -0.654*** -0.666*** 
 (-4.38) (-3.99) (-4.48) (-4.57)    
     
Observation 814 814 814 814 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-within 0.935 0.935 0.935 0.936 
     
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
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thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on 
average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan 
interest rate. 
 
 
5.6 Robustness  
Table 56: The relationship between alternative bank credit and political connection - OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
     
PCD 0.374**                
 (2.54)                
PCB  0.344***               
  (14.48)               
PCP   2.262***              
   (5.60)              
PCGO    -0.701*   
    (-1.92)    
Constant 13.011*** 11.529*** 12.380*** 13.310*** 
 (101.48) (85.59) (73.00) (194.26) 
     
Observation 792 792 792 792 
F test 6.474 209.696 31.405 3.674 
R 0.008 0.207 0.038 0.005 
     
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on 
average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan 
interest rate. 
 
This section presents the robustness checks to validate the finding of increased lending 
in politically connected banks. First, I use the amount of interest income in the natural 
logarithm to replace the gross loan growth. Again, I specify a regression where the 
dependent variable is the interest income variable, and where the set of independent 
variables includes political connections, bank characteristics and macroeconomic 
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variables. On the whole, I obtain similar results with regard to the impact of the 
variables of interest on the allocation of resources (political connection variables). The 
results still provide strong evidence about political influences on credit in the emerging 
market. For example, the coefficient on political connection is positive and significant 
in all specifications. 
 
Table 57: The relationship between bank credit and political connection – sub sample  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
     
PCD 0.029**    
 (1.97)    
PCB  0.005               
  (1.55)               
PCP   0.098**              
   (2.50)              
PCGO    0.017 
    (0.72) 
ETA -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (-4.19) (-4.15) (-4.05) (-4.24)    
LNTA 0.900*** 0.897*** 0.899*** 0.901*** 
 (66.53) (67.69) (65.73) (67.04) 
DEP 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (23.14) (22.62) (22.99) (22.59) 
NPL 0.025** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.024**  
 (2.54) (2.62) (2.66) (2.42) 
ROA 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.053**  
 (2.67) (2.65) (2.65) (2.27) 
INF -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 
 (-1.20) (-1.15) (-1.16) (-0.94)    
LINT 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.015 
 (1.35) (1.17) (1.20) (1.18) 
Constant -0.438* -0.377 -0.431 -0.408 
 (-1.69) (-1.44) (-1.61) (-1.56)    
     
Observation 662 662 662 662 
F test 1496.851 1470.03 1461.434 1573.301 
R 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.962 
     
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
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government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on 
average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan 
interest rate. 
 
Second, results for split samples are reported in Table (57). The coefficient for 
politically connected banks is still positive for the unlisted banks, corroborating that 
borrowers have been more sensitive to political connections since the bank started 
listing on the stock exchange. The positive coefficient found on politically connected 
bank credit still supports the development view explanation of government ownership 
of banks in developing countries. 
 
Third, although the global financial crisis triggered in 2008 did not affect East Asia as 
rapidly as in other areas, following Nys et al. (2015) and Onder and Ozyildirim (2013), 
I run the estimations by deleting the observations of the year 2008 to ensure that the 
results are not driven, to some extent, by loss of investor confidence in the financial 
system. The results remain unchanged and show that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between gross lending growth and political connection. In addition, most of 
the coefficients for the bank-level characteristics are significant at the five per cent level. 
The findings presented in this section provide clear support for the argument that 
preferential influence is related to the political connection in itself, and not to other 
economic elements involved with the connection (such as an enhancement in the bank's 
profitability). 
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Table 58: The relationship between bank credit and political connection – without year 2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
     
PCD 0.031**    
 (2.03)    
PCB  0.005*               
  (1.78)               
PCP   0.108***              
   (2.83)              
PCGO    0.057*   
    (1.81) 
ETA -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (-3.44) (-3.43) (-3.38) (-3.53)    
LNTA 0.959*** 0.957*** 0.958*** 0.961*** 
 (130.66) (136.42) (131.2) (133.49) 
DEP 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (22.05) (21.66) (21.93) (21.66) 
NPL 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 
 (5.00) (5.08) (5.07) (4.72) 
ROA 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.099*** 0.091*** 
 (4.59) (4.61) (4.54) (4.14) 
INF -0.018** -0.017** -0.018** -0.017**  
 (-2.22) (-2.18) (-2.21) (-2.10)    
LINT 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 
 (3.81) (3.72) (3.82) (3.78) 
Constant -1.758*** -1.708*** -1.755*** -1.737*** 
 (-11.06) (-10.88) (-10.89) (-10.81)    
     
Observation 761 761 761 761 
F test 6779.718 6658.212 6448.126 6734.645 
R 0.987 0.987 0.987 0.987 
     
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on 
average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan 
interest rate. 
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Table 59: The relationship between bank credit and political connection – GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable LOAN LOAN LOAN LOAN 
     
Lag. LOAN 0.571*** 0.573*** 0.570*** 0.583*** 
 (27.04) (29.14) (28.04) (28.30) 
PCD 0.024***                
 (3.80)                
PCB  0.005**               
  (2.52)               
PCP   0.080***              
   (3.28)              
PCGO    0.026 
    (0.85) 
ETA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (-0.84) (-0.98) (-0.86) (0.70) 
LNTA 0.403*** 0.398*** 0.403*** 0.392*** 
 (19.82) (20.79) (20.48) (19.89) 
DEP 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (11.38) (11.94) (12.01) (11.25) 
NPL 0.004 0.004 0.005* -0.001 
 (1.26) (1.22) (1.71) (-0.30)    
ROA -0.007 -0.016 -0.014 -0.036*** 
 (-0.52) (-1.16) (-1.05) (-2.77)    
INF -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-8.90) (-8.17) (-8.23) (-7.13)    
LINT 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (13.45) (12.4) (14.12) (11.60) 
Constant -0.405*** -0.338*** -0.401*** -0.395*** 
 (-5.74) (-4.90) (-5.69) (-5.93)    
     
Observation 761 761 761 761 
F test 42107.18 43018.38 38129.36 37535.25 
AR 1 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.018 
AR 2 0.185 0.185 0.183 0.178 
Hansen test 0.183 0.194 0.156 0.181 
     
Note: LOAN is the natural logarithm of total gross loan in thousands of CYN. CORP is the natural logarithm of total corporate loans in 
thousands of CYN. CONS is the natural logarithm of total consumer loans in thousands of CYN. INTI is the natural logarithm of total 
interest income in thousands of CYN. PCD is 1 if the chairman or CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. PCB is the number of 
board members with political connections. PCP is the percentage of board members with political connections. PCGO is the percentage of 
government shareholdings. ETA is the ratio of total equity to total asset. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of USD. 
DEP is the ratio of total deposits to total loans. NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. ROA is the ratio of return on 
average assets. GDP is the gross domestic product (GDP) change (in percentage points). INF is the Inflation rate. LINT is the one-year loan 
interest rate. 
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Fourth, the GMM system estimation is used as one of the robustness checks. Past 
shocks to bank lending may directly influence the contemporaneous political connection 
and there is a risk that the results may be inconsistent. Additionally, the results may also 
be due to reverse causality problems. For example, banks with more lending may attract 
politicians as board members and also use the influence of these members to distribute 
more credit. Given these issues, a more convincing estimation method would be 
included to control for all time-invariant attributes.  
 
Again, positive and significant coefficients are observed in the relationship between of 
gross loans and the politics-connected variable. In addition, the regressions pass the AR 
(2) and Hansen OIR specification tests, suggesting the validity of the instrumentation. 
The GMM estimation results are reported in Table (59) with two diagnostics: the 
Hansen test does not reject the over identification conditions for instrument variables, 
and the Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation find no second order serial correlation. 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Banks generally supply a considerable portion of firm financing and play a vital role in 
economic development. A stable and efficient banking sector can be a huge source of 
benefit to governments, and bank failures can get politicians, as well as the entire 
economy, into ‘hot water’. Politically connected banks are likely to utilise the 
relationship to attract government subsidies, such as sources of finance, government 
guarantees and bad debts resolutions. Loan portfolio managers of main Chinese banks 
may select to follow the ‘herd’ of bankers in the region and invest heavily in high-profit 
but high-risk property industry. 
 
Identifying the heart of bank lending behaviour with regard to political influence is 
valuable. Governments do not only impose maximum social and political objectives, but 
also offer implicit guarantees against failure. Given these conflicting views of influence 
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and the predominant role of bank credit behavior, this chapter empirically investigates 
the lending responses of political impacts on the bank sector. The findings of this 
chapter should be decoded with caution, as are other finance-growth literatures that 
analyse the connection between lending growth and financial services provided by 
governments. 
 
The findings indicate that politically connected banks distribute more credit than 
non-politically connected banks. This evidence tests for robustness by controlling for 
country macroeconomic elements, as well as bank-specific factors. Results shows a 
significant interaction between the effect of banks’ political connections and GDP 
growth on credit supply. This effect suggests that political connection and lending 
exhibit a complicated relationship rather than a linear relationship, which has been the 
focus in the literature. 
 
This chapter is related to studies that explore the reasons why various bank ownership 
types (state, domestic private, and foreign banks) may differ in terms of credit behaviour. 
This chapter, nonetheless, contributes some new, tentative, empirical evidence on a 
range of current policy issues and theoretical debates. The methodology applied is 
relatively straightforward and can be replicated in other avenues to examine the role of 
politics in banking. In addition, the results indicate that the omission of the politic 
element as an independent variable may explain why previous studies from China have 
been, to a certain extent, inconclusive.  
 
This chapter indicates some interesting directions for further research. First, my dataset 
consists of Chinese banks, which allows me to consider the impact of the institutional 
environment in which these banks operate. China’s financial sector has experienced 
fundamental and extensive changes since the early 2000s. However, the Chinese market 
is a relatively weak institution, where investors are not well protected. This poses the 
research question of what the value of political connection is in markets with very 
strong institutions, and requires more research to better understand whether political 
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connections are driving the differences. Second, collecting deposits is an important and 
essential activity for banks. The role banks’ political connections play, not only in 
lending channels but also in attracting deposits, reflects how politics affect depositor 
behaviour. Last, there would be various possible reasons for the differences in 
politically connected bank behaviour in developing markets and developed markets. 
Therefore, the relationship between bank lending and political influence could be 
analysed together with bank financial statement items (i.e. profitability, liquidity, and 
capitalisation) in a simultaneous equation structure (such as a panel VAR) in order to 
better capture the differences among markets. Therefore, analysing the combination of 
these mechanisms is a promising scope for future studies. 
 
My chapter is subject to some limitations. First, the literature on government-owned 
banks and private banks in times of recession suggests that government-owned banks 
are less risk averse during crisis periods (Bertay et al., 2015; Brei and Schclarek, 2015). 
However, China’s banking industry has been comparatively immune from financial 
crises due to strict government controls and political orientation, which relatively isolate 
the domestic financial sector from the developments in the global financial system. I am 
silent on this case. Such concerns are not taken into concern in this chapter and so are 
not addressed here. Second, industry distribution of loans (e.g. financial or 
manufacturing sectors) is not included in this study because the full data on these loans 
are limited and unreliable. Banks should be encouraged to report the allocation of loans 
in more detail in their annual reports. Moreover, the chapter would provide more 
convincing evidence if the information of political connection can be broken down into 
centre and local government and their differing political goals. It is important to 
understand why bank credit distribution differs across politicians throughout the country. 
However, analysing such a research questions go beyond the scope of this chapter 
because of data limitation at the regional level. Furthermore, investigating the impact of 
political influence on bank credit distribution is a challenging task due to the potential 
endogeneity between politics and firm investment, as the lending downturn itself has 
arguably generated a great deal of political uncertainty (Julio and Yook, 2012). 
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These results may provide several important policy implications that go beyond 
economic development and financial stability. First, the empirical results may be useful 
for the Chinese government and banking regulatory authority to make relevant policies 
on ownership reform. The supervisory authorities should be aware that the combinations 
of different types of ownership, in conjunction with the circumstances and economic 
situation, would result in differentiated lending outcomes. Privatisation may be more 
beneficial to society, as opposed to the direct subsidies of state-owned institutions in the 
purely commercial parts of the financial markets. However, we should be aware that the 
findings do not suggest that full privatisation of banks will eliminate political rent 
seeking. Second, the findings have important implications for the causes and 
consequences of banking regulations. The results in this chapter seem to support the 
argument that regulatory banking authorities should be independent from political 
influence for the effectiveness of the financial system.  
 
Concurrently, the role that political influence plays in the financial system and in the 
emerging markets has come to attract more attention. The focus of this chapter is 
whether or not politically connected banks carry a higher supply of credit. The results 
imply that financial integration is more of a double-edged sword than previously 
thought. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The defining principle of general corporate governance is a typical term of the contract 
between shareholders and the firm, with the duty of managers and directors to maximise 
firm value for shareholders. The separation of shareholder ownership and management 
control is the major problem of modern corporate governance. As a result, agency 
problems occur when shareholders’ lack the necessary power or information to monitor 
and control managers. Research on corporate governance has devoted tremendous effort 
to focusing on some internal mechanisms, such as board structure, managerial 
compensation, ownership structure, institutional investors, and foreign investors, 
specifically. However, external mechanisms of corporate governance also can influence 
firm value. Additionally, internal and external corporate governance mechanisms can 
interact as either complements or substitutes (Ferreira et al., 2011), which would affect 
firm value simultaneously. Thus, it is desirable to look at a universe of governance 
mechanisms in its entirety. Therefore, this study extends the relevant literature in three 
major areas: corporate governance, financial market microstructure, and bank stability. 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to study empirically the impact of various 
governance mechanisms on bank stability, in terms of capital strategy, risk taking and 
performance. Although it is well recognised that corporate governance can affect bank 
value, in this thesis, I combine the external and internal corporate governances by 
considering the board composition, ownership structure and trading behaviours on stock 
market. The understanding of different governance mechanisms drivers facilitates the 
identification of key vulnerabilities of the banking sector. 
 
In Chapter 2, I apply the model to the annual panel data for publicly traded bank 
holding companies in three stock markets over a sample period from 2006 to 2015. 
Using fixed effect, I find a significantly positive relationship between market discipline 
from informed trading and bank capital structure. In addition, I use the Stochastic 
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Frontier Approach (SFA) to measure bank performance in terms of profit inefficiency. I 
examine the relation between bank performance and market discipline mechanisms by 
regressing bank inefficiency on measures of governance and control variables. The 
results suggest that market discipline is a more effective avenue to enhance bank capital 
when banks perform efficiently. Robust tests based on instrumental variables and 
dynamic GMM show evidence of a causal link between market discipline and bank 
capital structure. The results have certain policy implications for understanding the role 
of stock markets in affecting bank operations, which in turn, could improve bank 
prudency and assist the design of an enhanced regulation framework. An important 
premise of corporate finance theory is that markets discipline managers to maximise all 
stockholders’ wealth. 
 
In Chapter 3, following Hass et al. (2014), my internal governance measure includes 
seven attributes, which are: the number of independent board members board size, 
executive ownership, Big 4 audit firm, foreign ownership, CEO duality, and 
relationships among the top ten shareholders. After analysing a majority regional banks 
over the period from 2006 to 2015, I find that banks with strong corporate governance 
are associated with higher risk-taking. More specifically, banks with intermediate sized 
boards, separation between CEO and the chairman of board, and that are audited by one 
of the Big Four audit firms, are likely to take high risks. The findings in Chapter 3 offer  
encouraging directions for further research and notable insights for policy makers. From 
an academic point of view, researchers aiming to embed a banking sector in a 
macroeconomic model with financial frictions should adequately control for bank 
risk-taking. I show in a regional context that macroeconomic conditions affect bank risk 
dynamics. In addition, bank stress tests, of a general nature, in the banking system in 
China (macro-tests) typically undertake a scenario analysis where the impact of specific 
determinants on a bank’s financial conditions are assessed. Finally, the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator is used to control correlation and possible 
endogeneity problems for the regression. Our results hold after addressing endogeneity 
and using these tests. 
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In Chapter 4, I examine how different types of ownership structure in a country’s 
banking system affect bank performance. Specifically, I use both return on assets and 
return on equity accounting-based measures to examine performance differences 
between the privately-owned and state-owned shareholding banks in an emerging 
market from 2006 through 2015. I find that banks with high government and SOE 
ownership are generally operated less profitably, and suggest that state-owned banks 
finance the government to a greater degree. This result can be explained by Shleifer and 
Vishny’s (1997) corporate governance theory on state ownership of firms and 
contestable market perspectives of banking policy mistakes. In addition, foreign 
ownership is negatively associated with bank performance. Foreign shareholders might 
stand in a minority position, making it more conflicting, and ultimately reducing bank 
performance. Furthermore, more ownership type diversity is associated with better 
performance.  
 
In Chapter 5, I examine corporate political connections that are widespread across the 
world among financial firms, particularly in countries with inefficient legal frameworks. 
Governments set up agencies to regulate and govern bank activities via chartering 
restrictions, authorisation and licensing. In addition, governments may set up practices 
to monitor bank operation and risk-taking. Moreover, governments may provide 
insurance to bank depositors and lenders with last or even only resort. Obviously, the 
governments play a significant and active role in the banking sector. 
 
Differences in bank credit preference are not only a result of differences in financial 
statements, but also of differences in the models of business, which are closely related 
to corporate governance. It is reasonable that banks relying on a relationship-based 
approach to lending may be willing to increase loans to borrowers with whom they tend 
to have stable relationships. I examine the impact of banks’ political connections to the 
supply of funds by estimating the supply functions of loans, and by using simultaneous 
estimations panel data techniques. 
210 
 
 
The prior literature examining controls on bank lending behaviour has considered 
information of corporate governance in general, while largely ignoring political 
connection specifically. The present chapter demonstrates that the role of political 
connections should be considered in analysing the effects of bank behaviour on lending. 
Given the growing literature on the importance of bank scarce resource allocation and 
ownership reform, we examine whether banks (in important developing countries) with 
political connections are associated with their lending decisions. The findings enhance 
the understanding of bank political connections in general, and in emerging markets in 
particular. 
 
This thesis provides important contributions to the knowledge of corporate governance 
and provides a strong foundation on which future researchers can build. Future avenues 
of research can benefit by examining performance in the banking industry across 
different governance mechanisms. Firstly, from a policy perspective, my results of 
Chapter 2, based on the simple capital ratio, might be helpful in analysing and 
fine-tuning the Basel III agreement. In general, Basel II and Basel III follow a 
one-size-fits-all-countries approach. However, I show that stock trading characteristics 
affect bank capital structure adjustments and hence a conditional policy may be more 
desirable. Effective public monitoring and supervision positively affect the level of bank 
capital. Secondly, as found in Chapter 3, governance improvements have a role to play 
in bank risk variation; thus, this role must be considered against the backdrop of the 
existing systematic factors in the banking system. The distinct differences found in the 
risk attributes of capital, profitability and size across developed and developing 
financial markets should be considered when implementing a regulatory system. The 
key challenge for future research is to understand if, and under what conditions, the 
potential benefits of the development governance regulation can effectively monitor the 
managers and directors to maximize shareholders’ values and protect shareholders' 
rights. 
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